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The Debt
By Paul Laurence Dunbar (1872–1906)
This is the debt I pay
Just for one riotous day,
Years of regret and grief,
Sorrow without relief.
Pay it I will to the end –
Until the grave, my friend,
Gives me a true release –
Gives me the clasp of peace.
Slight was the thing I bought,
Small was the debt I thought,
Poor was the loan at best –
God! but the interest!
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“Debt” is a seemingly universal and constant aspect of human 
experience and history. However, the social practices and economic 
structures that are involved need to be understood through the 
global interconnections that give form to its historical instantiations 
as well as its contemporary manifestations. This is the compelling 
claim of Tim Di Muzio and Richard H. Robbin’s book Debt as 
Power and, as such, fits perfectly into the Theory for a Global Age 
series that seeks to take “global interconnections” as the basis from 
which to rethink both conceptual frameworks and commonly held 
understandings.
In Debt as Power, Di Muzio and Robbins present a historical 
account of the modern origins of capitalist debt by looking at how 
commercial money is produced as debt in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. They expertly demonstrate their key 
contention—that debt is a technology of power—and identify the 
ways in which the control, production, and distribution of money, 
as interest-bearing debt, are used to discipline populations. Their 
sharp analysis brings together histories of the development of the 
Bank of England and the establishment of permanent national debt 
with the intensification and expansion of debt, as a “technology of 
power”, under colonialism in a global context. The latter part of the 
book addresses the consequences of modern regimes of debt and puts 
forward proposals of what needs to be done, politically, to reverse 
the problems generated by debt-based economies. The final chapter 
presents a convincing case for the 99% to use the power of debt to 
challenge present inequalities and outlines a platform for action 
suggesting possible alternatives.
This ambitious book is both a diagnosis of our current social and 
economic global condition structured by the debt–credit nexus and 
a clarion call to action. Action is necessary if we are to overturn the 
Series Editor’s Foreword
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manifold miseries associated with debt and bring about a more equal 
distribution, not only of wealth, but also of societal well-being. It 
is possible, as Di Muzio and Robbins forcefully argue, that the very 
survival of humanity depends on it.
Gurminder K Bhambra
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1Toward a Stark Utopia
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a 
stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of 
time without annihilating the human and natural substance of 
society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed 
his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took 
measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired 
the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and 
thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma 
which forced the development of the market system into a definite 
groove and finally disrupted the social organization based upon it. 
(Polanyi 1944: 3–4)
On November 20, 2003, in the rural countryside of India, Nagalinga 
Reddy, a farmer of rice and sunflowers, committed suicide. At fity 
years of age, Reddy took his life by ingesting ammonium phosphate 
tablets—a pesticide used in modernized farming. His rice crops 
had just failed due to pests and he was deeply in debt to usurious 
moneylenders, three banks, and a cooperative. He was harassed 
regularly by his creditors, and he finally put an end to their tyranny 
by taking his life.1 But Reddy’s suicide was no isolated incident. Since 
1995, there has been what can only be described as an epidemic 
of farmer suicides in India. The Hindu reports that from 1995 to 
2010, 256,913 farmers have taken their lives—the vast majority by 
ingesting the very same pesticide swallowed by Reddy.2 According to 
the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and P. Sainath, who 
has covered the epidemic in India, the common link between these 
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suicides is punishing personal indebtedness to local moneylenders 
and/or microfinance institutions (2011: 1; Deshpande and Arora 
2010; Young 2010; Taylor 2012). But the epidemic has another 
contributing factor: the neoliberal reforms introduced in India 
in 1991. To regain the confidence of creditors in its burgeoning 
budget and trade deficit as well as mounting national debt, the 
Indian government accepted neoliberal reforms in exchange for a 
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Chossudovsky 
2002: 149ff; McCartney in Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005: 238).3 
To ensure debt service to rich creditors, economic reforms hit 
many agricultural communities particularly hard. Many farmers 
experienced mounting costs for energy and basic inputs like fertilizer. 
These goods were once subsidized by the government, but with the 
turn to neoliberal austerity in the 1990s, farming was increasingly 
financed through the personal debt of farmers and their families. This 
politico-agricultural transformation has led to land dispossession, the 
concentration of land in fewer hands, and widespread farmer suicides 
(Mohanty 2005; Levien 2011; 2012; 2013).
In the rural countryside of Thailand, we find another story of 
humanity in the global age. Nok is a woman raised in rural Thailand 
and a seemingly willful participant in her own trafficking to Japan. 
According to her own account, her father was deeply in debt to credit 
and agricultural cooperatives because the money the family made from 
rice farming was insufficient to repay the interest, let alone the principal. 
In this predicament, Nok’s older sister had agreed to be trafficked to 
Japan in return for paying a debt of 3.5 million yen (about $34,000) 
to her traffickers. She worked in the sex industry and eventually paid 
down her debt, enabling her to send more money back home. Nok 
soon followed in her sister’s footsteps and used the same trafficker to 
become a sex worker in Japan (Aoyama 2009: 85ff). Like the farmer 
suicides of India, this is no isolated incident. Countless Thai women 
have been trafficked not only to Japan and surrounding region but also 
to brothels in their home country. The practice typically begins when 
a family is encouraged to sell their daughter to a broker who promises 
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to get them cash work in the city. The transaction is too oten made 
so that the family can use the money to overcome economic hardship 
(e.g., to repay mortgages on rice fields) and even acquire some of the 
trappings of modernity (e.g., television and electrical appliances).4 This 
begins what can only be called a debt trap:
The contractual arrangement between the broker and parents requires 
that this money be repaid by the daughter’s labor before she is free 
to leave or is allowed to send money home. Sometimes the money is 
treated as a loan to the parents, the girl being both the collateral and 
the means of repayment. In such cases the exorbitant interest charged 
on the loan means there is little chance that a girl’s sexual slavery will 
ever repay the debt. (Bales 2012: 41).
As Jefferies notes, this practice is not isolated to Thailand: “trafficking 
in women and girls into debt bondage is becoming the main method 
of supply for national and international sex industries. It is worth $31 
billion yearly according to UN estimates” (2009: 152).
The dismal epidemic of farmer suicides and sex trafficking have 
also corresponded with a rise in organ trafficking. Medical research 
and modern technology have made organ transplants more routine, 
potentially elongating and improving the lives of a lucky few who 
have access to donors and capable surgeons. But this medical advance 
also has a dark side. Poverty, debt, and desperation have helped fuel 
a growing international trade in human organs. The trade is oten 
illicit but appears to be happening with increasing frequency among 
vulnerable populations (Scheper-Hughes 2000; Territo and Matteson 
2011; Decker 2014). In rural Bangladesh, what Moniruzzaman (2012) 
calls a “body bazzar” has emerged to take advantage of mounting debt 
levels due to the microcredit revolution and the financialization of 
the countryside. Microcredit is the extension of small non-collateral-
backed loans. The loans are made with the belief that the poor will 
use this money to become entrepreneurial and eventually better 
their economic and social conditions. While this revolution has 
been celebrated by many for liting poor women and men out of 
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poverty, it has also been heavily criticized for capitalizing the most 
vulnerable and creating mini-debt traps that can spiral out of control. 
For example, with the introduction of credit into rural Bangladesh, 
many Bangladeshis who have taken loans are finding it difficult to 
repay their creditors. Some, such as Mohammad Akhta Alam, were 
in debt to more than one nongovernmental organization specializing 
in microcredit. The more wealthy and educated take advantage of 
desperate debtors, who are mostly illiterate and uneducated, and 
convince them to sell one of their kidneys, liver lobes, or corneas. 
When Alam could not repay his debt, an organ broker persuaded him 
to sell one of his kidneys. In desperation, Alam accepted the offer 
and is now partially paralyzed and blind in one eye. He can no longer 
do any heavy liting. What makes matters worse is the money Alam 
was promised was never paid in full—he received only a fraction of 
the total promised to him. In his own words, Alam says, “I agreed 
to sell my kidney because I couldn’t return the money to the NGOs. 
As we are poor and helpless, that is why we are bound to do this. 
I regret it.”5 Alam’s experience is not unique. As Moniruzzaman’s 
(2012) ethnography reveals, this type of “bio-violence” is increasingly 
common in Bangladesh. Although it is not always the case that people 
commodify their bodily organs for money to service their debts 
(some just do it for the extra money), debt has been a primary driver 
of the trade as identified in at least Brazil, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, 
Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Israel, Egypt, Serbia, Philippines, Vietnam, 
Mexico, South Africa, the United States, and China.
In a world of increasing commodification, education itself has 
become a commodity increasingly capitalized by investors. Nowhere 
is this more true than in the United States, where students now 
collectively owe $1.2 trillion to the US government and myriad banks 
and private lenders. The average student debt is $30,000, with some 
students finishing their education with debt as large as $150,000. Some 
will be able to service their debts and eventually repay them when they 
find decent employment. Many others, however, will have difficulty 
finding jobs with decent pay and hence struggle to service their 
interest-bearing loans throughout their lives. With few exceptions, 
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student loans can never be discharged through bankruptcy and many 
may go to their graves still in hock for pursuing an education. In fact, 
crushing debt burdens have already influenced some to take their own 
lives and many more have daily thoughts of suicide.6 Others suffer from 
acute stress, anxiety, and depression. For its part, the US government 
is doing precious little, largely because of bipartisan bickering and the 
influence of the banking lobby on Congress. With 40 million students 
leaving college with debt, the United States is looking more and more 
like a debtocracy than a democracy.7
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–8 was in reality a global 
debt crisis. Many nations are still affected, but the case of Greece is 
particularly stark for its social dislocations and violence. Kouvelakis 
(2011) has argued that the debt crisis in Greece must be understood 
within the historical trajectory of Greece’s development that emerged 
ater the dictatorship (1967–74). From 1981, successive administrations 
built up a social welfare state with a large public sector and generous 
entitlements such as jobs for life and generous pensions. The 
government also bought considerable military hardware from abroad 
and financed the 2004 Olympics construction. To pay for these projects, 
government elites borrowed from foreign creditors while many wealthy 
citizens underreported their income for tax purposes or evaded taxes 
altogether. From 1981 to 2007, the national debt ballooned from 
roughly 27 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to 105 percent 
by the time of the crisis. In 2014 that figure stands at 153 percent 
of GDP. Eventually, this debt became unsustainable and forced Greece 
into the hands of the EU–ECB–IMF, commonly known as the troika. 
The overall assessment was that the population was living beyond its 
means, and in order to receive new loans to service the old ones, the 
government would have to enact severe cuts to its social spending. 
Public sector salaries and pensions were slashed and public assets sold 
off to raise funds to repay creditors—a pattern, as we shall see, that 
has been recurrent in previous national debt crises. Not surprisingly, 
political upheaval and social unrest soon followed as the population 
turned its anger toward elite corruption, kleptocracy, and foreigners. 
Multiple reasons have been given for the debt crisis, from corruption 
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and tax evasion to a bloated public sector (Manolopoulos 2011). But 
one thing is certain: debt has led to a generalized politics of austerity 
with the most vulnerable suffering the most, as the Greek tragedy 
continues to unfold.
• • •
What unites these seemingly discrete moments of crisis and hardship 
that cut across both geographical space and historical time? Despite 
circumstantial differences, they are all social acts or practices that can 
be traced to the prevalence of debt. The world is awash in debt, and 
though we should recognize that debt levels and access to credit are 
radically unequal within and between countries, the commonality of 
all modern political economies is not so much that they are market 
oriented but that they are all debt-based political economies. Indeed, 
as Rowbotham noted, “the world can be considered a single debt-
based economy” (1998: 159). To take an international perspective, 
according to the global management consulting firm McKinsey and 
Co., as of the second quarter of 2014 the total outstanding debt across 
183 countries was $199 trillion.8 In 1990, the same figure was only $45 
trillion or a 342 percent increase over the period (McKinsey 2013). As 
identified in Table 1.1, since 2000 all categories of debt have increased 
considerably with government debt, financial industry debt, and 
household debt leading the categories.
Table 1.1 Total global debt by category
Type of debt 2000 (4Q) 
Dollar 
 (trillion)
2007 (4Q) 
Dollar 
 (trillion)
2014 (2Q) 
Dollar 
(trillion)
Percent 
increase (%) 
since 2000
Government bonds 22 33 58 163
Financial bonds 20 37 45 125
Corporate bonds 26 38 56 46
Household 20 33 40 100
Total debt as a 
% of GDP
246 269 286 16
Source: McKinsey (2015: 15).
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But the concept and prevalence of debt in capitalist modernity 
needs to be critically theorized. Our starting point, and primary 
argument, is that debt within capitalist modernity is a social 
technology of power and its continued deployment heralds a stark 
utopia. Our claim is not that debt can be thought of as a technology of 
power but rather that debt is a technology of power. By technology, 
we simply mean a skill, art, or manner of doing something connected 
to a form of rationality or logic and mobilized by definite social 
forces. In capitalism, the prevailing logic is the logic of differential 
accumulation, and given that debt instruments far outweigh equity 
instruments, we can safely claim that interest-bearing debt is the 
primary way in which economic inequality is generated as more 
money is redistributed to creditors. In other words, debt instruments 
effectively divide society into debtors and creditors within a power 
structure that vastly privileges the latter over the former. However, 
we know this is a bold claim to make, but we hope by the end of this 
book, the reader will be convinced of our argument and inspired to 
learn more and take political action.
A brief review of debt scholarship
The literature on debt cuts across the social sciences and is relatively vast. 
For this reason we cannot hope to offer a comprehensive review of the 
literature. However, as it currently stands, the literature can be divided 
into major groupings that address different, albeit, interrelated concerns: 
(1) the origin of the national debt (Omond 1870; Denby 1916; Hamilton 
1947); (2) debt within and throughout history (Geisst 2013; Graeber 
2013; Kwarteng 2014); (3) the debt crises of the 1980s in the Global South 
(Payer 1974; George 1988; 1992; Griffith-Jones 1989); (4) the current 
sovereign debt crises of the Global North (Pettifor 2006; Chorafas 2011; 
Lane 2012; Greer 2014); (5) odious debt (Bonilla 2011; Manolopoulos 
2011; Ndikumana and Boyce 2011); and (6) country-specific debt crises 
and struggles to find alternatives (Rowbotham 1998; Lin 2003; Brown 
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2007; 2013; Bonner and Wiggin 2009; Dienst 2011; Soederberg 2012; 
2013a; 2013b; Jackson and Dyson 2013; Pettifor 2014 ).
For the most part, these are all valuable contributions to our 
knowledge. However, our study seeks to cut across these boundaries to 
provide a more foundational, historically sensitive, and comprehensive 
theorization of debt as an interconnected global phenomenon. In this 
light, our book is unique for two main reasons.
First, rather than focus on the historical emergence of debt as a 
moral obligation, country-specific debt, or periodic financial crises 
related to debt, we are interested in the production of commercial 
money as debt under capitalism. We argue that under capitalism, debt 
is a technology of power, intimately connected with the control, creation, 
and allocation of modern money, the requirement for perpetual growth, 
and the differential capitalization that benefits what has recently, and 
aptly, been called “the 1%”—particularly the owners of money-creating 
instruments (Di Muzio 2014). Thus, what we are interested in is how 
the control, production, and allocation of money as interest-bearing 
debt gets capitalized by private social forces and what this means for 
the majority of people on the planet. This is incredibly important since 
ater oil and gas, banking is the most heavily capitalized sector on the 
planet, with the largest banks by market capitalization valued at $4.4 
trillion dollars (Di Muzio 2012).9 The owners or investors of these 
banks capitalize the banking sector’s power to create money as interest-
bearing debt—the major source of the banking sector’s profits. This is 
highly troublesome but not just for systemic risk and future financial 
crises, as the IMF has pointed out.10 When we consider the question of 
differential power, it is worrisome because of the following:
(1) We know that only a small minority of individuals and families 
own the majority of shares in publically listed banks and that this 
ownership is largely hidden from public scrutiny.11
(2) We know that the banking sector is highly interconnected with 
banks owning shares in each other as well as other corporations 
(Vitali et al. 2011).
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(3) The ability to create money as interest-bearing debt out of nothing 
is an incredible power that funnels money upward to the owners 
and executives of banks as they collect interest and fees on needed 
credit.
(4) Given that loans are contingent on creditworthiness and past 
wealth accumulation, there is always a hierarchy of access to 
money with the already rich having far easier access to credit and 
thus far more advantages to accumulate wealth.
(5) Democracy is held at ransom by the banks insofar as our elected 
governments have tacitly agreed to let private individuals and 
families capitalize the supply of money required for economic 
interdependence in a market economy. We historicize and 
elaborate on each of these points in the ensuing chapters.
The second reason this book is unique is that we follow Ingham (2004) 
and others (see e.g., Piketty 2014: 573ff) in recognizing that the ossified 
disciplinary boundaries that originated with the Methodenstreit are 
largely unhelpful if we want to understand the social relations of 
capitalism. For this reason, we approach our study with what we call 
an “interconnected historical holism.” What we mean by this term 
is a mode of historical inquiry that begins with the recognition that 
the histories of human communities and their natural environments 
are interconnected in complex spatial and hierarchical relations of 
power. We suggest that to understand their development we need to 
examine not only the particularities of a given human community and 
their cultural practices but more importantly their interconnected, 
interdependent, and international dimensions (Bhambra 2007; 2010). 
Since all modern economies are debt economies, this leads us to a 
more holistic account of debt as a technology of power within capitalist 
modernity. Since debt under capitalism is increasingly ubiquitous at all 
levels of society and economic growth (and austerity) is now virtually 
the sole mantra of dominant political parties around the world, we 
argue that tracing some of the major inflections in the evolution and 
effects of debt as a technology of power is crucial for understanding 
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the “present as history” and for suggesting possible alternatives to 
our current trajectory. But as Mann reminds us, “ubiquity, however, 
is not uniformity” (2003: 3). The hierarchy, meaning, and culture of 
indebtedness is not static, but a fluid continuum within and between 
political communities.
It is not our intent to do a review of the extensive literature, much 
of it recent, on debt and its impact. However, two highly publicized 
works relate directly to our work, one, David Graeber’s Debt: A 5000 
Year History, explicitly addressing debt, and the other, Thomas Piketty’s 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, implicitly addressing it and the 
distribution and creation of power over social reproduction (Bakker 
and Gill 2003). Given the magnitude and timeliness of both Graeber’s 
book on debt and Piketty’s on capital, it is important to show how our 
work is distinct from theirs and how they both inform our arguments.
Graeber’s starting point seems to be how social obligations eventually 
turn into pecuniary debts that are quantifiable. From this point he 
stumbles upon power and argues that debts are typically enforced and 
facilitated by violence or the threat of punishment and that a market 
economy is largely the result of war, conquest, and slavery (2013: 385). 
But Graeber does not sufficiently theorize the power underpinnings of 
debt in a society governed by markets and the price system—power is 
not his starting point, but a supporting actor in a much larger 5,000-year 
historico-anthropology of debt.12 Unlike Graeber, our starting point is 
the presence of power as a differential social relation, and we theorize 
debt not just as money owed but as a technology of differential power 
over others rooted in private ownership. So whereas Graeber muses that 
“what makes debt different is that it is premised on an assumption of 
equality,” we argue the exact opposite: the very foundation of modern 
capitalist debt is premised upon inequality or “differential power”—
our preferred term (2011: 86). This point leads us to consider, to our 
knowledge for the first time in this light, not just the private control 
over the production and allocation of money but its very ownership 
and capitalization.13 It is only from this starting point, we reason, that 
we can begin to think about debt within capitalist modernity in its 
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interconnected and international dimensions. This is the second point 
of difference our work has with Graeber’s erudite and impressive study: 
we do not offer a sweeping history of debt across millennia but have 
the far more modest goal of trying to understand the role of debt as a 
technology of power in the emergence and development of capitalist 
modernity. Of course, we recognize with Ingham’s sympathetic critique 
of Graeber’s work that “a long developmental sequence” was certainly 
involved in producing current levels and practices of debt (2013: 135). 
But while retracing millennia of human history may be intellectually 
stimulating, we reason with Polanyi ([1944] 1957) that capitalism was 
such a decisive break with previous forms of human economy that it 
warrants closer scrutiny than Graeber’s study permitted.14 A third point 
of departure from Graeber’s work is that in historicizing the emergence 
of capitalism we postulate an energy–debt–money nexus, whereby the 
expansion of the money supply through the creation of interest-bearing 
loans is assisted (not determined) by the surplus energy of fossil fuels 
(oil, coal, and natural gas).15 In other words, countries that have high 
levels of total final energy consumption will also be economies with large 
money supplies and mounting levels of debt. We find this empirically 
verifiable, and as such, our observations have important implications 
for the future of the global economy. A fourth distinction of this work 
is that we recognize the ecological dimension to our present debt-
monetary order. The ecological dimension can be stated thus: the 
creation of money as interest-bearing debt is the motive force triggering 
the need for economic growth and an automatic progression in the 
destruction, despoliation, and commodification of the natural world of 
limited and finite resources. A final difference with our work from that 
of Graeber is that we offer solutions to the problems discussed in the 
book. Not knowing exactly how to proceed with his research findings, 
Graeber more or less throws his hands up in the air at the end of his 
study.16 Strangely, there is no proposed solution to some of the key 
problems he identifies other than praising the nonindustrious poor 
(2013: 390).17 Our analysis, however, not only differs from Graeber’s 
in the ways identified above but also offers feasible solutions that can 
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be debated by activists and policymakers alike, and a strategy through 
which these reforms can be implemented.
Piketty’s much-publicized work derives largely from over 200 years 
of data on wealth distribution, compiled by him and his associates, 
that shows that wealth and income inequality, high in the nineteenth 
century, fell in the mid-twentieth century, but has risen again and, 
according to Piketty, will continue to rise throughout the twenty-first 
century absent any measures to prevent it. Capital purports to explain 
the reasons for this wealth trajectory, and, implicitly the distribution 
and accumulation of power.
The key to his work relates to the relationship between the rate 
of return on capital (r) in an economy and its rate of economic 
growth (g). When the rate of return on capital, that is, financial 
return in the form of profits, dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and 
other incomes from capital, exceeds the rate of growth, that is, the 
national income, capitalism will automatically generate “arbitrary and 
unsustainable inequalities” that violate the meritocratic values at the 
foundation of democratic societies (Piketty 2014: 1). He represents 
this relationship as r > g. For example, in 1910 the income of the top 
10 percent of the income distribution constituted some 45–50 percent 
of the national income, declined to under 35 percent in 1970, but 
rose again to 50 percent in 2007, declining slightly since then as a 
consequence of the 2007/2008 recession. Thus, since 1980, the top 
10 percent of the income distribution appropriated three-quarters 
of income growth, the richest 1 percent received 60 percent, while 
the bottom 90 percent received less than 0.5 percent a year (Piketty 
2014: 297). The same picture is true regarding wealth distribution. 
The top 10 percent, which owned between 60 and 80 percent of the 
wealth in the early nineteenth century, had its share of national wealth 
reduced to around 60 percent in the mid-twentieth century but now 
holds between 60 and 70 percent. In essence, Piketty demonstrates that 
the portion of national income that is owed to capital, that is, the return 
of profits, dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and so on, inexorably 
increases and presently claims some 30 percent of national income.
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There are a number of reasons why wealth and income distribution 
converged in the mid-twentieth century according to Piketty, but 
according to him the major factors were the two world wars and the 
Great Depression, which not only destroyed capital but also prompted 
governments to formulate economic policies that increased labor’s 
share of the national income. Absent these shocks to capital and the 
subsequent reversal of government policies regarding public spending, 
wealth and income inequality have again diverged, creating the 
inequalities we see today.
Piketty’s arguments are, obviously, more complex and require 
consideration of such things as the role of inherited wealth in the 
economy and the role of the rise of what he calls “super-managers” 
and their outsized salaries, and we will be addressing some of Piketty’s 
findings throughout this book, but at this point it is useful to highlight 
aspects of his work that relate most directly to ours.
While Piketty does not address debt, per se (there is no index entry), 
the book is every bit as much about debt as is Graeber’s. Simply put, for 
the economic books to balance, for every capital investment, that is, for 
every expected return on capital, whether it be in the form of a loan, 
rent, a stock purchase, a business investment, and so on, there must be 
a corresponding debt and someone or something that will generate the 
return. This has a number of important implications.
First, it essentially divides society into net creditors and net debtors. 
The difference between these two analytical categories is that some—
the net creditors—receive more income from capital than they pay 
out, while others—the net debtors—pay out more in interest than 
they receive. By recognizing this division between net creditors and 
net debtors (as opposed to simply viewing it abstractly as “capital” or 
“return on capital”), we get a better sense of the extent to which the 
vast majority of the population must generate financial returns for a 
small minority.
The second major point to extract from Piketty’s work is the fact that 
while capital has a present existence it is always future oriented, since the 
returns on capital are contingent on meeting present profit expectations 
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in the future. In other words, the great unknown is whether returns on 
capital can be realized. Recall that the total global debt in 2014 was 
$199 trillion; while we don’t know exactly the expected return on that 
debt, nor the time period in which it must be paid, we do know that if 
future economic growth is insufficient, there can be dire consequences. 
Regardless, the future owes a debt to the present; capital has a claim 
on the future (or, as Piketty puts it, “the past devours the future”) and 
the size of that claim obviously makes a big difference. Regardless, 
if, as Piketty shows, historical precedent is any indicator, capital will 
exercise a greater and greater claim on future income, and the question 
is whether economic growth will be sufficient to meet that claim, and, 
if not, where will capital attempt to realize or seize its expected return?
And this takes us to a third major point of Piketty’s work: growth, he 
predicts, will slow and approach the historical average of 1.5–2 percent, 
while expected return on capital will remain at its historic average of 
4–6 percent. Piketty doesn’t explain, as we will try to do, why growth 
will slow, recognizing only that the growth rates of emerging economies 
will slow to that of rich countries, a phenomenon that economists refer 
to as “convergence”; but economists do recognize that the wealthier a 
country becomes, the more difficult increasing the rate of growth will 
be. But this fact has enormous import given the present and growing 
claim of capital, that is, creditors, on national income. So, what are the 
main factors inhibiting growth and the ability of the future to repay the 
past or debtors to repay creditors? We’ll mention only two here.
First, economic growth is exponential, such that an economy 
growing at a 3 percent rate must essentially double every twenty-three 
years. Thus, if the global economy grew at 3 percent a year, by 2100, as 
we will see, it would approach a quadrillion dollars. We will examine 
this limitation on growth in more detail in Chapter 4.
Second, economic growth is largely dependent on fossil fuel energy 
and this type of energy is a nonrenewable resource that is likely to 
increase in cost throughout the twenty-first century. In fact, our 
economy is essentially based on the transformation of energy (largely 
from fossil fuels but other sources as well) into money, and either a 
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decline in the availability of energy or an increase in its cost will 
substantially hinder continued growth. In other words, our societies 
monetize energy flows and stores. While Piketty basically ignores the 
role of energy in the economy, as does Graeber, it may be no accident 
that the historical period of convergence of income corresponds to the 
period of plentiful and affordable oil.
If, then, the rate of growth slows, but capital investments, and 
consequently its inverse—debt—grows, how can capital’s share of the 
national income be honored and defaults, bankruptcies, and financial 
chaos avoided? This is where the full consequences of debt as a 
technology of power can be appreciated.
If more and more income is owed to capital, which is almost all 
in private hands, and if the power of capital and debt supersedes all 
others, then capital’s claim on future income will trump all other 
claims, regardless of moral or humanitarian consequences, a point 
that Graeber emphasizes. As we have seen in the past thirty years, 
and more recently during the economic contraction of 2007/2008, 
the claims of capital or creditors were the first honored, even if that 
required taxpayer bailouts, or the taking of money from other public 
resources (e.g., education health and welfare) or from labor’s share of 
the national income. Quantitative easing is also a way in which the 
central banks in the capitalist core have tried to re-inflate the capital 
markets.
Unlike Graeber, who offers no solution, Piketty is far bolder. 
According to him, the only way we can avoid the problem is through 
a global tax on wealth. This, he says, will lower the claim of capital on 
national wealth and provide funds to minimize the damage. Such a 
utopian solution, he says, can only be accomplished through banking 
laws that make wealth holdings transparent. A number of countries, 
including Italy, Spain, and Sweden, have attempted this. The problem, 
as Italy discovered, is that without international laws, capital will simply 
flee to friendlier havens to escape the tax. The difficulty, of course, is 
persuading governments to consider such measures and examine 
whether this is the only solution, an issue we will return to in Chapter 5.
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Arguments and structure
As a technology of differential social power, debt is intertwined with 
local and global social struggles with interconnected and international 
implications for the future of the global economy. This book makes a 
series of interrelated arguments around this general claim. First, debt, 
and its inverse credit, can be theorized as a major technology of power 
known by its effects on social relations and environmental change. 
The main purpose of debt has not been so much to enable debtors; 
instead it has been, more importantly, to disable them from engaging 
in certain practices that would find them outside the orbit of the world 
market of differential accumulation. Capitalist debt helps to produce 
market-based subjects (Mahmud 2012: 469). Second, as the institution 
of exclusive private property advanced by violence and legal sanction, 
debt was mobilized in a more systematic and intensified manner by 
those in the control of credit in order to shape and reshape the terrain 
of social reproduction for the sake of the symbolic accumulation of 
power represented in money. Third, there is a transition to the modern, 
organized control of credit/debt with the birth of the national debt 
and the extension and amplification of state bureaucracy, taxation, 
standing armies, and over time, the private capitalization of banking or 
money creation. Fourth, by the twentieth century, credit/debt largely 
becomes depersonalized and corporatized so that a small number of 
investors have come to capitalize evermore aspects of human endeavor 
and natural resources through their ownership of banks and financial 
instruments. Fith, the present magnitude and globalization of debt 
would not have been possible without the exploitation of abundant, 
affordable, and accessible fossil fuels. In other words, the exploitation 
of a surplus energy source permitted some of humanity to delink 
themselves from the austerity of organic economies with lower 
surpluses. However, as fossil fuel energy becomes evermore expensive 
in the twenty-first century, we are likely to experience more intensive 
debt crises at all levels of society and across political boundaries, as 
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more of people’s disposable income is transferred to those in control of 
the energy that they require to socially reproduce their lifestyles. Sixth, 
modern money, created largely as interest-bearing debt, spurs the need 
for economic growth, with drastic social, cultural, and environmental 
consequences that are leading to evermore social dislocations and 
dire environmental consequences such as the loss of biodiversity, 
deforestation, desertification, and global climate change. Seventh, 
in the twentieth century, debt becomes more connected to a culture 
of materialism and conspicuous consumption, whereby people are 
encouraged and conditioned to self-actualize through the purchase of 
advertised commodities (Gill 1995). Eighth, current levels of debt imply 
what Polanyi called a “stark utopia”: the belief that the modern system 
of money created as interest-bearing debt can continue ad infinitum on 
a finite planet. So long as our political and business leaders continue to 
cling to this false utopia of endless money-debt and growth, transitioning 
to a saner, more equitable, and environmentally sustainable world will 
be near impossible. Last, there is a need not only to interpret the present 
situation and to understand it historically but also to change it to ensure 
the well-being, if not the survival, of humanity. Moreover, for those who 
believe in democracy—that the people should have a say in their own 
governance— it is imperative that the public claims ownership over the 
control of money and manufacturers it in such a way that will avoid 
crippling debt and the redistribution of wealth upward. Building on the 
outcomes of our study, we offer a way in which this might be addressed 
through a Party of the 99% and a political strategy that uses debt itself 
as a means to promote change; we consider also how we might imagine 
ways of decapitalizing a near-universal but radically unequal sociality 
of debt that has emerged and intensified with the private capitalization 
of the power to create and allocate money as interest-bearing debt.
To examine these claims in more detail, we have organized the 
remainder of this book into four chapters organized by theme: the 
modern origins of capitalist debt, how debt as a technology of 
power was intensified historically, the consequences of modern 
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debt, and what is to be done. We provide a brief summary of each to 
conclude this introduction.
In Chapter 2 we investigate the modern origins of debt as a 
technology of power by focusing on war, the creation of the “national” 
debt, and the capitalization of the organized force of the state. We trace 
the origins of debt as a technology of power to a confluence of events in 
seventeenth-century England. However, far from seeing this as a series 
of discrete events untainted by international interconnections, we 
theorize them as already embedded in a web of dynastic, geopolitical, 
and domestic relations of force. The purpose of founding the national 
debt in England—which was war—is already stamped with the financial 
machinations of the Dutch empire, Italian city-states of the fourteenth 
and fiteenth centuries, the Atlantic slave trade, and the conquest of 
North America and India by capitalized joint-stock companies such 
as the East India Company. The main argument in this chapter is that 
the invention of a funded long-term national debt was principally born 
not to finance wars to aggrandize the power of the Crown per se but 
more importantly to aggrandize the power of what Justin Rosenberg 
(1994) has called “the empire of civil society”—or to be more accurate, 
those members in civil society with the means and mentality to 
accumulate money, not the unpropertied, pauperized masses. The 
way we approach this account of the rise of debt as a technology of 
power is to understand it from the point of view of the powerful who 
came to capitalize the state by effectively owning private shares in the 
government’s right to tax its citizenry (Marx 1887; Nitzan and Bichler 
2009: 294ff). But since the state’s primary function at this time was war-
making, the capitalization of the state meant that investors were also 
capitalizing the ability of the state to mobilize its organized violence 
to quell domestic dissent and open and keep open colonies and trade 
routes. With this in mind, we must also be concerned to illustrate how 
the capitalization of joint-stock companies contributed to debt and the 
transformation of human relations and the environment as merchants 
pursued differential earnings outside of England, and ater the Acts of 
Union (1707) in Britain.
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In Chapter 3 we use the term “intensification” rather than spread 
or proliferation to think about both the amplification and spatial 
expansion of debt as a technology of power during the era of European 
colonialism and resistance. Once again we start from the point of view of 
the powerful—of superior force and violence in the quest for differential 
accumulation. Here, we examine how imposing imperial taxation 
regimes or what we call “imperial monetization” (always backed by force 
and punishment) contributed to displacing modes of life not connected 
up with the international market of price and profit. Unlike Graeber 
and Braudel, we do not see the market as something separate from 
capitalism but the very precondition for the emergence of capitalization 
and debt as a technology of power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). As 
numeric computational power processes, capitalization and debt can 
only work through price, and where contracts, transactions, activities, 
and so forth cannot be priced, bought, and sold, capitalization and debt 
as technology of power cannot operate. Put another way, the market 
is not a space outside of capitalization or debt but the chief enabling 
mechanism for the accumulation of differential power represented 
in money. We then move to examine how “national” debts were 
created and administered in the colonies, the impact decolonization 
movements had on these historical structures, and the major events 
leading up to the debt crisis of the 1980s in what today is referred to 
as the Global South. We conclude the chapter with an examination of 
the sovereign debt crisis in the so-called heartland of global capitalism 
or what Pettifor (2006) has called the “coming first world debt crisis.”
In Chapter 4 we examine the consequences of debt as a technology 
of power at both the macrolevel (e.g., environmental destruction, 
inequality of wealth, and life chances) and microlevel (e.g., the 
re-emergence of debtor prisons in the United States and the disciplining 
of indebted subjects). With these two levels in mind, we explore three 
major consequences of the private capitalization of money as interest-
bearing debt.
The first major consequence is that the creation of money as debt 
requiring interest requires evermore economic growth and therefore 
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the greater and more rapid exploitation of natural resources. There are 
three chief obstacles to this pursuit, and why continuing to believe the 
present system can replicate itself in perpetuity implies blatant utopic 
thinking: (1) the planet is finite and we are exhausting many of our 
resources at an accelerated pace, (2) fossil fuels are nonrenewable and 
their combustion contributes excessively to global warming/dimming, 
and (3) there has never been an example of continuous exponential 
growth on earth.
A second consequence is that our creation of money through loans/
debt, where the interest is never created, means that there is always more 
debt in the system than there is the ability to repay it. For example, when 
a bank extends a loan of $1,000 dollars at 10 percent interest, it does not 
create the money to pay that interest—which would be $100. Put simply, 
the bank creates $1,000 not $1,100. So the question must be, where the 
interest comes from? The only possible solution is that the interest must 
come from the principal itself—meaning there is never enough money 
in the system to clear all debts. In this sense, the source of debt as a 
technology of power for creditors lies in its very permanence.
A third consequence is the intensification of neoliberalism and 
austerity measures in various countries experiencing higher levels 
of debt to GDP ratios, not to mention capital flight and tax evasion 
(e.g., Greece). Here we examine the impact of austerity measures and 
the growth of debt levels and how they affect citizens of indebted 
nations as well as those in developed countries. We will also re-examine 
Thomas Piketty’s work and suggest that he neglects to consider the role 
of debt in the increasing income and wealth gaps that he documents, 
and we will illustrate the extent to which debt serves as a device of 
wealth transfer. Finally, to demonstrate the extent to which debt as a 
technology of power has colonized our lives, we’ll examine the question 
of who, under the existing political economy, controls our future.
Having considered the consequences of debt as a technology of 
power in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 we examine what should and can be 
done about debt in the current conjuncture. Our first argument is that a 
Party of the 99% with a specific party platform is a useful starting point 
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for thinking about resistance to the present debt order. Our second 
argument focuses on using debt itself to force the decapitalization of the 
present monetary order so that a small minority cannot capitalize the 
labor of others or the world’s natural resources for their own symbolic 
accumulation. In this regard, it is important to realize that, while debt is 
a technology of power, and that creditors exercise an inordinate amount 
of control over debtors, the wealth of the 1% lies largely in the pockets 
of the 99% where it must work to generate ever-increasing returns for 
the dominant owners of capital.
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2Origins: War, National Debt, 
and the Capitalized State
The initiators of the modern credit system take as their point 
of departure not an anathema against interest-bearing capital in 
general, but on the contrary, its explicit recognition. (Marx 1981: 429)
In order to trace how debt became a technology of organized differential 
social power under capitalism and the consequences this technology 
has on social relations and the environment, we must provide a brief 
genealogy of its emergence. Due to disciplinary silos and the prevalence 
of contested concepts across disciplines, we are in immediate danger of 
falling into traps if we are not clear what we are looking for at the outset. 
Many mainstream scholars of money, finance, and the capitalist firm try 
to convince us that capitalism has primarily been about the mitigation 
of risk, decreasing transaction costs, organizational and technological 
efficiency, and equilibrium prices (Roy 1997). In this reading of history, 
it is as if the goal of all human evolution—the telos of the species—has 
been the reduction of risk and transaction costs, the search for greater 
efficiency, and the endless search for equilibrium prices and Pareto 
optimality. We do not deny some role for these phenomena and fetishes—
real or imaginary. What we do not share is this teleological approach to 
historical inquiry. First, because it occludes the illegitimate hierarchical 
effects of organized power and second because our starting point of 
differential power relations does not permit a teleological reading of 
history. In short, things can always be otherwise, and part of our task 
as scholars is to uncover how the present is no natural or progressive 
derivation, but constituted in social struggles that simultaneously 
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open up and close down political prospects. But an antiteleological 
view, skeptical of progressive or linear renderings of history, does not 
mean that history is absent human logic and rational pursuits.1 As 
Weatherford has argued, “every culture organizes life around a few 
simple principles, activities and beliefs” (1997: 8). Without wanting to 
minimize other aspects of human endeavor, in capitalist culture, life 
and social reproduction are largely organized, we contend, around the 
logic of differential accumulation and the ritual of capitalization in an 
effort to gain more money and power over others and the environment 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009). This is the pathological pursuit not of the 
entire population—who generally pursue what could be called the logic 
of livelihood—but only of a small minority. In other words, most people 
pursue money because they need it to survive and have a decent quality 
of life, not as an end in itself and not always to exert power over others. 
At the center of this order stands the privileged subject of capitalist 
history: the investors or capitalists who are driven by their own logic 
to accumulate differentially (Gill 1995). Differential accumulation 
simply means that capitalists aim to accumulate more money faster 
than others relative to a moving benchmark or shiting “normal” rate of 
return. In this sense, capitalists have no idea what maximum profits are, 
since they can only assess their performance relative to other capitalists 
trying to do the exact same (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 241 and 309). 
For example, if I make 5 percent returns on my investments over a year 
and you make 7 percent, I know that my decisions were inferior relative 
to yours. If the average return on investment, however, is 11 percent, 
then both of us have drastically underperformed even those who have 
achieved “average” returns. If we were serious about beating the average 
rate of return, then our underperformance would be an indication that 
we need to change strategies.
The concept of capitalization is closely related to the logic of 
differential accumulation. Capitalization is the act of investors 
discounting a future flow of income into a present value adjusted 
by some factor of risk. The exact math, along with the time value 
theory of money, took a while to develop, but as we will see, the act 
of discounting future profit flows based on some assessment of risk 
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has a long historical pedigree.2 As we know from Chapter 1, most 
capitalization consists of some form of debt instrument, mostly 
various forms of government debt, financial bonds, and 
nonsecuritized loans (e.g., student loans and credit cards). The 
other way capitalization is accomplished is in the equity or stock 
market. These markets are historically novel and a way of organizing 
corporate power and ownership (Henwood 1997). They provide 
investors with an exit option should they want to sell their ownership 
claims to companies or buy new claims to the income streams of 
other firms. Worldwide outstanding capitalization is $67 trillion 
across sixty major exchanges.3 Di Muzio (2014) has argued that 
the rise in capitalization from humble beginnings coincided 
with the exploitation of energy derived from fossil fuels.4 Thus, 
what this suggests is that a key facet of capitalist culture since its 
emergence is the explosive rise in capitalization and institutions like 
the stock market, to support the trade in ownership claims over the 
future profit of companies shaping social reproduction by capitalizing 
energy. The largest companies in the world by market capitalization 
are called “dominant capital” by Nitzan and Bichler (2009). When 
we refer to “dominant capital,” in this book we mean the companies 
listed on the Global Financial Times 500—a list of firms ranked by 
market capitalization.5 These firms have tremendous power to shape 
and reshape patterns of social reproduction given their control over 
production and social reproduction. They control energy, food, 
medicine, clothing, sotware, media, telecommunications, transport, 
mineral wealth, and much more. It is also important to note that 
many of these nonfinancial firms are also deeply in debt to banks. For 
example, US nonfinancial corporate debt is $13.9 trillion according 
to the Federal Reserve.6
But while differential accumulation is the dominant logic of 
capitalism and capitalization its dominant ritual, market dependence 
and the price system are also integral to capitalism. This means that 
money—in this case, the unit of account—is absolutely central to 
capitalism since accumulation is measured in pecuniary terms and 
only pecuniary terms. Insofar as this is an accurate assessment of our 
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affairs, we ought to have a clear understanding of how capitalist money 
is created. As Ingham and others have noted, there is considerable 
confusion over what money is and how it is produced. Orthodox 
economics is of no help. Modern economics textbooks continue 
to inculcate a distorted and incorrect account of modern money 
creation, leading to generations of graduates leaving school with little 
understanding of arguably the most important social institution of their 
societies. As Ingham has explained and others have confirmed, modern 
money is “a social relation of credit and debt denominated in a money 
of account” (2004: 12; see also Rowbotham 1998). The majority of any 
country’s money supply is produced when banks issue loans to willing 
borrowers, namely, governments, businesses, and households.7 In other 
words, banks are not intermediaries—they do not take from savers and 
lend to borrowers with differential interest rates.8 Nor does the creation 
of money depend upon someone entering a commercial bank to make a 
deposit (Sheard 2013). Commercial banks are quite simply “merchants 
of debt” that produce and allocate needed money as interest-bearing 
debt (Minsky cited in Ingham 2004: 161).
In traditional economic accounts, money is said to play at least 
three roles in society: a medium of exchange, a store of value, and 
a unit of account or measure of value. Following Innes and Keynes, 
Ingham (2004) argues that the unit of account function of money 
is far more important than the actual role played by the “medium” 
of exchange (Wray 2004). Money is not paper bills, coins, gold, 
silver, or chocolate, but an abstract unit of account that can be 
represented by any medium (albeit, the medium is typically selected 
by a political authority or power-holder and must meet certain 
standards). As Ingham (2004) and others argue, the role of money 
as an abstract measure of value is logically and historically prior to 
any fascination with coins or the gold standard and can at least be 
traced back to the first agrarian command economies of the Nile and 
Tigris (Wray 2004). Indeed, as Rowbotham suggests, “most money 
exists purely as a number” (1998: 10). However, while we should not 
confuse money with a “thing” or a material substance as do most 
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mainstream economists, Ingham argues that we can conceive of four 
historical modes of monetary production:
l Money accounting according to a standard of value without 
transferrable tokens (earliest known case: Mesopotamia, third 
millennium BC)
l Precious metal coinage systems (Asia Minor, ca. 700 BC to early 
twentieth century AD)
l Dual system of precious metal coinage and credit-money (fiteenth 
to early twentieth century)
l The pure capitalist credit-money system (mid-twentieth century 
onwards) (Ingham 2004: 77–78).
We agree with Schumpeter, Keynes, and Ingham that one of the key 
aspects that distinguishes capitalism from earlier forms of organizing 
society and its endeavors is the way in which money is created as 
interest-bearing debt (Schumpeter citied in Ingham 2004: 63). If, as 
Nitzan and Bichler (2009) claim, capital is commodified differential 
social power measured in money, then we ought to be highly curious 
how money is produced and allocated in our societies. In this chapter 
we argue that the key to understanding debt as a technology of power 
is not just to appreciate that modern money is largely created as 
debt by commercial banks but to point out, more importantly, that 
the production and allocation of money is privately owned. Thus, to 
provide a genealogy of debt as a technology of power in this chapter, 
we must be concerned with how the production and allocation came 
to be privately owned, controlled, and capitalized by the few. The 
corollary of this social fact is not simply that it makes the relationship 
between debtors and creditors paramount in capitalism but that the 
supply of money is “subject to rigorous control” so that there is always 
a demand for money and a dearth of its availability (Rowbotham 
1998; Ingham 2004: 7). To use Veblen’s language, we could call the 
private ownership over the production and allocation of money 
the greatest “sabotage” in human history since, in order to exert any 
power whatsoever, the owners of banks and their managers must 
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effectively incapacitate or restrict the money supply and war against 
possible alternatives to their effective monopoly. So far they have been 
very successful because they have attached themselves to state power. 
One indication is that money and monetary reform were very heavily 
debated in the past (Rowbotham 1998: 7). Today, debates and proposals 
for monetary reform do occur, but they are relatively marginal and have 
so far failed to gain significant political traction despite the obvious 
unfairness and frailty of the current system of modern finance and 
money production. This is what makes debt a technology of differential 
power beneficial to creditors: private ownership over an exclusive right 
to create credit (money as debt) and, over time, the naturalization 
of this power as private—both feats strongly assisted by the fact that 
most mainstream economics textbooks teach a completely inaccurate 
model of how money is supplied to the economy (Häring 2013). But 
while this is a central aspect of our argument, we also recognize that 
what is ultimately being monetized and capitalized is energy in its 
various forms. The money supply of various countries—particularly 
of the empires of England/Britain and later the United States—was 
allowed to expand because of surplus energy provided by fossil fuels. 
A further impetus of the present system of money creation, we argue, 
requires constant economic growth that is unsustainable in the long 
run due to the natural limits of some resources and the fact that fossil 
fuels—the primary source of energy for capitalism—are nonrenewable. 
It is worthwhile here to stop to consider why economic growth is so 
paramount to our societies. Why must our economies grow—even 
when GDP tells us nothing about human well-being (Daly 2005; 
Fioramonti 2013)?9 It seems that there are at least three main reasons: 
two are imperative given the enforced scarcity of money for the 
majority and one is ideological. As identified by Rowbotham (1998: 
37ff), forced economic growth first results from the competition for 
money to pay down debt or for use in buying goods and services. 
Since banks create money when they extend loans to borrowers but 
do not create the interest, there is always more debt in the system than 
there is the ability to repay the debt. For example, as stated above, 
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business or nonfinancial corporate debt in the United States is $13.9 
trillion. If we apply a simple rate of interest of just 3 percent, at the 
end of the year, the US business community would owe $417 billion 
to their creditors. Since this $417 billion has not been created at the 
time when the loans were taken out (the principal is only created, never 
the interest), the money to pay down business debt must be found 
elsewhere in the economy—thus ultimately removing it from popular 
circulation when debts are repaid. This creates a further scarcity of 
money in the economy. Moreover, the cost of borrowing must also 
be pushed on to consumers: it becomes an integral part of business 
pricing and inflation in the economic battle to accumulate differentially. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the rise in business debt in the United States 
and we assume a similar trajectory for other advanced capitalist nations.
The second factor identified by Rowbotham is the chronic lack 
of purchasing power in the economy, which results from the fact 
that “distributed incomes” are insufficient to purchase the goods 
and services produced in society. The evidence for this claim is 
the mounting consumer debt in rich countries. As The Economist 
reports, “The ratio of debt to disposable income rose by an average of 
30 percentage points, to 130%, in OECD countries between pre-boom 
2000 and pre-crisis 2007.”10 There would be no need for this consumer 
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debt if there were not a chronic lack of purchasing power in the 
economy. Furthermore, even if everyone “lived within their means” or 
“only spent what they earned” as conservative social forces are wont to 
advocate, the global economy would inevitably collapse. For example, 
the total outstanding unsecured debt as of 2012 stood at $62 trillion 
dollars across 183 countries (McKinsey 2013). It is the largest category 
of debt—bigger than the total national debt of all countries combined—
and is up by 170 percent from 1990. Such debt consists of personal 
loans, lines of credit, credit cards, and student debt among other debt 
“products.” Now imagine if all of a sudden this debt-money vanished 
from the global economy. Disaster would surely ensue.
The third reason for forced economic growth is ideological insofar 
as the promise of economic growth is supposed to increase the wealth 
of everyone over time as the economic pie gets larger. Hence, political 
elites and the extremely wealthy avoid any clarion calls for redistribution 
or a transformation of the prevailing social relations of production and 
exchange. As Kempf argued,
To escape any re-evaluation, the oligarchy keeps repeating the 
dominant ideology according to which the solution to the social crisis 
is production growth. That is supposedly the sole means of fighting 
poverty and unemployment. Growth would allow the overall level of 
wealth to rise and consequently improve the lot of the poor without—
and this part is never spelled out—any need to modify the distribution 
of wealth. (2008: 70)
The need for economic growth in spite of observable ecological limits 
on a finite planet is thus hardwired into debt-based economies—it is 
encoded not only in the math of the system but also in the ideological 
politics of growth. To illustrate how pathological the pursuit of growth 
is, try imagining any politician running a successful campaign at present 
by arguing the need to degrow the economy. Or imagine a corporate 
chietain arguing that he or she would like to generate fewer earnings 
in the next quarter than the last. Both are absurdities in a debt-based 
monetary system based on differential power.
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So to sum up here, our brief genealogy of debt as a technology of 
power has to take account of the following:
l Differential accumulation
l The rise of capitalization based on fossil fuel energy
l Differences in modes of money production
l The creation of the price system and market dependence
l The ownership and capitalization of money production as interest-
bearing debt
l The fact that debt-premised economies require perpetual economic 
growth
l The international dimensions of these phenomena.
To do so, we now turn to examine how debt became capitalized by 
organized power and find its genealogy rooted in war, the national 
debt, and the capitalized state of England.
Money, war, and debt before the Bank of England
While the social relations of credit and debt existed long before the 
emergence of capitalism, and money has taken many forms historically, 
we are interested in how debt became a technology of organized and 
capitalized power (Weatherford 1997; Davies 2002; Graeber 2011). The 
key development occurs with the creation of the Bank of England in 
1694 and the innovation of a funded long-term national debt capable 
of being serviced by the ever-growing regressive taxation on the 
public (Dickson 1967; O’Brien 1988; Brewer 1989; Braddick 1996). 
But we should not theorize England as existing in isolation from the 
geopolitics, foreign markets, and the religious and dynastic power 
struggles of Europe and later, the world (Teschke 2009). As many 
scholars have observed, since the Norman Conquest of 1066, rulers 
actively centralized political power earlier than most continental 
nations (Wood 2002). Over time, the nobility was largely demilitarized 
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relative to their continental counterparts, making violent challenges 
to centralized royal authority less likely (Brewer 1989). England also 
achieved the “first uniform national currency” by 1066—a feat that 
would take continental powers hundreds of years more to achieve 
(Davies 2002: 130). Finally, due to an “energy crisis” in the 1500s 
resulting from widespread deforestation that priced wood out of reach 
for many, more of England’s population turned to coal as a key source 
of energy (Nef 1977; Sieferle 2010). This new energy source and the 
need to excavate more coal from the watery bowels of the earth sparked 
what has popularly been called the world’s first Industrial Revolution as 
steam power and rail were used to pump water out of mines to extract 
and transport more coal energy (Smil 1994). As we will discuss briefly 
below, this new energy source inspired a number of inventions and 
innovations, increased productivity and surplus, and ignited the rise in 
British capitalization on the London Stock Exchange.
Despite these differences, England shared at least four characteristics 
with the nations of continental Europe. First, the country was 
overwhelming agrarian, undemocratic, and run for the benefit of royal 
authority and the lords of estates. Second, money was understood to be 
gold and silver rather than, say, pure credit or cattle. One of the chief goals 
of the rulers was to control the production of this money where possible 
and obtain evermore of it. Third, there was a dearth of money due to 
the belief that money could only be silver and gold—metallic substances 
believed to have some “intrinsic” worth. As a consequence, increasing 
the money supply could only be done in one of three ways: finding new 
mines at home or abroad, trading goods and services with other nations 
in exchange for gold and silver, or plundering it from others. Fourth, due 
to England’s geography, it avoided much of the constant and expensive 
warfare experienced on the continent in the early modern era. However, 
England too engaged in foreign battles and was therefore in constant need 
of money to finance its conquests and conflicts and to satisfy the desire of 
its ruling class for more money, wealth, and power (Brewer 1989).
Up until the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the creation of the Bank 
of England (1694) and the national debt, the production or creation of 
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money and its initial allocation was the prerogative of the sovereign 
(Davies 2002: 136). The sovereign would enlist various “moneyers” 
or mint-masters of a certain reputation to mint the sovereign coins 
and occasionally remint them when they had become debased or 
overused. Minting errors or chicanery with the currency was greeted 
with corporeal punishment such as the chopping off of hands, blinding, 
or castration, if not all three acts (Davies 2002: 140). These coins 
would then be spent into the economy, particularly for war-making or 
the support of soldiers in continental battles for dynastic power and 
wealth. This created a situation where private merchants engaged in the 
production and trade of goods and services could potentially amass a 
small fortune in coins. It is also worth remembering that the historical 
record appears to confirm that, at least in the early modern era before 
the Industrial Revolution, most peasants had little access to this form 
of money (Dyer 1997; Gilbert and Helleiner 1999: 3). In other words, 
metallic money of the silver and gold variety was circulated by the 
powerful in pursuit of their interests as an early form of accounting for 
their social power to command goods and services from others (Davies 
2002: 145). Money was largely a product of the powerful, not a weapon 
of the weak. Some of the coins spent into the economy by the regent 
would then be redistributed to the sovereign purse through official 
taxation. This meant that monetary and fiscal policies were tightly 
linked. As Davies noted, “minting and taxing were two sides of the 
same coin of royal prerogative” (2002: 147). Taxation made the coins 
valuable since they were needed to pay taxes.
However, unlike royal authority in France, which was constantly 
on the prowl for more taxes because it had to pay for a burgeoning 
group of venal officeholders who were oten tax exempt themselves, 
English sovereigns appear to have been more constrained by their 
subjects. This made it more difficult to overburden the population with 
excessive taxes—particularly without regular parliaments. This does 
not mean that taxes were not onerous on some populations; it is just 
to suggest that from a comparative perspective, the English were more 
lightly taxed than their counterparts in France, with the burden falling 
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more on the propertied than on the nonmonetized peasantry. However, 
ater the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the creation of the national 
debt, the English would become the most heavily taxed population in 
all of Europe. As we will discuss momentarily, a plethora of new taxes 
was raised to finance the English ruling class’s continental wars and 
colonial conquests (O’Brien 1988; Brewer 1989). But this could not 
have had any effect and, indeed, would have destroyed the economy 
without an expansive monetary supply first occasioned by the Bank of 
England issuing loans originally backed by silver coinage (Carruthers 
1996; Davies 2002; Wennerlind 2011).
What is oten forgotten is that before the sovereign was made 
subordinate to Parliament, financing war was the personal responsibility 
of royal authority. With relatively strict limits placed upon taxation, 
and with a limited money supply, this meant that if the sovereign 
wanted to pay for expensive wars, he or she could only raise funds in a 
limited number of ways. First, the sovereign could borrow from private 
subjects and where finance was not forthcoming, the regent could 
force loans. The first option was limited by the creditor’s perception 
of the royal finances, while the second (forced loans) was limited by 
the private power of moneyed lenders and their ability to obscure 
their truth worth. Second, peerage titles, venal offices, monopolies, 
and royal lands could be sold for ready cash to private social forces. 
While the first two options were not as common as the practice was 
in France, the third and fourth options (discussed below) were very 
common and a chief source of royal revenue. In fact, since Richard I 
(1189–99), successive monarchies effectively “privatized” royal assets 
and privileges when they needed money to repay debts and/or finance 
war (Davies 2002: 158; Wennerlind 2011: 25). Brewer put this in the 
context of war:
The fiscal demands of the crown also prompted the sale of trade 
privileges and monopolies. Joel Hurstfield has described this as 
“putting up for auction the machinery of government itself.” Begun 
by Elizabeth and rapidly expanded during the Spanish War in the 
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1580s and 1590s, the practice reached a peak in the 1630s when the 
monopolies on starch, coal, salt and soap raised £80,000 a year for 
the crown, and between £200,000 and £300,000 for the monopolists. 
(1989: 14)
As we shall see, this practice of selling state assets to repay debt 
continues to this day. The only difference is that “public” rather than 
“royal” assets are now sold to private capitalists—a key facet of debt 
being mobilized as a technology of the powerful in our own times 
(Chossudovsky 2002: 55ff; Perkins 2004). A third way regents could 
raise funds was from rents on the royal estates. This was a key source 
of revenue, but since successive regents sold off more and more royal 
property, the proceeds were never sufficient to finance war and other 
affairs of state. A fourth option was to debase the currency by lessening 
its metallic content, thus creating more coins out of the same metallic 
base. This was, of course, a highly contested option among the true 
believers in sound metallic money. Two additional avenues could be 
used: the plunder of gold and silver from enemies and, by the time of 
Henry VIII, the dissolution of the monasteries. The expropriation and 
private sale of the monasteries was primarily a revenue-raising exercise 
as the “department established to supervise the dissolution, the Court 
of the Augmentation of the Revenues of the King’s Crown” makes clear 
(Woodward 1966; Davies 2002: 194ff).
So what are we to make of money, war, and debt before the Bank of 
England? First, while the sovereign did have the ability to mint money, 
once it was spent into the economy, successive regents lost control of it 
and could only recollect money through taxation and the various other 
means mentioned above. What this suggests is that while the regent was 
effectively above the law and therefore exercised differential legal power 
over subjects, at base the regent had very limited financial power. The 
way in which money was spent into the economy, private monopolies 
were granted, and royal assets were sold allowed private social forces to 
amass greater and greater fortunes ultimately giving a small group of 
merchants and creditors considerable financial power over the juridically 
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superior monarch. Second, at least since Richard I, all successive 
monarchies were in constant debt to creditors, which continued to 
weaken their power over time. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
emergent political theory of the time. Harrington’s tract Oceana (1656) 
argued that the breakdown of the monarchy in the bloody English Civil 
Wars (1642–51) was largely the result of a shit in the financial power 
of the propertied (Pipes 1999: 32). Differential power in property and 
finance now rested with wealthy subjects rather than the monarch. 
The regent could not be all powerful and the nation’s largest debtor at 
the same time. Third, the fiscal demands of the sovereign were largely 
for the purposes of war-making and defending the realm—expensive 
propositions that called for evermore money (Brewer 1989). Last, 
because money was primarily thought of as silver and gold, there was 
virtually always a scarcity of money, though not of potential material 
capacity (Davies 2002: 170). Increasing the money supply meant 
debasement or finding new sources of silver and gold by trading with 
other nations, plundering other nations, or finding and exploiting new 
mines. If the monarch would have had the power to create capitalist 
credit-money out of thin air, the history of capitalism might have been 
radically different. But rather than becoming the realm’s chief creditor, 
successive monarchies were typically the kingdom’s chief debtors. In this 
light, it is hardly surprising that the regent would eventually be made 
subordinate to the financially prosperous and propertied in Parliament. 
As it turns out, the power to create money as interest-bearing debt 
was given to private social forces. Thus, a potentially public institution 
operating in the interests of all emerged as a private institution operating 
in the interests of a small class of merchants and financiers.
The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street
By the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688—a revolution that 
solidified parliamentary power over the monarchy—elite debates had 
raged over the scarcity of money and what could be done about the 
dire situation. Moreover, there was a general feeling among certain 
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sectors of the elite that the economy was not living up to its full 
potential. Capacity to improve and produce more agricultural goods 
and manufactures seemed within technical reach, but so long as 
money was conceptualized as bullion, the supply could not be easily 
increased and expanding commerce beyond a certain limit, virtually 
impossible. As Wennerlind notes, “while modern economic theory 
does not recognize the possibility of a scarcity of money, seventeenth-
century thinkers were consumed by this problem” (2011: 17 our 
emphasis). In an effort to expand the money supply, contemporaries 
even sought the philosopher’s stone, or the alchemical ability to 
transform base metals into gold and silver. The idea of credit was 
well known and extensively used domestically and in international 
exchange, but like alchemy, it too was limited (Muldrew 1998). 
Before the Bank of England, credit was traditionally a private and 
personal affair between known lenders and borrowers—not a social 
relation among strangers. It is also true that goldsmiths extended 
the currency by issuing paper notes in excess of their gold deposits 
(Davies 2002: 249ff). But whatever the various types of credit notes 
or pledges in existence to facilitate commerce, they were neither 
generally assignable nor transferrable, thereby limiting their use as a 
normally circulating currency that could replace the national coinage 
in circulation and increase the supply of money with any great effect 
(Wennerlind 2011: 69).
In this atmosphere of scarce money, a hundred or more proposals 
were put forward for some type of public bank that could relieve the 
popular cry for more money (examined more fully in Horsefield 1960). 
On the heels of these proposals, only one scheme was officially 
sanctioned: the privately owned, for-profit Bank of England. As 
Dickson (1967) has argued, this institutional innovation ushered 
in a “financial revolution” that would facilitate the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions. However, as Wennerlind (2011) argues, what 
was ultimately required before any institution could be developed 
to solve the problem of scarce coinage was an epistemological 
revolution that dissociated money from a metallic substance such as 
gold or silver. Wennerlind traces this to the Hartlib Circle’s belief in 
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the possibility of constant improvement and their reinterpretation of 
money as a symbol of value rather than a staunch material substance. 
As he explains,
The Hartlibians believed that by facilitating circulation and 
engendering productive endeavors, money had the capacity to 
activate hidden or dormant resources in nature and mankind. 
Money thus partnered with knowledge and industry as the key 
ingredients in the infinite expansion of nature and society. Moreover, 
as the world of goods expanded continuously the money stock had 
to be able to grow proportionally in order to circulate all the new 
commodities … Expanding the money stock was therefore no longer 
about solving a temporary scarcity of money, but rather about the 
introduction of a monetary mechanism that could facilitate change 
and growth, ad infinitum. (2011: 45)
This ideological transformation, however, did not wholly delink 
credit from a metallic substance—a mode of money production not 
countenanced fully until the United States abandoned the gold standard 
instituted by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. Nor, as is the case 
today, did this institutional innovation delink money from war or the 
preparation for war (albeit some states have smaller military budgets 
and a few, none at all, e.g., Costa Rica). In fact, while the birth of 
the Bank of England can be traced to the scarcity of money debates 
of the seventeenth century, the ultimate reason for its creation was 
not the Hartlibian improvement of society but to finance war against 
Europe’s most powerful ruler, Louis XIV. As Davies makes clear,
The Bank of England came into being by the Ways and Means Act 
of June 1694 and was confirmed by a Royal Charter of Incorporation 
(27 July 1694). The Act makes it clear that its real purpose was to 
raise money for the War of the League of Augsburg by taxation and 
by the novel device of a permanent loan, the bank being very much 
a secondary matter, though essential to guarantee the success of the 
main purpose. (2002: 259)
The political settlement of 1688 placed more power in the hands of 
Parliament to govern and oversee the fiscal matters of the realm. This 
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gave greater confidence to city merchants, goldsmiths, and property 
holders more generally, who had oten been the victims of forced 
loans, arbitrary taxation, and royal defaults in the past (North and 
Weingast 1989). Organized by the Scot, William Paterson, and a coterie 
of city merchants, the Bank of England was to extend a permanent loan 
of £1.2 million in banknotes to the new government to finance the 
war with France. In exchange, the bank received corporate existence, 
8 percent annual interest on the initial sum lent (£100,000), and a 
£4000 pound annual management fee (Davies 2002: 260; Broz and 
Grossman 2004: 56). The income stream of interest and fees paid to 
the Bank of England was secured by a specific tax—the “Tonnage”—
which raised taxes on the carrying capacity of sea-going vessels largely 
carrying alcohol. Together, these acts constituted a radical historical 
break from early forms of finance since, for the first time, a funded, 
permanent national debt was created. This meant that private creditors 
were no longer capitalizing the power of royal authority when they 
lent to the regent, but the fused power of the King-in-Parliament 
and their ability to tax the population by force if necessary. A further 
development stemming from this institutional innovation was that the 
money supply could be extended more fully than in the past. To recall, 
goldsmiths could issue their own notes in excess of their gold reserves, 
thus increasing the money supply. But this exercise was limited by their 
private reserves and the confidence of borrowers and depositors, and 
therefore individual goldsmiths could not solve the scarcity of money 
problem in England. What made the Bank of England unique was that 
it was an organized corporate force of creditors that capitalized the 
King-in-Parliament’s power to tax, therefore guaranteeing a revenue 
stream of interest on a permanent public debt that would likely never 
be paid off in full.11 Marx noticed the historical and international 
dimension of the public debt:
The system of public credit, i.e., of national debts, whose origin we 
discover in Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took 
possession of Europe generally during the manufacturing period. 
The colonial system with its maritime trade and commercial wars 
served as a forcing-house for it. Thus it first took root in Holland. 
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National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state—whether despotic, 
constitutional or republican—marked with its stamp the capitalistic 
era. The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually 
enters into the collective possessions of modern peoples is their 
national debt. Hence, as a necessary consequence, the modern 
doctrine that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in 
debt. (1887: 529)
What made England different from its precursors is that backed up by 
a relatively small reserve of silver (and later gold), the Bank of England 
could also issue assignable notes in considerable excess of its reserves—
effectively creating a new currency and expanding the money supply 
to greater effect than individual goldsmiths. As Wennerlind points out, 
though there were historical precursors, this created “England’s and 
Europe’s first widely circulating credit currency” (2011: 109).
Scholars of the “financial revolution” in England have made much of 
these developments since Dickson’s (1967) seminal work on the Bank 
of England and the permanent national debt. However, despite minor 
disagreements in the literature, most have focused on the institutional 
factors that made the revolution a success. These scholarly accounts 
tend to be more celebratory than critical and they too oten downplay 
the effects of class power and violence in the making of debt as a 
technology of institutionalized social power—a power wielded, we 
remind the reader, by minority social forces extending loans as interest. 
Our approach is different: we want to uncover the power underpinnings 
of this new relation of force between money-creating creditors and the 
majority of debtors. Not only do we want to uncover the international 
dimensions of this new institutional apparatus of credit, debt, and 
political power, but we also want to demonstrate the ways in which the 
exclusive nature of money creation as interest-bearing debt by private 
social forces was instantiated and the consequences of this system’s 
operations on political economies today. We will discuss this in greater 
detail in the next two chapters, but here we want to draw out some of 
the key theoretical and practical dimensions of debt as a technology of 
power at its institutionalized inception.
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First, the national debt backed by the government’s power to tax 
facilitated colonial adventures and furthered wars that dispossessed 
first peoples of their land, enforced their labor and new ways of life, 
destroyed languages and culture, and put to death many of those who 
resisted imperial policy. All of this extended ruling-class power in 
Britain through the internationalization of debt relationships backed 
by superior force. As Brewer notes, “ater 1688 the scope of British 
military involvement changed radically. Britain was at war more 
frequently and for longer periods of time, deploying armies and navies 
of unprecedented size” (1989: 22). Indeed, in the eighteenth century, 
English governments spent “between 75 percent and 85 percent of 
annual expenditure” on the military apparatus or servicing debts 
to private creditors for previous wars (Brewer 1989: 31). Thus, the 
so-called “national” debt was intimately tied up with ruling-class power 
and a growing apparatus of transformative international violence. But 
there is something more missed by most observers of this period. The 
power of money creation was slowly slipping toward private creditors 
at the Bank of England, and later commercial banks outside and inside 
of London, and this meant that financing the organized violence of 
ruling-class power embodied in the state was the largest way in which 
new money entered the economy. Put another way, as Britain’s national 
debt ballooned to pay for wars, so too did its monetary supply and 
interest charges owed to private creditors.12 With more war, there was 
more money in the economy and therefore the potential for greater 
prosperity, albeit unevenly shared across the class hierarchy. While 
the nature of national belligerence may have changed since the days of 
formal colonialism, government spending on war and the preparation 
for war is still one of the fundamental ways in which new money 
enters the economy. For example, at least since 2000 if not before, 
the United States current account deficit closely mirrors its defense 
spending so that if defense spending were significantly curtailed it is 
likely that the United States could achieve balance of payment surpluses 
(see Figure 2.2). Yet if this war-spending is not forthcoming or replaced 
by other types of government spending, the global money supply of 
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dollars (effectively the world’s most important reserve currency) will 
contract and there will inevitably be more financial crises, business 
failures, and higher world unemployment. The “fiscal-military-state” or 
what some have called the welfare-warfare state is the direct result of 
debt being mobilized as a private technology of power (Clayton 1976; 
Brewer 1989).
Second, debt as a technology of power cannot be mobilized without 
exclusive ownership and the right to exclude others from doing the 
same thing. If everyone is a creditor, there are no debtors. Although the 
initial charter of the Bank of England did not grant the bank an exclusive 
monopoly over the issue of paper notes, as other social forces vied for 
the same power, the bank’s owner-managers worked to solidify their 
exclusive rights. In the Bank of England’s recharter of 1697, Parliament 
agreed that no other bank should be erected while the Bank of England 
remained in operation. As Parliament needed to finance more foreign 
wars, additional protections were included in renewed charters:
In 1708, during the War of Spanish Succession and again in exchange 
for a fresh loan, the Bank obtained from Parliament its most significant 
protection from competition: the legal prohibition of associations of 
more than six individuals from carrying on a banking business in 
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Figure 2.2 US military spending and current account deficit 1980–2014
Source: Federal Reserve and OMB. Historical Tables 3.2.
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England. This was crucial in restricting competition, because issuing 
bank notes was the major source of bank funding in this era. The Act 
of 1708 thus gave the Bank a monopoly over joint-stock note issue. 
(Broz and Grossman 2004: 57)
What this suggests is that early on, the bank sought to incapacitate 
competing banks and secure its own exclusive rights to issue credit 
to the government in return for political favors, interest, and fees. But 
it was not just competing banks and ideas for releasing credit to the 
public to facilitate trade that were attacked by the Bank of England’s 
operators. As Wennerlind’s research shows, protecting the nascent 
credit industry meant the death penalty for counterfeiters. To secure 
the public’s trust in credit, Sir Isaac Newton was made warden of the 
mint and tasked with “investigating, detecting and prosecuting crimes 
against the currency” (2011: 18). Since there could only be one real 
counterfeiter—the Bank of England—members of the population who 
clipped coins or counterfeited the new paper banknotes were punished 
by death: hanging in the case of men and burning in the case of women 
(Wennerlind 2011: 150). The death penalty was not only a monetary 
policy but a deterrent for the inception of debt as a technology of 
organized power (Wennerlind 2004). Today, the entire commercial 
banking system depends on this type of exclusive right to issue credit 
and the profits of these institutions are protected by a massive legal 
apparatus that punishes crimes against money and sanctions what in 
an earlier time used to be called usury (Geisst 2013). In most countries 
today, usury is a legally sanctioned weapon of the powerful against the 
weak. What this means is that not only do publically elected officials 
actively refuse to create and allocate non-interest-bearing credit as a 
public good, but they also enforce their very exclusion from money 
creation! And while modern banking is not altogether a monopoly—
there is indeed ostensible competition among the banks for market 
share—this is in considerable respects—illusory. Through interlocking 
ownership, commercial banks have come to capitalize one another so 
they have what could be called an “effective monopoly” on creating the 
money supply (Vitali et al. 2011).
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A third theoretical and practical dimension emerges from our brief 
analysis above: the relationship between differential capitalization, 
energy, and the normal rate of return. With the creation of the Bank 
of England and the national debt, a “normal” rate of return connected 
to state power was established.13 Thus, at its inception, Parliament 
promised an 8 percent return on invested capital to city financiers who 
subscribed to the Bank of England. In modern parlance, this interest 
rate provided a “benchmark return” by which investors could judge 
alternative courses of investment, thus institutionalizing what Nitzan 
and Bichler (2009) call “differential accumulation” by pegging interest 
to state power. To this day, interest rates on government bonds remain 
the benchmark or heart of global finance since they all represent the 
state’s power to tax its citizenry and service debt to creditors. Emerging 
alongside this market in government securities was the chartered joint-
stock company (Scott 1912; Walker 1931; Micklethwait and Wooldrige 
2003; Robins 2006). In England, these companies predate the Bank of 
England and were capitalized on the basis of their exclusive rights to 
profit from trade granted to them by royal charter. Yet two companies 
were particularly important for helping to finance or uphold the 
national debt of England: the South Sea Company and the East Indian 
Company. The South Sea Company was founded in 1711 and was 
originally intended to help alleviate government debt by engrating 
government securities into company shares. The capitalization of the 
South Sea Company was largely contingent on the Spanish Asiento, 
which granted the company exclusive rights to sell African slaves to 
Latin America. In effect, investors who bought shares in the South 
Sea Company were betting on the profit and loss of the slave trade, or 
put differently, they were capitalizing the violence used to capture and 
commodify human life energy—a particularly important international 
dimension of England’s ability to service its national debt to private 
social forces. The national debt also helped the East India Company 
finance its trade and colonial control of a considerable portion of Asia 
by using its ownership over some of the national debt to secure loans to 
finance its foreign operations (Baskin and Miranti 1997: 103). The Bank 
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of England, the South Sea Company, and the East India Company had 
the largest capitalization of the time before more coal energy came on 
line to offer greater opportunities for capitalization in mines, steel, and 
railroads (Baskin and Miranti 1997: 56). In essence, by 1717, would-be 
equity investors had at least three major options to achieve differential 
accumulation: (1) they could capitalize the national debt and the power 
of the state to enforce domestic taxation and colonial policy; (2) they 
could invest in the slave trade to Latin America through the South Sea 
Company; and/or (3) they could invest in the gradual colonization and 
trade with Asia through the East India Company (Baskin and Miranti 
1997: 56). These endeavors were immensely transformative and set the 
stage for the further development of debt as a technology of organized 
power. Nowhere was this perhaps more clear than in the colonies of 
Europe, where debt would gradually take over—but never wholly 
replace—the role of force in rendering the population useful for the 
differential accumulation of the few.
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If the history of progress has been written as a history of the 
emergence of the autonomous, possessive and self-possessed 
individual, it was the history of indebtedness that underlay 
this teleology. The latter history has subsisted in the shadow 
of forgetfulness … . (Banerjee 2000: 423)
The technology of debt was internationalized long before the state’s 
power to tax was capitalized on the basis of a permanent national 
debt. As we saw in Chapter 2, the key rupture with the past was the 
creation of the Bank of England and the permanent national debt that 
stretched English money beyond the limitations of gold and silver 
coinage. The move also anchored the emergence of an international 
credit system based on sterling and the capitalization of colonialism. 
The new paper currency issues remained linked to a metallic substance 
during this period, but the tether was extended so that the value of 
paper notes in circulation was never fully backed by the metallic horde 
at the Bank of England and other provincial banks that would spring 
up during the Industrial Revolution. With varying degrees of success, 
this institutional innovation was later adopted by other nations that 
remained free of colonial rule. It helped to mitigate (never totally 
solve) the scarcity of money problem that had so riddled England and 
much of the European continent in an era of colonial plunder, slavery, 
long-distance trade, and the exploitation of a new energy source, that 
is, coal. The perpetual debt became a way of permanently locking in 
the relationship between private creditors and the power of the state 
3
Intensification: War, Debt, 
and Colonial Power
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to regulate commercial relations, tax its population, fight foreign 
wars, and quell domestic rebellion during a tumultuous time of social 
transformation and resistance. It also guaranteed a “normal rate of 
return” to capital since the ownership of government debt was assumed 
to be a far safer investment than risking one’s money in foreign trade. 
As Marx understood,
As with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, [the public debt] endows 
barren money with the power of breeding and thus turns it into capital, 
without the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and risks 
inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The state 
creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed 
into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their 
hands just as so much hard cash would. (1887: 529)
In other words, not only did the public debt of nations become 
the key benchmark and the heart of a growing credit industry but 
investors never truly gave anything away since they could always 
sell their claim onto others or borrow based on the fact that their 
bonds were an asset. If not, they collected their money back with 
interest over time. As Ferguson (2006) has demonstrated, owning 
a small share of state power through government bonds was a 
lucrative enterprise during this era and one of the key routes to the 
accumulation of a private fortune. The Rothschilds are an extreme 
case in point, but they were not the only beneficiaries of “national” 
debts accumulated to fund wars (Ferguson 1998). However, while 
the benefits of holding government debt were not simply the purview 
of well-known historical capitalists, ownership—like financial 
knowledge—was still heavily skewed toward the few. According to 
Ferguson, “as a percentage of the population of England and Wales, 
bondholders were … a tiny and dwindling élite: from 2.7 percent of 
the population when Napoleon I was defeated to just 0.9 percent 
when the same fate befell Napoleon III” (2006: 195). As Ferguson 
notes, since the debt was largely funded by regressive forms of 
taxation, servicing the interest on the public debt represented 
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“an astonishingly inequitable system of transfers from the poor 
majority to the bondholding minority” (2006: 195).
In this chapter we aim to historically illustrate both the amplification 
and spatial expansion of debt as a technology of power during the era 
of European colonialism and resistance and how this legacy extends to 
the present day. By starting from the point of view of the powerful—of 
superior force and violence in the quest for differential accumulation—
we want to demonstrate how networks of indebtedness reconfigured 
political communities for the benefit of creditors and capitalists and 
how this continued on ater formal colonialism started to come to an 
end in fits and starts ater the Second World War. Over time, arguably, 
debt has become a more effective tool of wealth transfer and social 
transformation than war—though, of course, the two are intertwined 
in complex ways as the origins of the permanent public debt in England 
make clear. Since we cannot hope to provide a comprehensive study in 
such a short volume, what we intend to do is examine what we think 
are some of the most insightful and significant aspects of debt being 
mobilized as a technology of organized differential power. We begin by 
examining how the imposition of imperial taxation regimes or what we 
call “imperial monetization” (always backed by force and punishment) 
contributed to the constitution of new forms of agency geared for the 
capitalist world market. Unlike Graeber and Braudel, we do not see the 
market as something separate from capitalism but the very precondition 
for the emergence of capitalization and debt as a technology of organized 
power. As numeric computational power processes, capitalization and 
debt can only work through price, and where contracts, transactions, 
and practices cannot be priced, bought, and sold, the capitalization of 
debt as technology of power breaks down immediately. Put another 
way, the market is not space outside of capitalization or debt but the 
chief enabling mechanism for the accumulation of differential power 
represented in money (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 306). We then move 
on to examine how “national” debts were created and administered in 
the colonies by focusing on the nascent United States of America and 
Haiti. We then turn to explore the impact decolonization movements in 
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Africa and Asia had on these historical structures and the major events 
leading up to the debt crisis of the 1980s in what today is referred to as 
the Global South. We conclude the chapter with a brief examination of 
the sovereign debt crisis in the so-called heartland of global capitalism.
Imperial monetization, transformation, and resistance
European colonial encounters during the so-called age of exploration 
revealed modes of life, cultural practices, and systems of meaning that 
were different from those experienced in Christian Europe. Outside 
Europe, different forms of money and exchange were observed, but in 
many instances, gold and silver—the main monetary sources coveted 
by the Europeans—were more likely to be used in decoration for 
status than as a medium of exchange to be accumulated or invested. 
In a way, this fact demonstrated that the European fascination 
with gold and silver as the only “real” money was little more than a 
socially constructed fetish—albeit, an extremely powerful one. In 
other words, preconquest populations had established methods and 
rituals of social reproduction not premised upon capitalist markets 
and the accumulation of (metallic) money as an end in itself. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that the colonized were not keen to abandon 
their generational traditions of social reproduction in order to meet 
the demands of imperialists for labor, gold and silver, and other 
goods that could be commodified. As such, one of the key problems 
faced by the Europeans in achieving differential accumulation in the 
colonies was native resistance to imperial policies. To be sure, as Rodney 
(1972: 165) points out in the case of Africa, many West Africans on the 
coast willingly participated in the colonial money economy introduced 
by the Europeans, with the transatlantic slave trade being the most 
obvious example of local involvement (see also Blackburn 2010). 
However, while some reaped benefits by participating in the growing 
world market for human energy (slavery) and goods, the vast majority 
preferred to continue with their own practices of social reproduction 
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outside of capitalist markets. The evidence is more than decisive on the 
matter given the persistent resistance to colonial policy experienced 
virtually everywhere Europeans sought to impose their will and the 
series of punishments and disciplines that were inflicted on recalcitrant 
social forces that refused to comply with the transformative practices 
initiated by colonial administrators and businessmen (Stavrianos 1981: 
282, 367ff; Miller et al. 1995; Brown 2014). Capitalist markets do not 
spring up spontaneously, as Marx (1887) and Polanyi ([1944] 1957) 
rightly recognized and Graeber (2011) confirmed in his recent study. 
Capitalist markets were socially constructed by the powerful in the 
quest for differential power and accumulation in an increasingly 
monetized world order of near constant warfare.
Outside the direct application of violence—including genocidal 
practices—one of the chief ways traditional forms of social 
reproduction were transformed, and in many instances destroyed, was 
through the imposition of imperial taxation regimes. As some early 
political economists understood—and Marx later emphasized and 
criticized—taxation was not only the most effective method (outside 
of direct violence) for enforcing wage-labor but also an efficient 
technology of expropriation—that is, a mechanism for transferring 
ownership from direct producers and concentrating it in the hands of 
capitalists (1887: 530). This time-worn technology of power, applied 
in the European heartland to fund “national” debts amassed to finance 
dynastic wars and fund the savagery of for-profit colonial projects, 
would be imposed anew in the colonies. The evidence of taxation being 
used as an imposed debt obligation with transformative effects is best 
illustrated by the case of colonial Africa, where it was applied near 
ubiquitously regardless of the colonizer (Rodney 1972; Stavrianos 1981: 
300ff; Wray 1998: 57ff; Bush and Maltby 2004; Forstater 2005). Let us 
consider some examples in the context of colonial enterprise.
As suggested above, one of the fundamental problems faced by 
colonialists was how to obtain the necessary labor to make their 
newly acquired lands or mines profitable. Appropriating land through 
violence and fraud was one thing, recruiting a labor force loyal to 
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colonial projects, quite another altogether. Even when the local 
communities were promised wages for work, they more oten than 
not declined the offer. The natives had little need for wages when they 
could reproduce their own livelihoods outside of the colonial market. 
One of the main ways this imperial “problem” was overcome was for 
colonial administrators to impose a cattle, hut, or head (poll) tax on 
the local population that had to be paid in the currency issued by the 
colonizer. Since failure to pay the required tax was met with strict 
punishment, those who complied found themselves converting part 
of their land into cash crops (e.g., cotton, groundnuts, flowers) that 
could be sold for the imperial currency needed to settle their tax debt 
to the sovereign authorities. Forstater (2005: 60–61), Marks (in Oliver 
and Sanderson 1985: 456), Killingray (1986),1 and others have 
documented punishments including: the burning of huts, shooting, 
the seizure of cattle and goods, fines, prison labor, and public shaming. 
For example, tax debtors in Burkina Faso who refused payment were 
forced to chant the prayer Puennam co mam ligidi or translated—
“God, give me money”—throughout the day under the scathing 
heat of the tropical sun. Others would be forced to run around the 
administrative building while carrying their wife, or—in the case of 
polygamous relationships—wives, on their backs. Wives would then 
have to take a turn piggy-backing their husband around the building. 
Where growing cash crops proved more difficult, Africans had to turn 
to wage-labor in order to satisfy their need for colonial currency. With 
the prospect of inevitable crop failures from time to time as well as 
the arbitrary nature of taxation, many struggled to pay their taxes in 
relatively scarce colonial currency. In order to avoid punishment, many 
Africans resorted to local moneylenders who were oten more than 
happy to extend usurious loans to producers in return for collateral 
(land) they oten assumed when debts could not be repaid. Tax debt 
was a forcing house for the concentration of property in fewer hands 
just as much as it was the motive force compelling Africans to work 
for their colonial masters. Indeed, perpetual tax debt on top of credit 
taken from moneylenders created a permanent force of wage-laborers 
since taxation made money a necessity to avoid punitive measures. 
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The final way in which tax debt operated as a technology of power 
was through the corvée system. Instead of imposing a tax to be paid 
in colonial money, a certain amount of labor was demanded by locals 
to discharge the tax. In many instances this was a preferred practice 
of labor recruitment since it could even operate in an environment 
where money was scarce (Oliver and Sanderson 1985: 527). The 
tax was paid back in hours and days worked for others rather than 
one’s own family or the community and the work oten involved 
considerable migration. But whichever way debt was mobilized in its 
specificity as a technology of power, one thing is certain: its operation 
had transformative effects on social relations and served the colonists 
by severing the colonized from their previous patterns of social 
reproduction. What is more, an uneven regime of economic growth 
and environmental transformation was being increasingly thrust 
upon local communities through imperial monetization brought on 
by taxation. In our theorization of debt as a technology of organized 
power, the concept of “imperial monetization” means at least two 
things. First, the term captures the process whereby imperial or 
colonial powers impose their monetary system upon a society that 
coordinated their economic interdependence and social reproduction 
in some other fashion. Over time, this meant the juridical sabotage 
or banning of alternative forms of currency used by Africans 
such as the Maria Theresa thaler (dollar), manillas, and cowries 
(Ofonagoro 1979; Ubah 1980; Uche 1999; Mwangi 2001; Helleiner 
2002a; Hermann 2011).2 For colonial policy to be effective, imperial 
money was to be made exclusive and the practice of accounting a 
weapon (Annisette and Neu 2004). Second, imperial monetization 
also refers to the process whereby debts are contracted in an imperial 
or colonial currency. This second role accomplishes two goals: first, 
it helps expand the imperial money supply through the extension of 
new loans to foreigners to pay for capital imports from Europe. These 
loans effectively capitalized the exploitive capacity of the colonies 
and their ability to repay debt to creditors (e.g., cash crops, mines, 
infrastructural projects, and later fossil fuels). Engels noticed this 
relationship in a supplement to volume three of Marx’s Capital:
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Then colonisation. Today this is purely a subsidiary of the stock 
exchange, in whose interests the European powers divided Africa a few 
years ago, and the French conquered Tunis and Tonkin. Africa leased 
directly to companies (Niger, South Africa, German South-West and 
German East Africa), and Mashonaland and Natal seized by Rhodes 
for the stock exchange. (quoted in Marx 1981: 1047)
What this passage suggests is that the riches of the colonies and the 
radical changes in social relations imposed on indigenous forces were 
effectively being capitalized by investors in the stock markets of Europe. 
Second, the extension of these loans oten resulted in the creation of 
unrepayable “national” debts owed to foreign interests in the foreign 
currency borrowed. We will discuss this role and its implications in 
greater detail in the last two sections of this chapter.
Yet imperial monetization was not without its contradictions and 
we should be mindful not to theorize it as a universal law being 
applied as a linear and unwavering strategy despite its eventual 
ubiquity before national independence movements. For example, 
many European traders preferred to continue the practice of barter 
trade with local traders. There appears to be two primary reasons why 
this was so. First, barter established personal relationships between 
traders, and the Europeans could take advantage of price differentials 
in goods—often dictated by themselves and an early form of unequal 
exchange. Second, it was thought that if African traders entered 
the monetized world they would out-compete and potentially 
out-accumulate their European counterparts (Hermann 2011). In 
other words, continuing to use barter as a principal form of trade 
was one way for individual firms to sabotage local competing 
interests. However, colonial administrators understood that these 
private forms of barter were not helpful in advancing a uniform 
and exclusive standard of colonial money, and where possible, they 
challenged rogue traders.
It is of course true, to some extent, as more sympathetic scholars 
of imperialism are wont to emphasize, that taxes were oten used to 
finance public works of one kind or another. For example, infrastructure 
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projects such as the setting up of railroads, hospitals, ports, and dykes 
were said to benefit local populations despite the fact that they largely 
benefited private capitalists. In this view, colonial taxation was largely 
a collective project of mutual benefit in the agelong quest to better 
standards of living and to “civilize” the natives through Western 
commercial growth and modes of life. But as more critical scholars 
have pointed out, whatever biopolitics were at play—that is to say, at 
least in this context, whatever attempts to improve life by directing 
infrastructural projects—they were likely ancillary to the primary drive 
of imposing new forms of capitalist social reproduction on populations 
increasingly policed by an apparatus of imperial discipline, punishment, 
and surveillance (Wray 1998: 60). We should recall, as Rodney reminds 
us, that debt-funded “public works” also included “building castles for 
governors, prisons for Africans, barracks for troops, and bungalows for 
colonial officials” (1972: 166).
The imposition of debt-taxes on colonial populations in Africa is 
illustrative of the Chartalist or state theory of money that argues, 
following the original formulation of Knapp, that a sovereign or ruler 
pays for its goods and services in a definite form of money, which is 
accepted by the providers of those goods and services because this 
particular form of money is needed to service the imposed or imputed 
taxes (Wray 2002, 2004). Wray summarized what this process entailed 
for more orthodox accounts of money’s origins:
the case of the colonial governors may be a more powerful test of 
the taxes-drive-money thesis than is readily apparent, for here is a 
case in which taxes are imposed by an external authority whose only 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population might be threat of use of 
force… However, the power to tax and to define the form in which 
the tax would be paid set in motion the process of monetization of the 
economy. The important point is that “monetization” did not spring 
forth from barter; nor did it require “trust”—as most stories about the 
origins of money claim. (1998: 61)
In other words, the monetization and transformation of African social 
reproduction was no spontaneous affair stemming from the natural 
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propensity of Africans to “truck, barter and trade” with their imperial 
masters, but a direct colonial imposition backed by force. It was not 
long before “taxation heightened popular aggravation and figured 
prominently in movements of protest and rebellion” (Wright in Oliver 
and Sanderson 1985: 590). Of the numerous examples of tax rebellions, 
revolts, and riots to draw on as illustrations from in the colonies, we 
only outline two in summary below (for a compendium see Burg 2004).
The Deccan riots
Long before the twenty-first-century epidemic of peasant suicides in 
rural India, the practice of lending money to peasant cultivators by a 
small class of creditors pervaded the village community. As a caste, 
however, their power had been limited by the way in which social 
power was divided in rural society. Until 1828, when the British colonial 
administration started to administer market reforms in Maharashtra, 
moneylenders—or vanis—extended money to a village community 
in the hope of making a return on their capital. Crucially, these loans 
were not collateralized, allowing for a historically unique (and perhaps 
strange) cooperation between moneylenders and cultivators. The 
constitution of this interdependence rested in the fact that the power 
of the vanis was restricted in at least two important ways. First, before 
colonial rule, vanis could not expropriate peasant land to repay debts 
because land was held by the village and could not be alienated. Second, 
as Metcalf remarked, “the state, on its part, gave the moneylender 
no assistance in the recovery of debts. If not actively hostile, it was 
apathetic, and let the creditor to collect his due as best he could” (1962: 
390; see also Kumar 2011: 614). With the onset of more market-oriented 
governance from 1828, these relations of force would be realigned by 
three colonial innovations that unleashed debt as a technology of power 
on village cultivators. First, the British performed surveys on the land 
and accorded private property titles to individual cultivators rather 
than to the village as a whole. This act not only individualized property 
ownership but also valued or “priced” the land held by farmers. Second, 
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a colonial legal apparatus was erected to enforce private property 
rights. Third, believing their two previous initiatives would spur greater 
agricultural productivity, successive colonial administrators applied 
ever-heavier direct taxation on the cultivators. While rural farmers 
did borrow money in times of crop failure or to pay for marriages, 
feasts, and social ceremonies, Metcalf (1962) has argued that the 
overwhelming reason cultivators borrowed from the vanis was because 
of the debt they owed in taxes to the colonial administration.3 Now, 
when the vanis extended credit under British rule, they demanded 
that cultivators advance their land as collateral. As debts mounted 
due to usurious interest rates, poor harvests, declining terms of trade, 
mounting taxes, or some combination thereof, the vanis used the court 
system to enforce their contracts with debtors. As a consequence, more 
and more cultivators lost possession of their land. Kumar noted what 
these agrarian changes meant “the dispossessed peasant was forced 
to live as a landless laborer, oten on those very fields which he had 
formerly cultivated as an independent proprietor” (2011: 619). What 
made matters even more unjust was the fact that the entirety of the 
land was oten seized when only a few payments were in arrears. 
Increasingly, land was being concentrated in the hands of the wealthier 
few as happened elsewhere where mass indebtedness pervaded rural 
society.4 By 1875, dispossession, indebtedness, and burdensome taxes 
were so widespread throughout the Deccan that cultivators directed 
their anger at the vanis and rioted. As Kumar argued, the object of these 
riots was “to obtain and destroy the bonds and decrees possessed by 
the moneylenders” in order to destroy them (2011: 634). As long as 
the moneylender gave up his debt-obligations and accounting records 
peacefully, little harm was done to his person or property. Where 
records were not given up so easily, violence typically ensued. Over 
time, the riots subsided but widespread indebtedness remained. Fearing 
another revolt, colonial administrators eventually put in place measures 
to protect cultivators from moneylenders, though these actions came 
ater fity years of British rule and unmistakable transformations in 
previous forms of rural social reproduction and power relations.
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The Bambatha Rebellion
Another key moment in the resistance to colonial taxation is the 
Bambatha Rebellion, an armed revolt in the Natal region of South 
Africa personalized by the name of its minor Zulu leader. A colonial hut 
tax had already been imposed on married African men in Natal but it 
was oten their sons who migrated to the cities or mines to earn money 
to pay the tax (Redding 2000: 38). By 1887, the previously independent 
political state of Zululand had been militarily defeated and came under 
the control of British colonial administrators. Much of the available 
arable land in the region was confiscated by white settlers and the hut 
tax was imposed on Zulu men. Defeat in battle was made worse by a 
series of natural calamities that killed cattle and ruined crops. In this 
dire situation, many were drawn to the gold and diamond mines, where 
they could earn better wages with which to pay or contribute to the 
hut tax of their father. But this posed a problem for white agricultural 
settlers who wanted to recruit African labor for their farms. Under 
pressure from white settlers, colonial officials introduced a £1 poll tax 
on all African men above eighteen years of age—an application of power 
facilitated by a census that had been taken of the region in 1905. While 
some were ambivalent about the new tax, others viewed the levy as 
accelerating and compounding changes in precolonial social relations. 
Once again, previous forms of social reproduction were being disturbed 
at the household level by a debt-tax—what Tilly called the “invasions 
of small-scale social life” (1990: 25). By 1906, Bambatha along with 
other Zulu chiefs and tribesmen refused to pay the new tax and ater a 
skirmish with authorities that led to the death of two colonial officers, 
martial law was declared by the colonial administration in Natal. Ater 
some minor attacks against colonial forces, Bambatha and his forces 
were held up in Mome Gorge, where they were eventually hunted like 
dogs and gunned down by the thousands (Zulus spears and shields 
being largely ineffective against steel and gunpowder). As Pakenham 
put it, “the Zulus learnt a bitter lesson about the realities of power” that 
day (1992: 649). Arguably, the lesson they learned was that British rule 
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and debt in the form of a poll tax was backed by the power of heavy 
artillery and machine guns. While records vary, it is estimated that 
3,000–4,000 Zulus were killed, 5,000–7,000 imprisoned, and 4,000 or 
so flogged by colonial authorities. Huts were also razed to the ground 
throughout the conflict (Marks 1970; Stuart 1913; Pakenham 1992: 
649; Redding 2000). The rebellion’s leader, Bambatha, was eventually 
captured, killed, and decapitated. When the governor of Natal sought to 
commemorate the victory with a medal in the honor of the dozen or so 
white men who had fallen, none other than Winston Churchill replied 
that it would be better to strike a new copper coin with Bambatha’s head 
on it as a more appropriate symbol of the colonizer’s sacrifice in blood. 
Imperial monetization not only encountered resistance but proposed to 
strike its victims upon its coins!
The birth of the “national” debt in the colonies
As in the case of imperial monetization through enforceable tax debt, we 
do not have the space to examine the proliferation and amplification of 
“national” debts. Demonstrating the near ubiquity of the phenomenon, 
there are currently only four countries in the world without national 
debts: Brunei, Liechtenstein, Palau, and Niue. The reader can be 
forgiven if they are unfamiliar with these countries since they are largely 
negligible to the global economy, where sovereign debt now stands at 
$58 trillion and mounting by the second.5 The United States of America 
and Japan make up just under half of all sovereign debt ($25 trillion). 
But while we cannot offer a full historical account of the development 
of “national” debts here, we investigate the creation of “national” 
debts in: (1) colonial America before and ater its revolutionary war 
with imperial Britain, and (2) the indemnity largely forced on a newly 
independent republic of Haiti founded by a successful slave revolution. 
As we shall see, and as addressed in Chapter 2, a key facet of instituting 
a “national” debt is not only that it was initially capitalized by a 
small coterie of private social forces but also that it was meant to be 
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permanent. Without this institutional permanence, debt could not act 
as a technology of organized power mobilized by the few for their own 
private accumulation. At the liberal end of the critiques of imperialism, 
Hobson captured the essence of debt being mobilized as a technology 
power inside and outside Europe:
The creation of public debts is a normal and a most imposing feature of 
Imperialism… It is a direct object of imperialist finance to create further 
debts, just as it is an object of the private money-lender to goad his clients 
into pecuniary difficulties in order that they may have recourse to him. 
Analysis of foreign investments shows that public or State-guaranteed 
debts are largely held by investors and financiers of other nations; and 
recent history shows, in the cases of Egypt, Turkey, China, the hand of 
the bond-holder, and of the potential bond-holder, in politics. This 
method of finance is not only profitable in the case of foreign nations, 
where it is a chief instrument or pretext for encroachment. It is of 
service to the financial classes to have a large national debt of their own. 
The floating of and the dealing in such public loans are a profitable 
business, and are means of exercising important political influences at 
critical junctures. (Hobson 2005: 108, emphasis added)
In other words, the national debt as a technology of power has an 
internal and external dimension. Internal insofar as it was used as a 
weapon against subordinate social forces to limit certain political 
possibilities. The modern corollary is clear enough: in the age of 
so-called neoliberal austerity, the national debt is used to justify the 
reconfiguration of power relations between state and society through 
privatizations, cutbacks in social spending (wages, infrastructure, 
pensions), and increases in tax and public service provisions (user fees). 
In its external or international dimension, the financiers of creditor 
nations can essentially reconfigure the established patterns of social 
reproduction of indebted countries when they fail to service debts 
and have insufficient power to defend their national sovereignty. We 
will discuss this below but it is largely accomplished by advisors and 
“experts” effectively commandeering the fiscal and monetary policy of 
the state to ensure debt repayment. There is little doubt that domestic 
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elites are oten complicit in the project. The United States of America 
reflected both these dimensions before and ater its revolutionary war 
against Imperial Britain.
The birth of the United States national debt
The British colonization of North America was a profit-seeking 
endeavor sponsored by the Crown but largely financed by private 
initiative. Indeed, Richard Hakluyt’s Discourse Concerning Western 
Planting (1584) can be read as one of the first “company prospectuses” 
aimed at convincing the Crown and investors of the benefits of 
Western colonization (Micklethwait and Wooldrige 2003: 18–19). How 
convincing this tract was is unclear, but a Western colonial project was 
soon sanctioned and proceeded in one of two ways. First, wealthy 
individuals (mainly around London) interested in the accumulation 
of money formed joint-stock trading companies and petitioned the 
Crown for an exclusive charter to certain tracts of North American 
land and trade. These “grants of land made by England served as centers 
of monopoly power to the companies” (Curtis 2014: 481). What this 
means is that the colonial enterprise was a capitalized project with the 
capitalization of colonial firms largely contingent on their monopoly 
privileges and their ability to make profit for their investors. This 
involved removing, killing, and swindling the native population out 
of their ancestral lands, and as we will see, debt was mobilized as an 
effective technology of power here too. The second way North America 
was colonized was by proprietorship. This was simply the act of the 
Crown granting land to individuals or a small band of individuals as 
either a favor or to resolve royal debts. For example, King Charles II 
granted what we today call Pennsylvania and Delaware to William 
Penn in return for cancelling a £16,000 debt that was owed to his father 
(Curtis 2014: 484). Debt and capitalization, then, were motive forces 
for English colonialism. They would also play an integral role in the 
founding of a new nation free of imperial control and its national debt.
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Before the American War of Independence (1775–83) and the 
coming into force of the Constitution of the United States (1789), 
there were two inescapable facts of colonial life among the settlers: 
the ubiquity of debt at all levels of society and the scarcity of money 
for trade and the settlement of debt. Mann captured the daily reality 
of indebtedness: “debt cut across regional, class, and occupational 
lines. Whether one was an Atlantic merchant or a rural shopkeeper, a 
tidewater planter or a backwoods farmer, debt was an integral part of 
daily life” (2003: 3). There were of course different types of debt found 
in the thirteen colonies and five main sources of currency for which 
debt could be incurred or settled: (1) furs and wampum; (2) commodity 
money or “Country Money” such as tobacco, indigo, wheat, and 
maize; (3) foreign coins, particularly of Spanish and Portuguese 
origin; (4) British coinage; and (5) various types of paper money or 
colonial scrip (Davies 2002: 459). Depending on the transaction, these 
mediums of exchange were all potentially useful. However, the scarcity 
of money problem largely resulted from the fact that gold and silver 
(as in Europe and elsewhere) were treated as the only “real” money. 
Since there were no domestic mines of gold and silver discovered early 
on in British North America, colonists had to rely on trade in order 
to attract coined money or bills of exchange redeemable for sterling 
(Ferguson 1954: 158; Davies 2002: 458). However, since the colonies 
were heavily dependent on imports from Britain for conveniences and 
luxuries, they suffered chronic shortages of currency since more money 
was being paid to British merchants than was earned abroad by selling 
domestic cash crops like tobacco.6 Moreover, money was required for 
domestic transactions and internal development, and there was not 
enough specie to facilitate the potential capacity of domestic trade. 
With a dearth of specie, the colonists turned to paper currency as a 
primary medium of exchange. There were two ways in which paper 
money could be issued: (1) colonial legislatures could print and spend 
the paper currency into the economy, mainly to finance the expense 
of war, and/or (2) they could set up a loan office or land bank to lend 
to farmers at low interest based on the security of the farmer’s land 
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(Ferguson 1954: 168). By most accounts, these paper notes eased 
internal and some external transactions and spurred what we would 
today call economic growth. It could also be used to pay taxes and, 
in places, purchase land. For most intents and purposes, the colonial 
scrip issued by the thirteen legislatures was considered legal tender or 
acceptable to meet financial obligations.
At first, London tolerated the paper currency since there was a 
recognized dearth of gold and silver in the colonies to facilitate trade. 
However, by 1751 the Parliament was pressured by creditors and 
mercantile interests to pass an act restricting paper money. Specifically, 
these interests wanted to ban legal tender laws that would allow settlers 
to settle their debts in colonial scrip (Ferguson 1954: 177). The act 
did just that but only applied to New England, where creditors were 
worried about being paid in depreciated currency. By the time the French 
and Indian War was terminated in favor of imperial Britain (1754–63), 
more paper currency south of New England had been emitted. The scrip 
was issued to help pay for the prolonged conflict, but now that peace 
had resumed, merchants and creditors feared that they would be forced 
to accept depreciated paper for sterling debts (Greene and Jellison 1961: 
486; Sosin 1964: 175). Their concerns were heard, and in 1764, another 
currency act was passed banning legal tender laws in the remaining 
provinces. Elite colonists protested against the currency acts but British 
officials would not repeal the legislation. This forced the provinces 
to seek a number of compromises, some of which were successful in 
resolving the scarcity of money problem. Still, without legal tender laws, 
debts to British creditors and merchants now had to be paid in sterling 
unless otherwise agreed. This caused considerable financial difficulties 
in New Jersey, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia in the decade before 
the American Revolutionary War. To be sure, at the First Continental 
Congress (1774), the Currency Act of 1764 was listed as one of the many 
violations of colonial rights (Greene and Jellison 1961: 518). While the 
currency issue may not have been a leading impetus for taking up arms 
against Britain, Greene and Jellison (1961) have convincingly argued 
that it was certainly a major grievance. As we will argue below, the other 
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major grievances were also largely connected to debt and the desire for 
pecuniary accumulation among colonial elites.
The historiography of the American Revolution and the subsequent 
political settlement are vast. However, up until the work of Charles 
Beard (1913), most scholarly accounts were celebratory or, in Curtis’ 
words, “chauvinistic” (2014: 475). In these renditions, the founding 
fathers were heralded as political geniuses who compromised to achieve 
a more perfect union than the Articles of Confederation allowed 
(for a critical reading of the events leading up to the Constitution, see Di 
Muzio in Gill and Cutler 2014: 81–94). To do so they had to overcome 
the antifederalists who were skeptical about protecting the interest of 
citizens and their liberties within a large rather than a small territorial 
unit.7 Building on the politico-economic observations Madison scribed 
in Federalist 10, Beard’s thesis argued that the constitutional settlement 
was primarily a work of men with financial vested interests trying to 
protect their property vis-à-vis their lesser counterparts (1913: 31–51). 
A constitution that authorized a national government would not only 
be able to secure unequal property in the present but also provide the 
organized force (rather than the disparate force of the Continental 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation) required to open up 
further avenues for the accumulation of wealth west of the Appalachians. 
At first, the most damaging charges launched against Beard’s thesis 
was that it was overly deterministic (that is, to say it was derived from 
economic interests solely), and the founders did not always seem to vote 
in their immediate economic interests. Current historians share some of 
this critique but argue that given the political-economy of the time and 
the goal of the federalists, Beard was correct to focus on the financial or 
economic interests of those arguing for a new “national” government 
(Holton 1999; 2004; 2005b; Curtis 2014). Given the discourse of the 
antifederalists and the popular social forces that were politicized during 
the revolution, things certainly could have been otherwise. But they 
were not. As one of the most prominent historians of the period argued, 
the federal Constitution was designed not only to “transfer power 
from the many to the few” but to secure unequal property, power, and 
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privilege well into the future (Wood 1969: 516 citing Richard Henry 
Lee; see also Nedelsky 1990: 2). But the ratification of the Constitution 
was not the only strategic move made by federalists. Under Hamilton’s 
initiatives, the new political settlement was to be backed up by a 
national debt and a for-profit, government-sponsored “national” bank. 
To understand why, we have to consider the situation leaders of the 
revolution found themselves in and what they wished to accomplish 
with the creation of an independent, centralized government.
The first major grievance of colonial elites, many of whom were 
deeply in debt to British creditors and merchants for their lifestyle, was 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774 (Morris 
1962: 15; Curtis 2014: 456–457). The Proclamation of 1763 was “a royal 
decree forbidding settlement or the purchase of Indian lands west of a 
line drawn along the crest of the Appalachians” (Ferguson 1979: 32). 
The primary reason for the decree was the considerable debt Britain 
had incurred fighting the French and Indian War from 1754 to 1763 
(part of the broader Seven’s Years War internationally). London thought 
that if colonists continued to press westward by usurping or purchasing 
Indian lands, this would provoke further wars with the Indians and thus 
produce even more debt. They also wanted to protect Indian hunting 
grounds from settlement since British merchants had a lucrative business 
trading with the Indians of the interior.8 “In effect, the Proclamation 
denied wealthy merchants, landowners and their companies access 
to vast tracts of land that could have been resold to settlers or used 
in the production of cash crops” like tobacco (Holton 1999: 3ff; Di 
Muzio 2014: 88). Since land was the primary source of wealth before 
the fossil fuel revolution, the decree placed a strict limit on the further 
accumulation of money and economic growth by exploiting western 
land inhabited by native tribes. The Quebec Act and additional land 
reform measures, which followed over a decade later, only compounded 
these problems by granting the Ohio Country to the province of 
Quebec, thereby nullifying land claims made by the thirteen colonies to 
the region. What made matters worse was not only the fact that native 
land was to be commodified and was viewed as a future profit-making 
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enterprise but also the fact that the ownership and sale of new lands was 
virtually the only way in which politically connected plantation owners 
could repay their mounting debts to British merchants.9 Indeed, by 
1766, a parliamentary committee found that about £4.5 million was due 
to British merchants in America with nine-tenths of the debt accounted 
for by Southern planters (Sosin 1964: 175 nt. 4; Friedenberg 1992: 149; 
Holton 1999: 35–36; cf. Evans 1962). Breen records why these new acts 
would have disturbed Southern planters so:
… the great planters … used their positions on the governor’s council or 
in the House of Burgesses to patent huge tracts of western lands … . The 
great planters held on to some choice pieces of property… but most of 
it was resold … at considerable profit … . This cozy system lasted until 
the early 1750s when the French and Indian War, coupled with tighter 
imperial controls over the granting of western lands, cut the gentry off 
from one of its major sources of income. (Breen 1985: 35–36)
According to Holton (1999), Bouton (2001), and Curtis (2014), the 
pressure of debt and the loss of the ability to appropriate, improve, or 
sell indigenous land in the west were enough to motivate key figures 
like Washington, Jefferson, Mason, and Lee to play key leadership roles 
in the armed struggle against imperial Britain.
But if debt was mobilized as a technology of power by British 
merchants against their colonial brethren, it was reapplied by the North 
American aristocracy of landowners and merchants to Native American 
tribes. Indeed, outside direct violence, one of the main ways that Indian 
communities lost their land was by going into debt to merchant settlers 
or colonial governments. If and when they could not repay these debts 
(and they typically could not, as more and more of their hunting 
grounds were being depleted of resources), then land was appropriated 
by creditors or colonial officials. In a private letter to William Henry 
Harrison, who was to negotiate treaties with Indians under Jefferson, the 
new president was candid about Indian policy under his administration:
To promote this disposition to ex-change lands, which they [native 
Indians] have to spare and we want, for necessaries, which we have 
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to spare and they want, we shall push our trading uses, and be glad 
to see the good and influential individuals among them run in debt, 
because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the 
individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession 
of lands… In this way our settlements will gradually circumscribe and 
approach the Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us 
as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi. The 
former is certainly the termination of their history most happy for 
themselves; but, in the whole course of this, it is essential to cultivate 
their love. As to their fear, we presume that our strength and their 
weakness is now so visible that they must see we have only to shut 
our hand to crush them … Should any tribe be fool-hardy enough to 
take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that 
tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition 
of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our 
final consolidation.10
This could not be a clearer statement of how debt is to be mobilized 
as a weapon of the powerful in order to expropriate the native 
population from their ancestral lands. The impetus to do this was 
made significantly more acute ater the American Revolutionary War 
and the constitutional settlement because the new government itself 
was in considerable debt to wealthy patriots and foreign creditors. As 
Banner notes, this relationship was well understood by the Continental 
Congress before a federal government was introduced:
Federal and state governments also had large money debts. In the short 
run they needed assets that could be sold to pay creditors. In the longer 
run, if they hoped to be able to borrow in the future, they would need 
a conspicuous stream of income to entice creditors to lend. The most 
obvious source of money in both the present and the future was the 
sale of public land. “The public creditors have been led to believe and 
have a right to expect,” the Continental Congress concluded, “that 
those territories will be speedily improved into a fund towards the 
security and payment of the national debt.” But the government had to 
acquire land before it could sell land, and the only people from whom 
land could be acquired were the Indians. (2005: 127)
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With imperial Britain defeated, the new federal government was free 
to pass its own legislation opening up the western frontier for further 
land speculation and settlement. These initiatives, as the quote suggests, 
were intimately tied to the creation of a national debt that used western 
lands as a security (Williams 1966: 134). Still, private social forces also 
leveraged the power of the national debt to assist in their acquisition 
of profit. For example, in the 1790s, Panton, Leslie and Co. began 
purchasing and consolidating the small and diffuse debts of southern 
tribes. Once they had a pool of debt (undoubtedly discounted from 
their original issuers), the firm used their power to petition the national 
government for a deal. According to Banner, by 1805 their efforts were 
successful. The federal government paid the Indian debt capitalized by 
the company and in return added about 8 million acres of indigenous 
land to the national coffers (2005: 126).11 Something very similar also 
happened with the outstanding debts incurred by the state and union 
governments in financing their war with imperial London.
With a dearth of specie, the only way in which the American 
Revolutionary War could be financed was through the issuance of 
paper money, most of which was issued as debt of some kind by state 
legislatures or the union government. Ater the war (1783), the fiscal 
situations of the victorious provinces were in disarray and a severe 
depression resulted from a lack of specie and the scarcity of money and 
credit. Desperate for hard money to pay taxes and to settle debts that 
were oten incurred to support families while in battle, many farmers 
and other middling settlers were forced to sell their land. Being forced 
to sell land to meet tax and additional debt payments ignited one of the 
most infamous resistance movements in postrevolutionary America: 
Shay’s Rebellion (1786–7). The goal of the 2,000-strong farmer rebellion 
was to shut down courthouses that were responsible for hearing the pleas 
of creditors and sanctioning the sale of land for debt and tax payments.12
Since a number of state militia were supportive of the movement, 
wealthy property owners of Massachusetts were forced to finance their 
own private army to suppress the revolt (Smith 1948; Szatmary 1980; 
Brown 1983).
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Yet another way in which desperate settlers aimed to get by was 
by selling army certificates they had received in payment for military 
service to the revolutionary governments. Desperate for money to pay 
taxes or afford their livelihood in a period of economic depression, 
many soldiers and widows sold their certificates to wealthy speculators 
at what was oten an extreme discount. While the debates are not 
definitive, there is considerable evidence to suggest that what made 
matters worse was the knowledge that an organized force of propertied 
interests were going to vie for a national government with the power 
to tax in order to meet the revolutionary debt and hold democracy 
at the state level in check because of debtor relief programs and the 
desire to overcome the scarcity of currency through the issuance of 
paper money (Ferguson 1954; Bogin 1989; Mann 2003: 176; Holton 
2004; Wright 2008). While some of the war debt was capitalized to 
weaken the British Empire by enemies from France, Spain, and the 
United Provinces, the overwhelming majority of debt issues from the 
revolutionary period were owned by domestic social forces (Davies 
2002: 467). How widespread revolutionary debts were held by the end 
of the war is a matter of considerable dispute; and given that a series 
of fires in the treasury destroyed federal records, it is unlikely that we 
will ever get definitive proof of the original distribution of ownership 
(Ferguson 1954: 35).13 However, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that most of the debt repayments did not go to the initial holders 
of the debt but to a small number of speculators who concentrated 
government securities in their own hands by buying up claims at 
considerable discounts. This was done in the anticipation that a central 
government with the power to tax would eventually come to fruition 
and pay back the debt at face value (Ferguson 1954; Mann 2003: 176; 
Wright 2008: 124). There is little doubt that one of the chief concerns of 
the men who met at the Philadelphia Convention was how to finance 
the debt accumulated during the war (Wright 2008: 81). Suspicious 
of distant and centralized power, the Articles of Confederation 
purposely created a weak federated government without the power to 
tax—one of the chief reasons why Continental dollars depreciated in 
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value throughout the war (Wray 1998: 62; Loubert 2012: 448–449). 
Although they only had a mandate to suggest needed changes to the 
Articles of Confederation, those present at the conference embarked 
upon creating a strong national constitution that would take the 
power of money creation and debt relief out of the hands of state 
legislatures. These legislatures had oten proved too democratic and 
sympathetic to the needs of their constituents, and where they were 
not, protests typically ensued creating instability and disrespect for 
“property” (Wood 1969; Edling and Kaplanoff 2004; Holton 2005a). 
To be sure, addressing the national debt problem and curtailing the 
rights of states were not the only goals of the framers. But here we 
are concentrating on the effects of the Constitution as it pertains to 
debt as a technology of power, and the constitutional settlement and 
its institutional development accomplished some very important goals 
in the service of the powerful. When thinking about the initiatives 
we list below, the reader would do well to recall the progressive thesis 
that there were really two American revolutions: the first, a popular 
struggle of diverse social forces that fought against imperial Britain, 
and the second, counter-revolution by colonial elites who wanted 
to stem the radicalism and democratic spirit of the revolution once 
victory was claimed for the former colonies (for an overview of 
this historiographical tradition, see Morris 1962: 20ff; Wood 1969: 
483ff; Fresia 1988; Tise 1998). While the elite counter-revolutionary 
program was never without contestation, the propertied men of the 
Philadelphia Convention achieved considerable success in creating 
the foundations of an empire premised upon unequal property and 
slavery with a national debt and privately capitalized “public” bank at 
its center.
The important constitutional initiatives that locked in debt as an 
organized technology of power were as follows. Article 1, Section 8 
gave power to the Congress to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts 
and excises”—a power never granted to the Continental Congress by 
the state governments. With the power to tax, the Congress could 
now officially enforce the collection of money to repay rich creditors 
of the revolutionary war debt and future debt incurred by war. As 
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Brown (1989: 1) detailed, up until the Great Depression most of 
the debt contracted by the US government was due to war or the 
preparation for war. Article 1, Section 10 effectively removed the 
power of state legislatures to create money and forced states to accept 
gold and silver as the only legal tender for debts. Since Americans 
were fonder of their local and state legislatures because they were 
more proximate centers of democratic power, this was a massive 
blow to democracy and led toward the centralization of monetary 
power. Section VI of the Constitution could not have been a clearer 
git to the speculators who had busied themselves purchasing US 
debt paper at deep discounts from desperate farmers and soldiers. It 
stated that “all debts contracted and engagements entered into, before 
the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United 
States under this constitution.” The technical details of financing 
what would become a consolidated “national” debt were not worked 
out by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton until 1790. 
Hamilton’s first initiative was to boost the creditworthiness of the new 
government by announcing that all debts issued by the Continental 
Congress would be honored to present, rather than original, holders. 
This, no doubt, delighted speculators and increased the value of 
their securities. Hamilton’s second initiative was to assume all state 
debts and aggregate them under one federally funded “national” 
debt. This move helped to pacify state resistance to the centralization 
of financial power by unburdening them of the responsibility to 
impose unpopular taxes. By 1804, even private debts of wealthy 
colonists were absorbed under the “national” debt, a trick, as we 
shall see in the following section, played by international bankers 
during the so-called Third World Debt Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Henry 2003; Curtis 2014: 456). Third, to raise revenue to service 
interest on the national debt, Hamilton introduced taxes on imports 
and particularly wine, spirits, tea, and coffee. This tax was regressive 
since it shited the burden of taxation away from income and 
property and applied to the rich and poor alike. But while this new 
tax helped to finance the burgeoning national debt, most speculators 
understood that the real prize held by the federal government was 
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the ability to appropriate and dispense native lands to favorites. If the 
power of the federal government was capitalized through its national 
debt, it was the power of the government to enforce the destruction 
of native forms of social reproduction and capture their land. Two 
further initiatives are worth mentioning. In 1792, the Coinage Act 
was passed, making the American silver dollar the official money of 
account in the United States and juridically (though not in practice 
until much later) banning all other forms of foreign money from 
interior circulation. Finally, Hamilton thought to erect a national 
bank on the model of the Bank of England to hold Treasury deposits 
and service the interest on government debt (Sylla 1998; Cowen 
2000; Konings 2011: 28). Although there were slight differences with 
the Bank of England (Wright 2008: 155), the first Bank of the United 
States (BUS) was a for-profit, capitalized chartered bank owned by 
a majority of private shareholders (Rothbard 2002: 68ff). The BUS 
was capitalized at $10 million, with the federal government paying 
in $2 million and outside investors the remainder. Investors could 
also use their outstanding government bonds to purchase shares in 
the new bank. Thus the national debt was born of war and the power 
of private creditors. Over the coming centuries, through continental 
expansion into native and Mexican territory and extracontinental 
wars powered by fossil fuels, the national debt would grow to 
become the world’s largest. When debt is understood as a technology 
of power, is it any wonder to find that the world’s most powerful 
nation is also its most indebted?
Colonization, decolonization, and national debts
We discussed the creation of a national debt in the United States in 
some detail not only because it was modeled on the union of state 
power and private finance as in England but also because it turned 
out to be one of the most successful at leveraging the power of the 
state in the pursuit of war, social transformation, and capitalist 
accumulation. If the level of capitalization is a measure of investor 
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confidence in the ability of any organized corporate force to shape 
and reshape the terrain of global social reproduction and world 
politics, then at least since the Second World War, investors have 
squarely placed their confidence with the US government and its 
military apparatus to enforce change and maintain world order 
(Arrighi 1994; Di Muzio 2007).
Unlike the United States, which managed to extricate itself from 
the imperial grip of Britain, most other states acquired their “national” 
debts during the process of empire building and, more oten than 
not, under the colonial gun of infrastructural projects for resource 
extraction. As yet, there is no comprehensive study on the emergence of 
national debts worldwide, but from our initial research we can make at 
least two theoretical observations based on historical evidence. First, 
“national” debts, particularly in the colonies, have their beginnings 
in the colonial practice of making “colonies pay for their own 
exploitation and conquest” (Anghie 2005: 172). Typically, this meant 
that the government would assume large capital investments primarily 
made by foreign business interests so that resources could be extracted 
and sold to external markets for private profit (Rodney 1972: 209). 
Given that this required “structural adjustment” of previous forms of 
social reproduction, the colonies were oten forced to finance their 
own policing and colonial foreign policy. Nehru discussed this in his 
study of British rule in India:
Thus India had to bear the cost of her own conquest, and then of her 
transfer (or sale) from the East India Company to the British Crown, 
for the extension of the British Empire to Burma and elsewhere, for 
expeditions to Africa, Persia, etc., and for her defence against Indians 
themselves. She was not only used as a base for imperial purposes, 
without any reimbursement for this, but she had further to pay for 
the training of part of the British Army in England—“capitation” 
charges these were called. Indeed India was charged for all manner 
of other expenses incurred by Britain, such as the maintenance of 
British diplomatic and consular establishments in China and Persia, 
the entire cost of the telegraph line from England to India, part 
of the expenses of the British Mediterranean fleet, and even the 
9781472584861.indd   73 02/05/15   5:26 PM
Debt as Power74
receptions given to the Sultan of Turkey in London. (1946: 305; see 
also Stavrianos 1981: 124 for additional expenses “incurred” by the 
colonial government)
These measures and others were financed by heavy taxation on the 
majority of the population: a peasantry increasingly squeezed and 
brought to the brink of survival.14
Second, if “national” debts did not result from foreign investments 
and colonial administration charged to the state coffers, they were oten 
enforced upon a population as an indemnity through force of arms. The 
examples of Haiti and China are perhaps the most prominent. Before 
Haiti became the first black republic to dot the world map, the country 
was the imperial possession of France and known as Saint-Domingue 
(from 1697). Since the native population was decimated by Spain’s initial 
colonial encounter, African slaves were imported to work the coffee and 
sugar plantations owned by Europeans. A rigid and brutal racial and 
class structure emerged, but one that did allow some slaves to earn their 
freedom. By the time the slaves took up arms against their oppressors, 
Haiti was France’s wealthiest colonial possession, producing 60 percent 
of the world’s coffee and 40 percent of its sugar. By 1804, and despite 
continued European attempts to crush the revolution in its infancy, 
the slaves won their independence. However, in an Atlantic world 
replete with slavery, Haiti was politically and economically isolated. To 
gain international recognition from France, Haitian leaders agreed to pay 
France reparations for the loss of its property to the tune of 150 million 
francs in gold. This was an incredible sum to pay and to do so Haiti 
had to take “out huge loans from American, German and French banks, 
at exorbitant rates of interest. By 1900, Haiti was spending about 80% 
of its national budget on loan repayments. It completely wrecked their 
economy. By the time the original reparations and interest were paid off, 
the place was basically destitute and trapped in a spiral of debt.”15 The 
legacy of debt combined with spates of corrupt leadership and natural 
disasters exacerbated by extreme resource exploitation have made Haiti 
the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.
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China also fell victim to debt as a technology of power more than 
once. By the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese social relations 
had been profoundly disturbed by the opium trade, recurrent war, 
and encroachments by commercial and Christian interests. Defeat in 
the first and second Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60), the first 
Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), and the Boxer Rebellion (1900–1) not 
only brought national humiliation but increasing indemnities: “To 
pay the £30 million indemnity following the defeat by Japan, the 
Chinese were forced to make loans that cost them £100 million to 
repay. Likewise the $333 million Boxer indemnity required annual 
installment payments that absorbed almost all of the imperial 
government’s income” (Stavrianos 1981: 325). To ensure repayment, 
colonial forces expropriated the post office and customs houses 
and essentially ran them as “debt collection agencies for foreign 
creditors” (King 2006: 665).16 China continued to pay the indemnity 
to its colonial invaders until the chaos of the Second World War 
interrupted payments. Thus, before more sustained and organized 
forms of resistance to imperialism began ater the Second World 
War, “national” debt was piled up by imperial administrators: (1) for 
investment projects typically related to the extraction of resources, 
(2) for colonial administration including pacification of the population 
through trained and armed professionals, and (3) by forcing weaker 
counterpart to accept punitive indemnities that they had little power 
to resist given alternative options.
Neocolonialism, the debt crisis, and neoliberalism
The social rights activist Desmond Tutu once intoned that “when 
the missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and we had the 
land. They said ‘Let us pray.’ We closed our eyes. When we opened 
them we had the Bible and they had the land” (Gish 2004: 101). Tutu 
forgot to add that the Bible came with a “national” debt. As we will 
argue in this section, the “national” debt is a technology of power in 
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permanent operation and just as effective as the Gatling gun in acting 
as a forcing house for the world market of differential accumulation 
and capitalist power.
Given the violence mobilized against anticolonial independence 
movements, there is considerable evidence to suggest that imperial 
powers were not rushing to relinquish their colonial possessions. 
However, the savagery of the Second World War let former colonial 
powers significantly weakened, only to find that the world they once 
ruled had shited toward the United States and a weakened, but 
industrialized, Soviet Union. The moral or ethical landscape, albeit 
slowly and never entirely, was also transforming, making it more 
difficult to rule by brute force alone. Still, counter-revolutionary 
assassinations and violence of unimaginable proportions were inflicted 
upon independence leaders, social activists, and revolutionary 
movements in the hope of maintaining a world order for capitalist power 
that had been forged for centuries (Marcuse 1972; Blum 2004; Prashad 
2007; Shaw 2011). According to Stavrianos, the shit toward decolonization 
ater the Second World War “did not signify that independent status 
was granted gratuitously or indiscriminately” (1981: 665). He argues 
that three factors played a role in the timing of decolonization: (1) the 
economic and military power of the imperialist country—the stronger 
the country the more likely it could grant political independence while 
maintaining economic control; (2) the role of the United States and 
the Soviet Union and their level of involvement through war, technical 
advice, or the sale of arms; and (3) the political aims of the groups 
vying for independence—the more socially revolutionary, the more 
these forces were met with “extreme repressive measures” (Stavrianos 
1981: 665–666). Since the creation of the United Nations, eighty former 
colonies have been granted formal political independence.17  But for most 
countries, nothing profound had radically changed in their economic 
situations. If we are to believe Stavrianos, the wave of decolonization 
and political independence experienced ater the Second World War 
was really played out on the international stage twice. The first time ater 
Latin American nations gained their independence in the nineteenth 
century, and the second, when the peoples of Africa, Asia, and parts 
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of the Asia-Pacific received theirs in the twentieth century (1981: 177ff 
and 623ff). But if the newly decolonized of both centuries were now 
politically independent, their national debt told an altogether different 
story: one of continued foreign domination by the owners of Anglo-
American banks. In other words, the price tag for independence 
was the acceptance of a quantifiable national debt to be diligently 
serviced, largely by earning foreign exchange through international 
trade (Nyerere 1985).18 For those not blinded by or serving imperial 
control, this new articulation of power was labeled neocolonialism by 
Kwame Nkrumah (1965). Stravrianos marked out the subtle difference 
between the two systems of rule: “if colonialism is a system of direct 
domination by the application of superior power, then neocolonialism 
is a system of indirect domination that cedes political independence in 
order to preserve economic dependence and exploitation” (Stavrianos 
1981: 456). Economic dependence and exploitation is anchored, we 
argue, in the structural power of the national debt largely amassed and 
owed in foreign currency. One particularly revealing example arrived 
just before 1994 and the transformation to majority rule in apartheid 
South Africa. The elite white minority and transnational creditors feared 
that the African National Congress (ANC) was largely an unknown 
quantity with an overly progressive social agenda. The privileged whites 
dreaded the possibility of high taxes for reparations, rampant inflation 
due to social spending, and a redistribution of wealth from whites to 
blacks and the rich to the poor. To overcome these threats and to appease 
international and domestic creditors, the ANC agreed to tie its hands 
while in power. The chief way this was done was by agreeing to a loan 
from the International Monetary Fund that was, according to Bond, not 
needed. The real purpose of the loan was to ensure policy continuity:
In December 1993, the first act of the Transitional Executive Committee 
(a government-in-waiting combining the ANC and the ruling 
National Party) was to borrow $850 million from the IMF, ostensibly 
for drought relief, although the drought had ended 18 months earlier. 
The loan’s secret conditions were leaked to Business Day in March 
1994, presumably to establish confidence in financial markets that the 
election in April 1994 and the subsequent transfer of power would be 
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characterized by a continuity in economic policy. These conditions 
included … lower import tariffs, cuts in state spending, large cuts in 
public-sector wages … [and] … intense pressure by IMF managing 
director Michel Camdessus to reappoint both finance minister Derek 
Keys and Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals, the two main stalwarts of 
National Party neo-liberalism. (Bond 2003: 68)
What this passage suggests is that debt was applied as a technology of 
power to ensure budgetary restraint and IMF supervision over the new 
government’s fiscal policy. Not only did the ANC assume the national 
debt of the old apartheid regime—debts that had been accumulated, in 
part, to repress and at times terrorize the African population—but the 
ANC sacrificed its own program of reconstruction and development 
aimed at ameliorating the deplorable conditions experienced by 
the majority of its citizens disempowered by decades of racist rule 
(Cheru 2001). South Africa, however, is not alone in having its fiscal 
hands tied thanks to the national debt, the power of international 
capital markets, and IMF surveillance.
The use of debt as a technology of power was intensified in the 
post–Second World War era when, influenced by the world religion 
of “development,” governments were encouraged to borrow to 
finance industrialization, infrastructure, and foreign-made arms 
(Rist 2008: 21). As George (1988: 21ff) notes, the military hardware 
imported by the Third World was typically used by privileged elites to 
repress their own populations. In other words, debt contributed to the 
militarization of the developing world. According to Stavrianos, the 
debt load of developing countries skyrocketed from “$19 billion in 
1960, to $64 billion in 1970 and to $376 billion in 1979” (1981: 448). 
Today there are 129 developing countries accountable to the World 
Bank’s Debt Reporting System. Using data from 2010, their total 
external stock of debt is now $4 trillion, up from $1.9 trillion in 
1995 despite some cancellation of debt through the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country initiative of the 2000s. Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
account for 40 percent of all external debt. Not surprisingly, the yearly 
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interest charge has risen from $85 billion in 1995 to $155 billion in 
2010 (World Bank 2012: 40). If we include principal repayments, the 
developing world collectively paid $582 billion to their creditors in 
2010, up from $205 billion in 1995. Put simply, not only do the debts 
owed to foreign creditors continue to mount but so do the interest 
payments: they are perpetual and rising. In his revealing exposé on 
economic hit men, John Perkins suggests that this was exactly the 
point of clandestine US policy in the postwar world: entice foreign 
leaders into accepting debts so large that future governments would 
be forever unable to repay them (2004: xi). This debt not only enriched 
the owners of American firms in engineering, construction, oil 
and gas, and arms manufacturing but they also, insofar as the loans 
were made in US dollars, gave the US government and its corporations 
significant leverage over indebted countries across the world 
(Henry 2003). But this did not just happen by economic hit men and 
private bankers extending excessive loans to foreign governments. 
The mountain of debt that triggered the Third World Debt Crisis of 
the 1980s was intensified by massive inflation in oil prices and US 
interest rates (George 1988: 27ff). While the following discussion will 
be controversial for some, there is convincing evidence to suggest that 
this inflation was orchestrated and strategic rather than unforeseeable 
and accidental (Oppenheim 1976–7).
By the time the Second World War ended in 1945, the United 
States was the unquestionable global superpower. Not only did the 
United States come out of the war with its factories and businesses 
unharmed but warfare stimulated the domestic economy and attracted 
considerable foreign capital. By the end of the war, the United States 
was the largest creditor nation in the world. What also benefited the 
United States and the Allies were the massive onshore oil deposits found 
within the continental United States. Whereas Hitler effectively ran 
out of oil, the Allies swam to victory on a sea of American oil (Yergin 
1992; Hayward 1995). As Yergin noted in his historical study of oil and 
international power, it was the First World War that focused strategic 
minds on the future of warfare and geopolitical power:
9781472584861.indd   79 02/05/15   5:26 PM
Debt as Power80
The Great War had made abundantly clear that petroleum had become 
an essential element in the strategy of nations; and the politicians 
and bureaucrats, though they had hardly been absent before, would 
now rush headlong into the center of the struggle, drawn into the 
competition by a common perception—that the postwar world would 
require ever-greater quantities of oil for economic prosperity and 
national power. (1992: 185)
The connection between oil, economic development, and international 
power is well understood despite the resource curse literature and 
mounting environmental contradictions. While fossil fuel energy is not 
a sufficient cause for development, it is certainly necessary and vital 
for economic growth (UNDP 2000; Wrigley 2010). Until the 1970s, 
the United States had it in spades. How oil plays a special role in the 
international monetary order is of crucial importance for our analysis 
of debt as technology of power.
By at least 1944, the Allies were more or less assured of victory 
against the Axis powers and started to prepare for international 
commerce in the postwar order. At a conference in Bretton Woods 
New Hampshire, plans were developed for an International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (commonly referred to as the 
World Bank). The bank was to help with the reconstruction of Western 
Europe, but as time went on, its remit widened to include “developing” 
countries with lower GDP. The International Monetary Fund was also 
created at the conference and was tasked with facilitating global trade 
by financing, what were thought to be at the time, temporary balance 
of payment deficits. Because of the long history of Europeans coveting 
gold as the only “real” money and the fact that most of the gold of the 
world had amassed in the United States thanks to two world wars, a 
new gold standard was proposed under IMF supervision. In this 
scheme, the US dollar was pegged to gold at $35 dollars to one troy 
ounce. In turn, member states of the IMF pegged their currencies to 
the US dollar at a relatively fixed and stable rate. Many believed that 
these fixed rates would help eliminate currency risk for international 
business and therefore facilitate corporate planning and economic 
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growth. This system did not last long, however. The reason was that, 
in some senses, the United States never stopped fighting the Second 
World War. Primarily as a result of its prolonged war in Indochina, 
the country started to experience routine balance of payments deficits 
by the early 1970s. The United States was moving fast at becoming 
the world’s largest debtor nation with twin deficits in its current and 
budget accounts. France was the first to realize that the United States 
had flooded the world with so many dollars that it did not have enough 
gold to back the currency in circulation. When Britain asked to cash in 
its reserves for gold, the Nixon administration unilaterally severed the 
link between the dollar and gold. The administration understood that 
the dollar had effectively become the world’s reserve currency so that a 
“pure capitalist credit-money system” was virtually inevitable given the 
contradictions of the dollar (Ingham 2004: 77–78; see also Konings 
2011: 89ff). How the Nixon administration managed this situation 
and the controversy surrounding it is of considerable interest from the 
perspective of debt as a technology of power.
US strategists not only knew that the dollar was the de facto world’s 
reserve currency but also understood that demand for the currency 
would remain high given the size of the US securities market, financial 
innovation by Wall Street and in Eurodollar market, and the fact that 
a range of internationally traded commodities were denominated 
in US dollars (Konings 2011: 123). The most important commodity 
was, of course, oil—the essential ingredient needed by all nations to 
propel industrial development and a “modern” consumer economy 
(Clark 2005: 30). By 1971 or so, the production of conventional oil in 
the United States had peaked, so it was incredibly important for the 
United States, as a growing debtor nation, that oil remain denominated 
in dollars rather than a basket of currencies as some Middle Eastern 
bureaucrats thought to do (Spiro 1999: 110). Saudi Arabia agreed to 
keep the numeraire for crude petroleum in dollars and the Organization 
for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) followed suit. By 1973, the 
price of oil skyrocketed and by the end of 1974 was up by 400 percent. 
While orthodox history blames this increase in oil prices on the Arab 
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oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur War, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that the price increase was desired by the Nixon 
administration and that Kissinger did his best to facilitate the war 
between Israelis, Syrians, and Egyptians by misrepresenting intentions 
to all parties (Oppenheim 1976–7; Kubursi and Mansur 1994: 313–327; 
Gowan 1999: 21–22; Engdahl 2004: 136; Clark 2005: 30).19 Even if 
some scholars do not want to contemplate the notion that oil prices 
were strategically rigged, the effects of the 850 percent increase in the 
cost of oil from 1973 to 1980 are rather clear: (1) petrodollars flooded 
into major US banks and the City of London due to the weak financial 
system in the Middle East; (2) this had the effect of recapitalizing the 
major banks, allowing them to loan more funds abroad while at the 
same time financing the current account deficit of the United States; 
(3) a portion of these petrodollars were used to purchase US treasuries 
(thereby helping to drain reserves) and considerable amounts of 
military hardware, which further militarized the Middle East; 
(4) the price increase plunged the industrial economies into a period 
of stagflation—a condition of rising prices, slow growth, and high 
unemployment;20 and finally (5) the price increase made oil much more 
expensive for countries with weaker currencies (Gowan 1999: 21–22; 
Clark 2005: 30ff).
Although economists have debated the source of the Great Inflation 
of the 1970s, it is pretty clear from the data that the massive inflation 
in the cost of oil was tightly correlated with the drastic increases in the 
consumer price index.21 Seemingly to combat inflation, Paul Volcker, 
then chairman of the Federal Reserve, took a radical step and raised 
the federal funds rate to astonishing levels—as high as 21 percent.22 The 
interest rate became a weapon. Unemployment climbed, but by 1983 
inflation started to sink. We have little space for a full investigation 
here, but it is worth asking a question, keeping in mind that the price 
of oil was the main driver of inflation: how does increasing the cost 
of money do anything whatsoever to quell oil prices? If anything, 
high interest rates would have made the cost of oil far more expensive 
for those countries who had to borrow dollars to purchase oil. And 
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this is precisely what happened to countries of the developing world 
dependent on oil imports: they had to borrow to meet their oil needs. 
In other words, these counties now had to pay not only the inflated 
cost of oil but the inflated cost plus interest on debts incurred from oil! 
The Volcker Shocks are all the more troubling when Nitzan’s empirical 
research has convincingly demonstrated that economic growth and 
inflation are inversely correlated historically (Nitzan 2001: 253ff). 
In other words, in boosting interest rates to epic proportions, the 
Federal Reserve was helping to increase inflation rather than defeat 
it. This is a fact consistent with the basic math of interest tables for 
debt and in line with Rowbotham’s (1998) claim that broad inflation 
is the result of a debt-based monetary system. The reason is simple: 
businesses ultimately push the cost of borrowing onto customers, 
increasing the price of goods and services. Lucky for Volcker, with 
unemployment skyrocketing, the beginning of a merger boom, and 
oil prices coming down in the early 1980s, inflation started to abate 
in the capitalist heartland and the financial press lionized him. But if 
things were returning to “normal” in the United States, the Volcker 
Shocks had served to inflate the debt of virtually every developing 
country—countries that oten had to take new loans just to service 
mounting interest payments (George 1988; Hall 1988: 12). Usury 
used to be applied at the level of the individual, but it was now being 
applied at the level of entire populations as a permanent technology 
of imperial power. From the perspective of capital as power, interest 
is a weapon of redistribution, pure and simple, and the “debt crisis,” 
exacerbated uncontrollably by heavy interest rates, was to serve as 
probably the greatest redistribution scheme in world history. The 
mirror image of it is found at the micropolitics of everyday debt in 
the credit card industry where banks prefer revolvers: customers who 
service their minimum monthly payments but never pay off their cards 
in full. Just like developing countries have to take out new loans to 
service old debts (therefore always increasing the total debt burden), 
so too do individuals take on new credit cards to service old ones. 
In this way, interest becomes perpetual, precisely the design of the 
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first permanent “national” debt under the supervision of the Bank of 
England.23 Whatever the exact design of the US Treasury and Federal 
Reserve during the Volcker Shocks, the idea that the persons running 
these institutions did not know that elevating interest rates to such 
proportions would exacerbate a debt crisis in the developing world 
is patently untenable. An important piece of evidence to this effect 
is the fact that in the debt crisis of the 1980s, the US administration 
“intervened heavily to prevent [debt restructuring or default] by 
offering financial assistance to bail out private investors and by tying 
this assistance to the adoption of tough IMF structural adjustment 
programmes in debtor countries” (Helleiner 2005: 952). And this 
brings us to what we call the debt–neoliberalism–restructuring nexus.
The literature on neoliberalism is vast and cuts across the social 
sciences. In such a short work like this, we cannot hope to fully engage the 
literature here. However, we share Cahill’s analysis that the turn toward 
neoliberalism cannot be fully explained by policy makers grabbing on 
to a new set of ideas inspired by Hayek, Friedman, a legion of right-
wing think tanks, and the Chicago School more generally (Cahill 2013; 
Cahill 2014). Our hypothesis is that insofar as neoliberalism can be 
conceived of as a set of policy prescriptions akin to the Washington 
Consensus, as coined and enumerated by Williamson (1990: 5–20), its 
origins are fundamentally rooted in the debt-based monetary system.24 
This is why—we suggest—that despite the Keynesian interlude, there are 
so many points of contact between austerity, expropriation, dispossession, 
environmental exploitation, the oppression of workers and the obsession 
with economic growth in the capitalist past and present. The differential 
accumulation of power in a debt-based money system constantly 
requires redistribution from debtors to creditors—be they individuals, 
nondominant corporations, or entire nation-states. The debt crisis 
that began in the 1980s and the debt crisis currently in the capitalist 
heartland are evidence of this fact insofar as entire political-economies 
have been and are daily being restructured as debt-repayment machines 
with: (1) drastic cuts in social spending and the sack of public workers; 
(2) newly minted and increasing “user fees” for public services; (3) the 
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privatization of public assets; (4) increases in taxes for the majority 
(mostly indirect, so applied regressively); (5) the creation of special 
export zones to encourage foreign investment in cheap labor; and 
(6) the wholesale destructions of environments and ecosystems that 
take place when nature is commodified to pay back debt. The crucial 
thing to note is that, despite all these measures, more debt is forever 
piling on. In the next chapter we explore some of the most important 
consequences of debt as a technology of power in greater detail.
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4Consequences: The Debt–Growth–
Inequality Nexus
Nowadays, economic growth is heralded as the ultimate goal by so 
many governments. To an extent, this goal is forced upon society as it 
struggles to meet the interest charges on its debt. Whilst debt grows at 
compound interest towards infinity, in the physical world everything 
depreciates towards zero. I propose that the price we shall all pay for 
running this unwinnable race against compound interest is a polluted 
and depleted world. (Tarek El Diwany 1997: 189)
Over 300 years ago, as we’ve detailed, a country the size of the state 
of Minnesota or half the size of Papua New Guinea embarked on a 
financial experiment dictated largely by debts accrued in war that 
arguably succeeded in making it the richest and most powerful country 
in the world. Dozens of other countries tried to emulate its success with 
varying degrees of success and failure. But by granting the right to the 
Bank of England to print and issue money as debt, the Government 
of Britain delivered to them the equivalent of the philosopher’s stone, 
enabling private citizens to create wealth with the stroke of a pen. Some 
321 years later we are in a position to evaluate the consequences of that 
experiment. It is certainly true that the financial system that evolved 
out of that beginning has created, for some, great wealth and numerous 
technological marvels. The human life span has been extended and cures 
for disease and illness realized for considerable portions of the global 
population. We can only speculate how history would have changed if, 
for example, the Government of England had reserved the right to issue 
money to itself, and had other countries, such as the United States, later 
followed suit.
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Regardless, issuing money as debt, as we have described above, 
not only creates hardships for individuals and countries unable 
to service or pay off their debts. We have tried to take that a little 
further and outline how debt is central to the global political economy 
as it has evolved since the fundamental institutional innovation of 
the Bank of England. As we have illustrated, it has been used as a 
means of expropriation of resources, a mode of discipline and market 
subjectification, and an instrument of control (Schild 2000).
Furthermore, for debt to be maintained and extended as a technology 
of power requires, as we noted earlier, perpetual and exponential 
economic growth. It is not incorrect to say that the requirement for 
growth arose simultaneously with the creation of a national debt, for 
without growth (or rapid inflation), the interest and/or dividend paid to 
debt holders could never be realized (Ferguson 2001: 140). Throughout 
history there have been periodic financial collapses when the necessary 
return to creditors was not forthcoming (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005; 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Indeed, the current crisis in the Eurozone 
is attributable to fears of default related to the prospects for economic 
growth in some European countries.
Without perpetual and exponential growth, in other words, a debt-
based monetary system cannot be sustained; furthermore, the rate of 
growth experienced over the past three centuries could not have been 
maintained without the fortuitous availability of affordable energy, first 
in the form of coal and then in the form of oil and gas.
In sum, we suggest that the ownership, production, and allocation 
of “capitalist credit money” creates a particular form of political 
economy that requires perpetual economic growth under the logic of 
differential accumulation, along with the availability of affordable fossil 
fuels to drive the necessary systems of production and consumption. 
We claim that this system is not natural and inevitable but a historical 
creation intertwined with the power of the 1%—of whom, owners 
and managers of financial institutions are the most important. We 
see the pursuit of this logic as leading toward what Polanyi called a 
“stark utopia”—a general situation of increasing austerity and hardship 
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for ordinary families and ever-greater environmental despoliation. 
However, unlike Polanyi, we do not understand the emergence of this 
“stark utopia” as being generated by belief in “self-adjusting markets” 
but fundamentally rooted in our debt-based money system capitalized 
and owned by the few. Moreover, given the precarious state of existence 
for many, mounting and variegated expulsions from society, and 
despoiled or newly barren environments in many parts of the globe, we 
can already start to identify what might be called a geography of “stark 
utopias” (Bauman 2004; Davis 2007; Standing 2011; Sassen 2014). 
Being the children of the oil age, neoliberals claim that growth is the 
source of all well-being and assume the growth logic as self-evidently 
desirous. However, their general confusion over the monetary system, 
a child-like belief in “free markets,” and their outlandish conviction in 
limitless growth lead them to ignore how debt serves as a technology of 
dispossession and private accumulation. This is an ongoing process that 
produces an ever-greater centralization of power as well as mounting 
environmental harm in spite of neoliberal incantations to the contrary 
that growth will promote individual freedoms and greater well-being.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will argue that we cannot fully 
evaluate the results of the debt-money experiment without considering 
our environmental decline, growing differential power and economic 
inequality, and a host of other social problems that stem from the debt-
driven requirement for perpetual economic growth that is, in turn, 
made possible only by the availability of affordable energy. We will first 
examine briefly the history of the growth paradigm and the dilemmas 
that it poses. Then we will examine why maintaining the necessary rate 
of growth becomes more difficult, and why it necessitates yet more 
debt and the continuing acceleration of environmental degradation 
and differential power accumulation. Then, we will reconsider Thomas 
Piketty’s (2014) work by examining the acceleration of differential power 
or inequality in light of our analysis of debt as a technology of power. 
More specifically, we will extend our analysis from the previous chapter 
on the role of debt in wealth transfer. Finally, we want to suggest the 
difficulties of changing our present environmental, political, and social 
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trajectories within the existing political economy by briefly examining 
the question of who controls the future of food and energy.
A brief history of perpetual growth
As mentioned above, the prime assumption of neoliberal economists, 
policy makers, and politicians is that perpetual economic growth, as 
measured by gross national product (GNP), is the source of all well-
being and progress (see Korten 1995: 70).1 As Michel Foucault put 
it, for neoliberalism “there is only one true and fundamental social 
policy: economic growth” (Foucault 2004: 144; see also Gellner 1983; 
O’Connor 1998). Embedded in this logic is the assumption that we live 
in a world in which it is possible to expand our economies ad infinitum, 
and that, as Igoe and Brockington put it, “the world is a pie that can 
grow bigger and bigger until everyone can have a piece” (2007: 434; see 
also Arndt 1978: 143–144).
The computation of growth as “gross national product” was 
developed in the United States by Simon Kuznets and associates during 
the Great Depression (Fioramonti 2013: 23). With the memory of the 
1930s depression fresh, leading economists such as John Maynard 
Keynes suggested that full employment was possible only in conditions 
of steady growth (Arndt 1978: 35). W. Arthur Lewis (1955: 420–421), 
in his classic work, The Theory of Economic Growth, suggested that 
growth would solve the problems of inflation and the balance of 
payments, promote greater economic equality, and provide greater 
control of the environment. Economic growth, some claimed, would 
even increase levels of happiness. As Paul Samuelson (1964: 778) 
suggested in the sixth edition of his famous text, Economics, while 
material goods are not themselves important, a society is happier when 
growing and not stagnating. Benjamin Friedman (2005) argues that 
economic growth fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, 
social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy; 
in other words, more money makes people more moral.2
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Concerns about economic growth and its formal computation 
intensified ater the Second World War and is perhaps now the world’s 
largest religion (Hamilton 2004).3 This religion is rationalized by 
the proposed benefits that include, among others things, increased 
national security, full employment, greater social and economic 
equality, increased social mobility, the economic development of the 
Third World, the growth of democracy, and greater happiness.4 This is 
why during the Global Financial Crisis the solution was to chase more 
growth. As the editorial board of the Financial Times (2009) spelled out 
in its “survival plan for global capitalism,”
There is one certainty. While recessions are inevitable, deep depressions 
or slumps—or whatever you call them—are neither necessary nor 
welcome. They destroy wealth, sap happiness and crush old certainties. 
What is more, increasing poverty is a grave threat to world stability and 
democracy. Revolutions oten start as bread riots, and economically-
stagnant countries make belligerent neighbours. Growth must be 
restarted.
Regardless of the origins of the need for perpetual growth and the 
ideology required to sustain it, one cannot argue that historically 
the goal has not met with remarkable success. As Angus Maddison 
(2001) documents in his monumental work, The World Economy: A 
Millennial Perspective, economic growth was virtually absent until the 
nineteenth century, when it surged in the era of abundant, affordable, 
and relatively accessible fossil fuels (Smil 1994; Goldstone 2002; 
Wrigley 2010) (see Figure 4.1).
Currently global GDP is over $70 trillion and has grown at an annual 
rate of about 2.5 percent since 1750. Since 2000, the rate of growth has 
been about 3 percent, which is the minimum that economists consider 
necessary for a “healthy” economy.
Of course, the drive to growth also led to unprecedented global 
competition for resources, two world wars, hundreds of smaller-
scale conflicts, and the expenditure of untold lives and wealth, not 
to mention mountains of debt at different scales of global society. Yet 
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Figure 4.1 Rate of per capita GDP growth from 0 to 1998 AD by regions
Source: Adapted from Maddison, Angus (2001) The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective 
(Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).
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the assumption that growth could solve socioeconomic and political 
problems persisted and ultimately became the main policy objective 
of virtually every country in the world as the system of national 
accounts and the discourse of “development” was institutionalized in 
the United Nations at the end of the Second World War (Rist 2008; 
Fioramonti 2013: 32).5
Other than the separation of economics from politics and the 
mathematization of the economy as a distinct sphere of “formal” study, 
the insistence on perpetual growth is the key belief that distinguishes 
classical economic theory from its neoliberal variant. Classic 
economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard 
Keynes, and, more recently, Amartya Sen did not envision perpetual 
economic growth as a specific policy goal. They saw political economy 
and later economics providing the tools for economies to grow to a 
certain point as organisms do in nature, and then, when people could, 
in Keynes words, live “wisely, agreeably and well,” growth would level 
off (see Jackson 2009: 41–42; Skidelsky 2009: xvii).
There is of course little doubt that some degree of economic growth 
for a given time period may have positive social benefits. However, 
there are major problems with pursuing economic growth for its 
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own sake in perpetuity.6 First, the computation is merely an adding 
up of economic transactions in the economy. What this means is that 
things that actually harm society—like car accidents, more disease, 
oil spills, and so on—are actually added to GDP. Second, economic 
growth tells us very little about how the potential benefits and harms 
of our transactions are distributed across and between societies. 
Moreover, it is difficult to justify empirically whether perpetual 
growth, the keystone of neoliberal logic, has delivered on its claims. If 
we go back only to 1950, the global economy has expanded more than 
six-fold (see Maddison 2001: 125). Surely with that much growth, 
we should have seen considerable improvement in the promised 
social, economic, environmental, and political gains. Yet nationally 
and internationally we are more unequal than ever (see, e.g., Noah 
2012; Stiglitz 2012; Dorling 2014; Johnston 2014; Di Muzio 2015); 
in the United States alone, one in five children still lives in poverty; 
instead of increasing, social mobility is decreasing (Bradbury 
2011); most developing countries are so heavily in debt that funds 
that should go to build roads, hospitals, schools, and public health 
facilities and to reduce poverty are flowing into Western banks and 
financial institutions just to service the interest on the debts. World 
expenditure on armaments has increased by 50 percent since 2001 
alone (Shah 2012), so it is difficult to make the case that growth has led 
to greater national security. Politically our institutions are increasingly 
dominated by large corporations and financial institutions. Moreover, 
as Bill McKibben (2007) points out, while in 1946, the United States 
was the happiest country among four advanced economies, thirty 
years later it declined to being ranked eighth among eleven advanced 
countries, and a decade later it ranked tenth among twenty-three 
countries, which include countries from the developing world. 
Furthermore, there is a steady decline in the percentage of Americans 
who claim their marriages are happy, are satisfied with their jobs, or 
find pleasure in the place they live. In fact, overall in the United States, 
there has been a dramatic drop in social capital, that is, relations of 
cooperation, reciprocity, and trust (Putnam 2000).
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While neoliberal economists generally accept a view of the world 
whereby problems can be solved through the perpetual growth of 
the economy, there have been periodic dissenters within the field of 
economics, skeptical of the benefits of rampant economic growth 
(Mishan 1967; Scitovsky 1976). The most renown is perhaps Herman 
Daly.
In 1996, Daly, a former economist with the World Bank, published 
his seminal work, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable 
Development. He not only argued that growth was unsustainable, 
but that it was doing irreparable harm to our societies, as well as our 
environments, and that GDP, then at just over $9 trillion in the United 
States, was an irresponsible way to measure the progress of a society.
Yet by 2014 US GDP was almost $17 trillion, or seventeen times 
greater than it was in 1967 and eight times greater than it was in 1976. 
Global GDP stood at about $70 trillion, over twenty times what it was in 
1967, and almost twice the size it was when Daly issued his warning. In 
fact, if the US economy grew at the minimum desired rate of 3 percent 
real GDP growth a year7 (close to the growth rate of Japan from 1900 
to 2000), in 2100 the GDP, that is what US citizens are consuming and 
producing, would be over $200 trillion, or 600 times what they spent 
and produced in 1950! And since some emerging nations tend to grow 
at higher rates than wealthy nations, global GDP could theoretically 
approach or exceed a quadrillion dollars.8
While neoliberal economists assume that more growth is better, it 
is impossible to conceive of the effects of a quadrillion dollar global 
economy on the world’s ecosystems, even if it was possible, let alone 
their societies. As John Magnus Speth (2008: x) argues, even if our 
economic output remained at its present level, the world would be 
virtually uninhabitable by the end of this century. The damage that 
has been and is being done is well documented by J. R. McNeill 
(2000), among many others, and illustrated pictorially by Will 
Steffen et al. (2004: 132–134) and his associates in the series of charts 
detailing the exponential environmental effects of economic growth 
(see Figure 4.2).9
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Figure 4.2 Rates of resource extraction and environmental change
Source: Adapted from Steffen, W., et al. (2004) Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet 
under Pressure (New York: Springer): 132–133.
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Even environmental economists are hard-pressed to come up 
with a scenario in which it would be possible to maintain growth 
and yet limit environmental destruction. Tim Jackson, economics 
commissioner on the UK Sustainable Development Commission, notes 
that “… there is as yet no credible, socially just, ecologically sustainable 
scenario of continually growing income for a world of 9 billion people.” 
Furthermore,
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Resource efficiency, renewable energy and reductions in material 
throughput all have a vital role to play in ensuring the sustainability 
of economic activity. But the analysis … suggests that it is entirely 
fanciful to suppose that deep emission and resource cuts can be 
achieved without confronting the structure of market economies. 
(Jackson 2009: 86)
Jackson is one of the few environmental economists examining the 
impact of economic growth on the environment, who recognizes that 
slowing or stopping growth will itself lead to economic disaster; that 
is, while continued growth will destroy the environment, stopping or 
slowing it will destroy the economic foundations of our societies. He 
concludes,
Taking a step back for a moment, there are only two ways out of [the 
dilemma of growth]. One is to make growth sustainable, the other is 
to make de-growth stable. Anything else invites either economic or 
ecological collapse. (Jackson 2009: 128)
But there is another problem that is equally, if not more, sobering: 
as economies generate more debt and material goods, as they grow 
wealthier, it becomes more and more difficult for them to sustain growth. 
Economists inexplicably call this the “convergence factor,” noting 
that developing countries, which are able to maintain higher growth 
rates, will “converge” to the growth rate of advanced economies (Jones 
2002: 63ff; Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin 2004: 462–463). But this 
makes little sense as an explanation for differential growth rates; more 
accurately, the reason has to do with the nature of exponential growth.
From the investment side, maintaining a compound rate of growth, 
as David Harvey (2010: 216) notes, requires money managers to find 
more and more profitable investment opportunities. Currently there is 
almost $100 trillion controlled by institutional investors in pensions 
and insurance alone, an amount that has more than doubled since 2000 
(OECD 2014: 7, 9). In physical terms, as Harvey puts it,
When capitalism was made up of activity within a fity-mile radius 
around Manchester and Birmingham in England and a few other 
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hotspots in 1750, then seemingly endless capital accumulation at a 
compound rate of 3 percent posed no big problem. But right now 
think of endless compound growth in relation not only to everything 
that is going on in North America, Oceania and Europe, but also east 
and south-east Asia as well as much of India and the Middle East, 
Latin America and significant areas of Africa. The task of keeping 
capitalism going at this compound rate is nothing if not daunting. 
(Harvey 2010: 27–28)
Harvey (2010: 28) notes that the wave of privatizations that is so central 
to neoliberal policy prescriptions is less about the unproven increases 
in efficiency and more about finding places to invest money and keep it 
working and growing. Furthermore, finding an exponential increase in 
places to grow money requires greater and greater risk, as the subprime 
mortgage fiasco proved.
To illustrate further the difficulty of maintaining growth, from the 
resource extraction side, from 1990 to 1995 the lumber industry in 
the United States maintained a growth rate over that period of about 
3.5 percent by cutting down the equivalent of one and a half million 
more trees than they had in the previous five-year period. However, 
in order to maintain the same 3.5 percent growth rate from 2005 to 
2010, they would have had to cut down the equivalent of two and 
a half million more trees (Howard 2007). Extrapolate those growth 
figures to automobiles, fish stocks, water usage, and so on, and the 
near impossibility of sustaining exponential growth becomes more 
easily apparent.
While we cannot elaborate further here, another significant 
consequence of the difficulty of growth maintenance is that the time 
spent and the processes used to maintain growth must accelerate; 
everything has to move faster.10 Money has to flow faster, people have 
to work faster, and even our food crops and animals have to grow faster; 
by using growth hormones, antibiotics, and feed lots, for example, beef 
cattle now reach slaughter weight in fourteen months, instead of a 
natural three to four years (see Robbins 2005; Pollan 2007). Time 
becomes an enemy to be overcome (Gleick 2000).
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We can conceptualize the difficulty of maintaining exponential 
growth, also, by remembering that capitalization is a claim on expected 
future earnings and that these earnings are contingent not only on 
the power of firms and certain government organs but also on the 
ability to commodify various aspects of the natural and social world. 
Furthermore, the transformation of the natural world into money and 
earnings requires energy, which is also beginning to approach limits 
and has severe consequences for the biosphere and human and natural 
life (Heinberg 2003; Rockström 2009; IPCC 2014). Chris Martenson 
(2011: 150) estimates that each 1 percent of economic growth 
requires a 0.27 percent increase in petroleum production; at a 4 percent 
growth rate, the world would need to increase the present 90 millions 
of barrels of oil a day to some 114 mbd by 2020. The problem is not 
necessarily with supply (although some estimates are that conventional 
oil is in decline), but with the environmental and monetary cost of 
retrieving what remains, including “unconventional” fossil fuels. In 
1930 it took one barrel of oil to extract 100. By 1970, with oil more 
difficult to extract in certain regions, the ratio fell to 25:1; by the 1990s 
it was between 18:1 and 10:1. There may be lots of oil in tar sands or 
shale, but the ratio between usable energy and energy needed to extract 
it is about 3:1, 2:1, and, some argue, even less (Martenson 2011: 133ff).
Debt, growth, and austerity
When we consider statistics on debt, we have to remember that one 
person, corporation, or government’s debt is another entity’s asset. 
The financial sector runs on debt. That is their main product; and they 
market that product as aggressively as any other producer of goods and 
services. But unlike other products, which require labor and resources 
to create, financial assets are largely created by computer entries. And 
while we may marvel at the fact that a car can be built in eighteen hours, 
billions of dollars in financial assets can be created (or destroyed) in 
milliseconds.
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This has one very significant implication: an economy operating 
with debt-money, and, therefore, one that requires perpetual and 
exponential growth, requires also the creation of evermore debt. But 
more debt, in turn, requires more growth to produce the required 
interest or dividend, and so the cycle continues. If at any point, the rate 
of growth is insufficient to produce the money required to pay debts, 
financial crisis inevitably ensues as credit collapses.
So while maintaining economic growth is not intrinsically good, 
particularly when weighed against the negative externalities it produces 
that include environmental devastation, the centralization of power, 
and dysfunctional social relations, growth (or, more accurately, capital 
accumulation) is necessary to ensure that the financial system does not 
freeze up or collapse and take the rest of the society with it. That is the 
price we pay and the dilemma we face for granting to private interests 
the right to issue money as interest-bearing debt.
Currently total global debt exceeds $199 trillion or almost 300 
percent of global GDP (Reddy 2013; Dobbs et al. 2015).11 If we assumed 
that the average interest on the debt was 5 percent with a term of ten 
years, the global economy would have to produce over that period 
over $50 trillion of new money in order to service all the interest. 
And that assumes that no new debt is issued, which is impossible 
in a debt-based monetary system. While we can only examine a few 
of the consequences of this process, we will focus, first, on how this 
plays out in loans to developing countries and, second, compare the 
process to some effects on domestic borrowers. Our major point here 
is that in a debt-based economy there can never be sufficient growth 
to honor all debt payments, and, furthermore, if growth accelerates, 
central banks will raise interest rates, not only increasing the need 
for growth to pay the additional interest, but paradoxically, making 
growth more difficult by reducing economic activity and job creation. 
Consequently, the money required for financial institutions to receive 
their needed return on capital must be realized elsewhere. In brief, 
what leading economists and banks call “austerity” is, in reality, a 
“taking” from others.
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Odious debt
We noted earlier how, ater the withdrawal of colonial powers, loans 
were extended to now nominally independent colonies as a means of 
discipline, market subjectification, and control. It is difficult to imagine 
how lending institutions, including the World Bank, could have 
assumed that there could ever be sufficient growth in those countries 
to produce the revenue to pay off the debts. Consider, only, that it 
required the control of the resources of over half the world, along with 
the control of a source of cheap energy for the wealthy countries of 
the world to maintain their necessary growth rate in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and it is easily apparent how absurd it was 
to expect colonial and ex-colonial countries to collectively grow 
sufficiently to pay off their debts. This is one among other reasons we 
can call it odious debt.
The term “odious debt” originates with the Russian jurist Alexander 
Sack and refers to a type of sovereign debt generally assumed by 
dictatorial regimes where the borrowed money did not benefit the 
citizenry (and is oten used to repress them), where the citizenry did 
not consent to the debt, and where creditors had full knowledge of 
the situation (UNCTAD 2007; Bonilla 2011). In 1997, when Franjo 
Tudjman of Croatia eliminated political opponents and looted public 
funds, the IMF cut off lending to Croatia. But commercial banks, 
nevertheless, lent an additional $2 billion to the Tudjman government 
until his death in 1999. While these loans benefited virtually no one 
but corrupt government officials and the banks that extended the 
loans, they, nevertheless, had to be repaid, usually by cutting funds 
for education, sanitation, health, and poverty reduction. Similar loans 
were made to the Apartheid government of South Africa, to dictators in 
Nigeria, Philippines, Nicaragua, Haiti, and much of Latin America, the 
financial burden of which is borne by the citizens of those countries, for 
which they not only received little if any benefit but with which many 
were imprisoned, tortured, and killed (Kremer and Jayachandran 2002; 
Ndikumana and Boyce 2011).
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This pattern of too much money being invested in countries that 
could not possibly produce the revenue to honor the loans has been 
repeated all over the world over the past forty years, with everyone 
pointing the blame for the debt crisis at everyone else.
However, these sovereign debts represent a colossal failure of 
banking judgment, ignorance of economic theory, or more than 
likely, as we mentioned earlier, a cynical strategy for economic and 
political control. To put these loans and the conditionalities that have 
been imposed on most countries by the IMF in perspective, imagine 
yourself going to the bank for a loan to open a hardware store on Main 
Street. The bank, your only source of capital, extends the loan but sets 
these conditions: you must pay back the loan with currency having 
half the value of the amount you received, essentially doubling your 
debt burden, and, if you borrow any additional money, you must pay 
twice the interest rates of competitors. In addition, the bank supports 
a big box store down the road from you and extends loans to a dozen 
other people to open hardware stores on your block, with whom 
you must compete. That essentially is what happens to emerging 
economies as conditions of the loans they have received. Unable 
to attain growth rates necessary to repay the loans, they have been 
forced, first, to restructure by devaluing their currency, ostensibly to 
encourage exports and discourage imports. Then, to counter inflation, 
they must pay higher interest rates on loans, and they must compete 
with economic sectors of developed economies that possess far 
superior technologies and whose businesses have lower energy costs. 
If you have a cup of morning coffee, remember that there are over fity 
coffee-exporting countries in the world, most trying to produce and 
sell as much coffee as possible to pay their external debts. But the glut 
of coffee on the market drives down prices, making it more difficult 
to attain the economic growth necessary to pay even the interest on 
the debt (Pendergrast 1999: 277ff; Tucker 2011; Robbins 2013).12 What 
is true of coffee is true also of most commodities (e.g., lumber, beef, 
tea, etc.), driving up the profits of importers, but leaving exporting 
countries even further in debt.
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To make matters worse, not only is there no provision, beyond 
default, for countries to declare bankruptcy but also unpayable 
sovereign debts are being purchased by hedge fund traders at a 
fraction of their face value from banks that have given up on collecting. 
These traders—dubbed “vulture capitalists” by Wall Street traders 
themselves— generally seek payment for the full face value of the debt 
by taking countries to court.
The default by Argentina in 2014, its second in thirty years, is 
instructive (Sassen 2014). First, it should be noted that Argentina’s 
external debt was accumulated by the military junta (1976–83) and, 
through the painstaking investigative work by Alejandro Olmos Gaona, 
was declared odious in Argentine court in 2000 (George 1988: 129–130; 
Naylor 1994: 142–149; Olmos Gaona 2001). When Argentina defaulted 
on its sovereign debt in 2001, Elliott Associates L.P., an investment firm 
headed by Paul Singer, purchased at a large discount, some $48 million 
of unpaid debts. Singer demanded from Argentina the full value of the 
debt, which, when interest and fees were added, was valued at anywhere 
from $1.5 billion to $3 billion. Singer took Argentina to court to collect, 
and a US federal judge ruled in Singer’s favor, forcing Argentina 
to again default to avoid payment and throwing their economy into 
turmoil.13 Singer had pioneered these funds, when, in October 1995, 
Elliott Associates purchased some $28.7 million of Panamanian 
sovereign debt for $17.5 million from large banks such as Citi and 
Credit Suisse, which had given up on ever collecting. As was normal in 
situations where countries did not have enough to service their debt, the 
government of Panama asked bondholders to restructure the debt, by 
extending the time period or taking a lower payment. Most agreed, 
but not Elliott Associates; they demanded full repayment of the $28.7 
million plus interest and fees. Elliott filed a lawsuit against Panama in 
New York district court, and the case went all the way to the New York 
Supreme Court, which sided with Elliott. Panama had to pay the firm 
$57 million, with an additional $14 million going to other creditors.
Following Singer’s innovation, other funds were formed, such as Dart 
Container Corp and EM Ltd., both linked to Kenneth Dart, one of the 
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most famous names in the world of vulture funds, to purchase sovereign 
debt of other indebted countries and demand full payment of the debts.
The problem that has been raised has to do with the morality of these 
transactions. The money that is flowing to investors in these funds is 
money that is oten being taken away from investments in education, 
health, and poverty alleviation in these countries (Palast 2014). Take the 
region of sub-Saharan Africa, for example. This region pays $10 billion 
every year in debt service. That is about four times as much money as 
the countries in the region spend on health care and education.
However, lest we place too much blame on the likes of Paul Singer 
and Kenneth Dart, we must remember that most of these loans were 
issued by major banks, oten with formal or informal assurances by 
the International Monetary Fund or World Bank that the loans could 
be repaid.
Domestic (odious?) debt
However, debt as a technology of power has not only been used in 
developing countries; it is a technique and pattern that is being applied 
in developed countries as well, and may be as odious as the debt foisted 
upon the developing world. The parallels between the use of debt to 
discipline, subjugate, and control other countries and the use of debt to 
control the citizens of so-called developed countries are striking.
As with global debt, debts of all kinds have been increasing 
dramatically in the United States, as well as in other countries of the 
world (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Since the vast majority of money is released into the economy as 
capitalized money bearing interest to the owners and managers of 
banks, this means that one way to expand earnings is by expanding 
the pool of debtors. One of the major inventions here was the creation 
and development of the consumer and various types of consumer credit 
“products”—from credit cards and lines of credit to car and home-
equity loans. The result has been a dramatic increase in consumer debt 
(see Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.4 Total private and public debt as a percent of GDP: major countries
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The literature on this topic is too vast to cover in any depth here, but 
at least three broad trends can be identified (Gelpi and Julien-Labruyère 
2000; Manning 2001; Montgomerie 2006; 2009; 2013; Sassatelli 2007; 
Burton 2008; Leonard 2011; Robbins 2014: Chapter 1; Soederberg 2014).
Figure 4.3 US private and public debt as a percent of GDP, 1870–2012
9781472584861.indd   104 02/05/15   5:26 PM
Consequences: The Debt–Growth–Inequality Nexus 105
First, creating the consumer through advertising has not only 
increased in geographical scope since the organized capitalization of 
advertising firms but also deepened across a range of new and traditional 
media. One indication has been the yearly growth in advertising 
spending, now surpassing a half trillion dollars—higher than the GDP 
of 163 countries listed by the World Bank.14 This spending facilitates 
debt as a technology of power insofar as it is designed to produce forms 
of identity and subjectivity that oten require access to consumer credit 
to achieve (Gill 1995). In a sense, advertisers have sold to consumers 
the same image of the good life that economic development advocates 
and lending agencies sold to citizens and politicians of the Third World.
Second, consumer credit instruments have globalized—albeit, 
extremely unevenly. One key example is the credit card industry, 
which views emerging economies as a key source of growth so long 
as consumer behavior can continue to be modified (Research and 
Markets; Global Credit Card Industry—Emerging Markets 2010). In 
China alone the market for credit cards grew by 13 percent in 2013 
to 391 million cards, with Euromonitor predicting strong growth 
for plastic credit going forward (Waldmeir and Rabinovitch 2014). 
Figure 4.5 US consumer credit, 1968–2012 in $millions
Source: see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_mt_flows.html
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Moreover, as wages have stagnated or fallen for the majority in mature 
economies, there has been an increasing reliance on consumer credit 
to finance necessities like food, medicine, and electricity—in part, 
what Soederberg calls “debtfarism” (2014). To be sure, some of this 
spending is on conspicuous consumption, but we must also recall that 
borrowers are not borrowing money that exists when they use bank 
products, but money created on computer screens. Furthermore, 
nonsecuritized loans account for $62 trillion dollars (McKinsey Global 
Institute 2013)—the largest category of debt in the world—while the 
World Bank notes that household consumption represents about 60 
percent of global GDP. Without debt-financed spending, then, there is 
little doubt that crises would ensue.
Third, there is a burgeoning industry growing up around the 
consumer debt revolution that includes debt-collecting agencies, debt 
counselors, credit-rating agencies, subprime debt traders, pawn shops, 
new technologies to monitor debtor whereabouts, and new punitive 
legal frameworks including the return of incarceration for unpaid debts 
(Gill and Roberts in Young et al. 2011; LeBaron and Roberts 2012; 
Corkery and Silver-Greenberg 2014).
The number of people whose debts have been referred to collection 
agencies is huge: some 35 percent of all people in the United States 
with credit records have, at one time or another, been reported to 
collection agencies with unpaid debts averaging $5,178 (Boak 2014; 
Ratcliffe et al. 2014).
Whereas creditors in developed countries can launch into indebted 
countries their legal teams and, if necessary, their country’s military to 
enforce debt payments, domestic banks and other lending institutions 
can send in lawyers, judges, and police.
For example, in the United States there is a growing market for bad 
debt, that is, debt that is more than a few months in arrears. Investors 
buy “bad paper,” as it is called, at pennies on the dollar and then use 
every means, both legal and illegal, to collect.15 Jake Halpern (2014) 
describes the world of the debt collector, individuals and firms who 
buy debts from banks that the banks have not been able to collect. 
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Oten they buy these debts for as low as 0.04 on the dollar, reaping 
huge profits in the process. By law, banks are not able to count as assets 
debts that are 180 days or more in arrears. Banks then “charge off ” 
these debts and then “sell” them in bulk to collectors who then attempt 
to collect from the debtors. These buyers are the domestic equivalents 
of “vulture capitalists.”
The bad debt business really took off in the United States ater the 
savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s, when the US government 
seized the assets of failed savings and loan institutions and auctioned 
off their unpaid loans. Debt buyers then call, threaten, and sue debtors 
to collect as much as they can. Halpern describes one portfolio of debt 
purchased by one bad paper collector for $28,000, that brought in more 
than $90,000 in six weeks, with the remaining unpaid loans then resold 
for $31,000, and resulting in an almost 200 percent return on the initial 
investment (2014: 15). The bad paper market grew from $582 million 
in 2009 to over one billion in 2012 (Hunter 2014). As a consequence, 
the number of lawsuits against consumers has skyrocketed, reaching 
200,000 in New York State alone in 2011. Other problems include 
collectors buying portfolios that have been stolen or have already 
been sold to someone else, threats of violence, and so on. As Halpern 
documents, the bad paper collection industry oten attracts the more 
unsavory elements of society. As one debt buyer who hired people to 
collect debts he had purchased described them to Halpern, “Oh my 
God, they were like thugs,” but, he said, the more clean-cut types 
couldn’t do the job (2014: 13).
Oten the methods used to collect these debts are illegal. In 2015, 
New York State reached a settlement of $675,000 with one of the biggest 
debt buyers, the Encore Capital group, over the filing of thousands 
of flawed debt collection lawsuits against state residents (Silver-
Greenberg 2015). And, as with indebted countries, to repay creditors 
domestic debtors must reduce spending on such family necessities as 
food, shelter, and health care.
While there are many other consequences of debt-based money, we 
will mention only two here. First, while it seems natural to say that we 
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need to reduce our debt, we must recognize that reducing debt reduces 
the money supply. There are many who claim that global and domestic 
sovereign debt is too high and must be paid down. But doing so makes 
it harder for everyone else to repay his or her debts and could itself 
produce a financial crisis. That is, for every government debt there is a 
corresponding private asset, and if the debt is paid off, the asset in the 
form of interest-bearing securities is destroyed.
To a great extent, the argument over whether to decrease or increase 
government spending is rooted in the contradictory functions of debt-
money. On the one hand, it serves as a store of value; consequently, 
holders of money deplore inflation because it reduces the value 
(or purchasing power) of the money held. On the other hand, money 
also serves as a means of exchange; consequently the more money 
(or debt) issued, the greater the amount of economic activity, and the 
more goods and services produced and jobs created. The fact that central 
banks have as their prime goal the control of inflation is indicative of 
who controls central banks—the holders of interest-bearing wealth.16
Second, there is a hierarchy of debt-owners, such that some receive 
their return on capital before others; that is, some creditors have priority 
over others. This is clearest in the case of sovereign debt. Greece, for 
example, unable to service its sovereign debt, carried out the biggest 
debt restructuring in history in 2012. Thanks to some €174.5 billion 
bailout money from other Eurozone governments, Greece was able 
to pay some of its creditors. But the Eurozone and the IMF required 
first paying Greek bondholders, and only using what was let for public 
needs, such as paying pensioners or teachers (Stevis 2013). The logic 
of this priority is that government bonds are generally considered the 
safest investment, and if bondholders faced the prospect of greater risk, 
bonds would cease to be as attractive an investment and more interest 
would be charged. But if growth is not maintained, debt is more difficult 
to repay, and more must be confiscated from other sources in order 
for the interest on the debt to be repaid to priority creditors. Various 
ways to do this include eliminating money for such things as education, 
welfare, and health services, as has been the case in developing 
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countries. Generally such measures go under the term “austerity,” 
and using a household metaphor, financiers, bankers, and co-opted 
politicians justify austerity by claiming that the indebted government 
or country is “living beyond its means,” as if they were all members of 
one big household irresponsibly spending more than it earned. A more 
apt household metaphor, however, would be one in which one sibling 
among ten expropriated 50 percent of the family income, leaving the 
rest for his nine brothers and sisters. Furthermore, if the family income 
ever declined, he demanded to be reimbursed first when it increased 
again, insisting that his brothers and sisters give him a portion of their 
income if he suffered any loss.
Thus, as Pavlina R Tcherneva (2014) documents, over the past 
thirty years, in any economic downturn, as soon as growth returns, the 
wealthiest 10 percent receive their money first, and, more recently, even 
confiscated some of the income of the other 90 percent (see Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of average income during expansions
Source: Tcherneva, P.R. (2014) “Reorienting Fiscal Policy: A Bottom-up Approach,” Journal 
of Post-Keynesian Economics, Vol. 37.
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As Tcherneva puts it,
An examination of average income growth during every postwar 
expansion (from trough to peak) and its distribution between the 
wealthiest 10 percent and bottom 90 percent of households reveals 
that income growth becomes more inequitably distributed with every 
subsequent expansion during the entire postwar period. Only during 
the 1950–53 expansion did the bottom 90 percent capture all of the 
average income growth in the economy. Since then, the top 10 percent 
of households have been capturing a greater and greater share of the 
income growth and, in the latest expansion, they have captured over 115 
percent of the income growth, while incomes of the bottom 90 percent of 
households declined. (2014: 54–55, our emphasis)
Inequality and the privileged decile
There is no question that inequality in the United States and elsewhere 
has risen dramatically over the past forty years, as evidenced by the 
number of recent works on the subject (see, e.g., Freeland 2012; Noah 
2012; Stiglitz 2012; Dorling 2014; Johnston 2014; Di Muzio 2015). 
Globally inequality has reached the level whereby the global 1% own 
just under 50 percent of global wealth (Oxfam 2015).
Factors identified as responsible for this trend include rapid 
technological change, the rapid globalization of the economy, stagnant 
or declining wages, the growth of finance, and the weakening or outright 
destruction of labor unions, particularly in the United States. The work 
on differential capital accumulation that has received the most attention 
is that of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, particularly Piketty’s 
(2014) best-selling Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which purports 
to show that growing inequality is endemic to a capitalist economy.
The idea that inequality is an intrinsic feature of our economic system 
runs counter to the claim of neoliberal economists who, historically, 
have maintained that growth will reduce inequality and the need for 
wealth redistribution. In their view, increased wealth will “trickle down” 
the economic ladder (Arndt 1978: 46–47; Kempf 2008). The key research 
on which this claim was based was Simon Kuznets and Elizabeth Jenks 
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(1953) work, Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings. It 
was the first work to rely on income distribution statistics and the first 
to measure social inequality on such a large scale. Based on tax records 
between 1913 and 1948, the authors demonstrated that economic 
inequality dramatically decreased during that time, that the income 
of the top 10 percent went from 45–50 percent of national income to 
30–35 percent. Kuznets and Jenks ostensibly had statistical proof that 
income inequality had dropped dramatically and that capitalism had 
widespread income benefits in the United States (Piketty 2014: 12–13).
Kuznets and Jenks recognized that the intervening World Wars and 
the Depression played a role in the lessening of income extremes; 
nevertheless, the study served as the foundation for economic policy over 
the next fity years and the key justification for neoliberal austerity policies.
Piketty essentially replicated Kuznet and Jenk’s study by extending 
the data back to the eighteenth century and forward to the present 
and into the future. His conclusion was that the normal process in a 
capitalist economy is for wealth and income divergence, that when, as 
he put it, the return on capital exceeds the rate of economic growth, 
as it has done for most of the past two centuries, wealth diverges and 
inequality increases. Figure 4.7 represents the historical trajectory of 
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Figure 4.7 Income inequality in the United States, 1910–2010: percent of 
income earned by the top decile
Sources and series: see piketty.pse.fr/capital21c.
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Figure 4.8 Income and wealth inequality in the United States, 1913–2012: 
percent of income earned and wealth held by the top 1 percent
Source: Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003) “Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913–1998,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1. Updated to 2008 at http://emlab.berkeley 
.edu/users/saez. See more at: http://inequality.org/income-inequality/#sthash.XAUIRSwA.dpuf.
the income in the United States of the top 10 percent, while Figure 4.8 
represents the share of income and wealth of the top 1 percent.
We briefly discussed Piketty’s contributions in Chapter 1, and this 
is not a place for an extensive review of his monumental work. But his 
basic point is that when the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of 
economic growth, capital will continue to amass a greater amount of 
the national income than labor. In essence, going back to our household 
metaphor, one sibling will continue to expropriate a far larger share 
of household income than his sisters and brothers. The question of 
whether or not the privileged child deserves that share is, of course, the 
stuff of monumental debate.17 Our question is, how does he do it? For 
Piketty (2014: 26–27) the key is the role of inherited wealth. He argues,
When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate 
of the economy (as it did through much of history until the nineteenth 
century and as is likely to be the case again in the twenty-first century), 
then it logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster than output 
and income. People with inherited wealth need only save a portion 
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of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly 
than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, it is almost 
inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from 
a lifetime’s labor by a wide margin, and the concentration of capital 
will attain extremely high levels—levels potentially incompatible with 
the meritocratic values and principles of social justice fundamental to 
modern democratic societies.
There is no question that inheritance, as Piketty suggests, plays a key 
role in inequality. But he neglects to discuss the role of debt-based 
money and the role of interest on debt in the global economy, and debt’s 
role as a regressive tax. Where is this inherited wealth coming from? 
Debt, itself, as we’ve mentioned, is a technology of wealth transfer that 
essentially divides the population into those who are net debtors and 
the privileged few who are net creditors, a division that today may be 
more or equally relevant than the standard economic division between 
capitalists and laborers. That is, net debtors of all countries share—
economically, culturally, and socially—more in common with net 
debtors of other countries than they share with net creditors of their 
own country (Di Muzio 2015).
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, while the word does not even appear 
in the index, Piketty’s book is in many ways about “debt.” For there to be 
a return on capital invested, there must be a corresponding return that 
constitutes someone or something’s obligation to produce an amount 
greater than that invested. Whether the return is a loan payment, 
rent, or profit, like any debt, it must be in addition to and greater than 
the initial loan or capital input. Consequently, it should come as no 
surprise that inequality has surged along with surging debt levels, and 
that once we understand the role of interest on debt in our economy, we 
can see how debt is essentially a structural regressive tax because of the 
way money is presently issued.
As it is presently constituted, every economic transaction—whether 
the purchase of a commodity, a rent or mortgage payment, a meal at 
a restaurant, or payment for some service—must contain interest on 
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someone or something’s debt. Even a portion of income and indirect 
tax payments will go to service the interest on the public debt held 
by bondholders.18 In other words, a portion of the price of virtually 
everything we buy and every tax we pay is interest on a loan through 
which money was injected into the economy. The question is, to whom 
is the interest portion of the price going? The German researcher 
Helmut Creutz answers thus:
The share of interest contained in prices … when redistributed, 
do not benefit all households and least of all the weaker ones. The 
overwhelming part of it flows towards those who have the most 
interest bearing assets at their disposal. More precisely: the richer 
one is, this means, the more interest bearing tangible and monetary 
capital one possesses, the larger is the share that one gets from the 
pot of the interests collected. The biggest loss is borne relatively, 
however by those households that have no interest yielding assets, 
or at least, none worth mentioning. They only pay in without ever 
getting anything back. (2010: 4)
The extent to which the top 1 percent and 10 percent control interest-
bearing (as well as dividend- and rent-bearing assets) is evident in 
Table 4.1, as are the total debt levels by wealth percentile. In brief, 
Table 4.1 Total income generating assets and debts by percentile 
of wealth: 2010
Asset type Top 1% Next 9% Bottom 90%
Stocks and mutual funds 48.8 42.5 8.6
Financial securities 64.4 29.5 6.1
Trusts 38.0 43.0 19.0
Business equity 61.4 30.5 8.1
Non-home real estate 35.5 43.6 20.9
Total assets for group 50.4 37.5 12.0
Total debt for group 5.9 21.6 72.5
Data from Wolff (2012, 2013).
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the top 1 percent own over 50 percent of the wealth-generating assets, but 
have only 5.9 percent of the debt.
Margrit Kennedy (2012), drawing on Creutz and research on 
the German economy, writes that some 35–40 percent of everything 
we buy goes to interest to bankers, financiers, and bondholders. As 
Ellen Hodgson Brown (2013) notes, that helps explain how wealth 
is systematically transferred from the majority to the minority at the 
top of the income pyramid. The one very key consequence of debt as a 
technology of power is that domination through the redistribution of 
money to the already rich is mathematically encoded into the system.
Consequently, we have constructed a debt-based monetary system 
divided into a society of net debtors and net creditors, with the latter 
comprising, at most, 1–5 percent of the population. If we were to graph the 
difference, we would get something like the distribution (as in Figure 4.9) 
based on a 1985 study in Germany (Kennedy and Kennedy 1995: 26).
To further appreciate the role of interest in our economy, Figure 4.10 
and Table A.1 show the amount of interest paid each year in the United 
Figure 4.9 The distribution of net creditors and net debtors
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States from 1960 to 2012, and the percentage of the national income 
(GDP) that it represents.
Interest payments in 1960 amounted to some 46 billion dollars, or 
a little less than 9 percent of the national income. By 1982, interest 
payments amounted to over $1 trillion, or some 30 percent of the 
national income. The rapid rise in interest as a share of US national 
income was likely caused by the removal of the cap on interest rates, 
then about 6 percent, due, in turn, to the rise of inflation in the late 
1970s and early 1980s that we discussed earlier. It may also be due, in 
part, to an increase in credit card use. Those caps, however, were 
never replaced, even when inflation rates declined to historically low 
levels. Since the early 1980s, the share of national wealth represented 
by interest has fluctuated between 15 and 31 percent, but since 
1980, it has averaged a little over 25 percent of GDP. Essentially, this 
represents a tax on money, the tax going to private lenders, rather 
than to the public good.
To illustrate the extent of this transfer of wealth, consider that the 
amount of interest paid each year in the United States has, since 1978, 
exceeded the amount paid in federal taxes (Figure 4.11 and Table B.1).
In other words, US citizens pay more to private interests as the cost 
of issuing money than they pay to the Federal government in taxes to 
Figure 4.10 Interest paid as a percent of GDP
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run the country! If the United States had not assigned the right to create 
money to private interests, and had kept for itself the right to issue 
money as interest-bearing debt, it would have collected, in the period 
from 1960 to 2012, a sum equal to all Federal taxes with an additional 
$20 trillion let over for the public good.
Moreover, to the share of the national income siphoned off in 
interest on debt, we can add the cost of the financial industry in general, 
which Thomas Philippon (2014) calculates is at an all-time high of 
9 percent of GDP. As Philippon (2014: 2) asks, “consider that 9 percent 
of US GDP last year was about $1.4 trillion—an unprecedented windfall 
for America’s capitalist class. What does society get in return? Or, in 
other words, what does the finance industry produce?” This does not 
mean that we do not need a financial industry, as Philippon recognizes, 
whose role it is to produce, trade, and settle financial contracts, transfer 
resources, produce information, and provide incentives, to, as the 3rd 
Lord Rothschild put it, “facilitate the movement of money from point 
A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed” (Ferguson 2008: 63). The 
question is, when in earlier eras, as Philippon documents, such services 
could be provided at 2–4 percent of GDP, why now, with the great 
Figure 4.11 Total interest paid in the United States compared to total federal 
tax revenue, 1960–2012
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.3; http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/
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increase in communication technology, can’t such services be provided 
far more inefficiently and cheaply?19
Our arguments in this book, also, should not be taken as an attack 
on the market, per se, however defined. There is nothing wrong with 
an economy in which people provide goods and services for others 
and receive an economic reward, even money, in return. However, 
the money that is used need not be created by a privileged few as 
interest-bearing debt through which they would accumulate a vastly 
disproportionate share of the society’s wealth. In other words, while the 
market is a prerequisite for debt to be used as a technology of power, 
markets can function perfectly well without a money supply created 
by a private elite through debt, as the number of alternative currency 
arrangements around the world demonstrate (Hallsmith and Lietaer 
2011). A perfectly workable modern market economy could be created 
if every individual received money only for productive work or, even, 
if every person, at the age of 18, was given a set amount with which to 
buy what was needed. This would not guarantee perfect equality, by 
any means, but it would ensure that people could choose what to do 
with their allocation and that, if they needed more, would offer goods 
or services that others demanded. It would not require perpetual, 
exponential growth and mounting dependence on a nonrenewable 
energy supply that destroys the biosphere.
Who controls the future?
Facing the impossibility of sustained exponential growth, mounting 
environmental problems, historically expensive oil, and wealth 
concentrating in ever fewer hands when levels of public, corporate, 
and consumer debts are expanding, the question becomes who, at this 
point in our history, controls the future?20 If we were to project into 
the future, who would have the greatest say in what it will look like? 
No doubt this is a difficult question to answer, but without a sustained 
democratic movement against the use of debt as a technology of power, 
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we anticipate that creditors, investors, and the giant firms they capitalize 
will continue to shape and reshape the limits of the possible for social 
reproduction and define the limits of how we address the problems 
we face. To illustrate this concern, we briefly mention the food and 
energy industries.
The future of food
One of the major long-term problems, particularly in the United States, 
is that of food supply; not that there is not enough, but, rather, too much. 
US food manufacturers produce some 3,900 calories a day per person. 
Their problem is selling it, which, if US obesity rates, particularly for 
children, are any indication, they are doing very effectively. The average 
American was some 23 pounds heavier in 2003 than their counterpart 
of 1960 and still getting heavier (Moss 2012; CDC 2013). This is such 
a worldwide trend that we could call the process the globalization of 
fatness and obesity (Roberts 2010; Raine 2012). It is not only about how 
many calories are consumed but also about the inequality of money 
and food options and the mass motorization of society that are chief 
contributors to the growing public health crisis.
There is also a problem with industrial agriculture; it is essentially 
unsustainable, dependent as it is on two rapidly diminishing resources—
oil and water.21 However, food production is a very profitable enterprise. 
But when we examine both US-style food production and consumption, 
we find an addiction to five things: oil and water on the production end, 
and salt, sugar, and fat on the consumption end. Our aim, here, is not to 
fully document the problem; that has been done extensively by others 
(e.g., Pollan 2007; Moss 2012; Gardner 2013). The question we want to 
ask is whether, under our present political economy, the global system 
of food production and consumption, which is hugely profitable, can 
be changed to one in which production is more sustainable and diets 
are healthier?
We may believe that we choose our food. But, clearly, what is available 
to us is controlled for the most part by large food companies who go to 
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great lengths to discover our tastes and preferences. In a brilliant job of 
investigative reporting, Michael Moss (2013) describes how even when 
food companies try to do the “right thing” they are oten stymied by 
investment capital.
In the early 2000s, there were executives at Krat Foods genuinely 
alarmed at the contribution of the company to the obesity epidemic 
and were concerned about the consumer backlash and how it would 
affect the company in the long run. To get people to eat more of their 
product required manipulating the amount of sugar, fat, and salt in 
their foods, but it was resulting in negative health consequences. Could 
they promote healthier food and remain competitive in an industry 
that kept adding more sugar, salt, and fat?
At the time, Krat was owned by Phillip Morris, and executives were 
worried that sugar, salt, and fat would bring down the processed food 
industry the same way as nicotine had brought down cigarettes. The 
tobacco industry, ater years of fraud and denial, lost its big lawsuit 
brought by forty states whose health care programs were buckling 
under the pressures of tobacco-related illness. It cost the tobacco 
industry some $365 billion in the resulting lawsuits.
Ater years of carefully using just the proper amount of sugar, salt, 
and fat to maximize sales, Krat made a decision to cap the amount 
of sugar, salt, and fat in their foods. However, the result was a drop in 
their stock price of some 17 percent at the same time as rivals were 
increasing at 5 percent. What ensued was a meeting with alarmed Wall 
Street analysts.
Moss describes a conversation a Krat executive had with Wall 
Street analysts about lower-than-expected sales and the pressure to do 
something about it:
“Do you think there’s a bigger problem?” a Morgan Stanley analyst 
asked. “Because clearly you’re underperforming your peers.” “And 
what about all this talk about fighting obesity?,” asked an analyst 
from Prudential Securities. “How was the company going to meet the 
projected sales growth of 3 percent if it was worrying about people’s 
waistlines?” “You’ve obviously made a statement on obesity,” the 
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analyst added. “But can you clarify the company’s efforts in achieving 
a volume increase? You’re going to try to grow your volume 2 to 3 
percent domestically, it’s almost got to make us fat.” (Moss 2013: 257)
Under the pressure of investors and in competition with other food 
giants, Krat’s executives went back to fat, salt, and sugar and abandoned 
any attempt to make their products less harmful. More could be said 
about how the global food system is shaped and reshaped by the logic 
of differential capitalization and the need for corporate earnings. But 
this brief example highlights how one company’s executives were more 
or less forced to maintain the excessive amounts of salt, sugar, and fat in 
their foods for the sake of earnings in the midst of an obesity epidemic 
in the United States and elsewhere.
The future of alternative energy
There are considerable debates over the future of energy. However, 
three main issues are relatively clear: (1) modern capitalism can be 
conceived of as a petro-market civilization since fossil fuels are the 
energy base that has allowed for the expansion and deepening of 
markets and the magnitude of monetary accumulation; (2) fossil 
fuels are nonrenewable and therefore this civilizational order is 
nonrenewable; and (3) the turn to coal, oil, and natural gas is altering 
the climate in ways that have impacted and will impact communities in 
harmful ways (Di Muzio 2012). Many recognize the need to transform 
our societies by finding alternative indicators of well-being and 
encouraging the switch to renewable energy and related technologies. 
However, studies also note that even if it were possible to run our 
societies on 100 percent renewable energy, what is not possible is the 
maintenance, let alone constant expansion of global growth into the 
next century (Trainer 2007; Heinberg 2011; Zehner 2012). Even if 
we were generous and included nuclear energy, renewables only make 
up 18.4 percent of global energy supplies—the remaining 81.6 percent 
consists of oil, natural gas, and coal. In other words, the transition to 
renewable energy will be protracted, and without significant direction 
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and investment from public officials, it is unlikely to be accomplished. 
There are a number of important reasons for this but the one considered 
here is what matters most to creditors, investors, and capitalist firms: 
differential earnings and differential capitalization. Figure 4.12 
compares the rise of capitalization in the oil and gas industry with that 
of its potential rival: the renewable energy industry. What the data 
demonstrate is that creditors and investors currently have little faith in 
the future profitability of the renewable energy industry relative its oil 
and gas counterpart.
Indeed, had you invested in the WilderHill index, you would have 
lost money from 2007 to 2012. However, had you invested in the oil 
and gas industry over the entire period, your investment would have 
grown by 182 percent. The reason is simple: the oil and gas industry is 
far more profitable than the renewable energy industry and capitalists 
chase differential returns not civilizational survival (Di Muzio 2012). 
Figure 4.12  Comparison of capitalization of oil and gas and renewable energy
Sources: FT 500 2001–2012; WilderHill NEX
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Until this goes into reverse or states make considerable investments 
in renewable energy, global society will be increasingly locked into 
an unsustainable petro-market world order that will go from crisis 
to crisis as oil becomes more expensive, debts mount, and austerity 
measures intensify.
Toward an expanding stark Utopia?
When Karl Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation, he described the 
horrendous effects of the development and growth of the industrial 
economy: the dispossession of rural farmers from their land, widespread 
pauperization and misery, and the plundering of the natural world. 
Polanyi predicted that if let unchecked, the “free” market would 
create a “stark utopia” of human wretchedness and vast ecological 
damage. In the postwar years, he assumed that the Keynesian policies 
implemented during and ater the Depression would provide such a 
check on industrial growth by the medium of democratic planning of 
the economy. But since Polanyi focused on the self-adjusting market 
as the “fount and matrix” of civilization rather than capitalist credit 
money, he could not fully foresee the price for maintaining a debt-
based monetary system and the exponential economic growth that it 
requires. Nor could he propose a convincing alternative to the domestic 
and international monetary order. As suggested above, we are already 
bearing witness to a geography of stark utopias that stretch across many 
communities around the world. And the movement toward this stark 
utopia moves in increments so small that we hardly realize what is 
happening. We argue that to reverse and avoid its expansion, we need 
to confront possible alternatives that take money, the environment, and 
the impossibility of exponential growth seriously—the subject of our 
final chapter.
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Money is one of the shatteringly simplifying ideas of all time, and 
like any other new and compelling idea, it creates its own revolution. 
(Bohannan 1959: 503)
There is an episode of the cartoon series South Park—
Margaritaville (2009)1—addressing the financial crisis of 2007/08. 
In it, Kyle Broflovski, the only Jewish character in the series, risks 
death to save the community from economic disaster by transferring 
everyone’s credit card debt to his own so they could resume buying 
stuff. The episode is a brilliant juxtaposition of economics and religion 
and highlights the many religious traditions in which redemption 
is achieved by freedom from all obligations, the freedom, as it were, 
from debt (Burridge 1969: 6–7). It is also a commentary on the 1887 
book of the German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche titled 
On the Genealogy of Morals. Commenting on the fact that the German 
word for “debt” (schuld) is also the word for “guilt” or “sin,” Nietzsche 
speculates that in Christianity, God becomes the ultimate creditor of 
human indebtedness, and, of course, its ultimate forgiver by dying for 
its sins (see Ahn 2010; Graeber 2011: 76ff).
This idea that the debtor–creditor relationship is central to our sense 
of moral obligation, and that ultimate power can be conceptualized as the 
debtor–creditor relationship, puts the lie to the classical economic idea 
that money is neutral and simply a means of exchange, a unit of account 
and store of value. If you have the power to create money through the 
medium of interest-bearing debt, once you lend it into existence, you 
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are replicating what, for Nietzsche, is the primal relationship of power 
and the source of morals and civilization itself.
As we have tried to show, the consequences of that experiment 
include continuing environmental devastation, growing social and 
economic inequality, and the continuing centralization of political 
power. Dozens of books and studies have carefully documented these 
developments (e.g., Reich 2012; Harvey 2014; Klein 2014; Piketty 
2014; Robbins 2014; Di Muzio 2015), and most have concluded with 
recommendations for reform: for Piketty it is a tax on wealth to begin 
some form of redistribution and for Naomi Klein it is a grassroots 
movement; while Ellen Hodgson Brown (2014) advocates the growth of 
public banks, Bernard Laeiter suggests the development of alternative 
currencies, to name only a very few recommendations for reform. The 
dream, writes David Harvey (2010: 247), “would be a grand alliance of 
all the deprived and the dispossessed everywhere. The aim would be 
to control the organization, production and distribution of the surplus 
product for the long-term benefit of all.”
While all are, to some extent, correct in their evaluations of 
the problems, and while all the recommendations would serve, if 
implemented, to reverse some of the negative externalities that result 
from a debt-based economy and the perpetual growth it requires, 
none offers a way to counter the power that capital represents. In this 
final chapter we want to offer, first, twelve solutions, most reflecting 
those proposed by others, that would become a political platform of a 
Party of the 99% (see Di Muzio 2015). We will then suggest the steps 
necessary to implement these proposals and a political strategy based 
on the idea that debt is a technology of power that can be utilized by 
debtors, as well as creditors.
The platform of the Party of the 99%
First, a Party of the 99% should be organized around the reform of 
its country’s monetary system. We have tried to show that the present 
state of affairs began with a single act: the act of bestowing on private 
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individuals the right and the power to issue interest-bearing money. 
Consequently, addressing the results of that act requires taking that 
right away. The current system of creating money through debt only 
benefits the owners of the banks. The rest of us, with insufficient 
incomes for what the economy can produce, get mounting debt 
that pushes up prices (inflation) and an economy that is effectively 
controlled by whether bankers feel confident to lend at profit 
(Rowbotham 1998: 292). The over $27 trillion in total interest on debt 
paid out in the United States from 2006 to 2013 represents the price 
US debtors pay for receiving money as interest-bearing debt, and 
was greater than the total GDP of all but two other countries in the 
world—China and Japan.
The goals of public banks include: (1) investments that create jobs in 
the local community, (2) investments that encourage the production of 
the most durable goods, (3) investments in research and development 
to enhance the quality of life, (4) investments in renewable energy, 
(5) investments in sustainable public infrastructure, and (6) investments 
in local sustainable agriculture.
Public banks are already common throughout the world. Ellen 
Hodgson Brown (2013), in her book The Public Bank Solution: From 
Austerity to Prosperity, points out that publically owned banks account 
for 40 percent of all banks globally, particularly in the BRIC countries: 
45 percent of all banks in Brazil, 60 percent in Russia, 75 percent in 
India, and 69 percent or more in China. As these countries rise in 
economic power, have better public debt to GDP ratios, and funnel 
wealth back to public projects, it may be necessary for wealthy 
countries to encourage the development of public banking or 
nationalize existing banks in order to keep up. These countries have 
even formed a BRICS Development Bank to challenge the IMF and the 
World Bank (Chen 2014).
Second, we must eliminate Third World debt. Developing countries 
receive about $136 billion in aid from donor countries, including debt 
cancellations. But they pay out to rich countries in debt service about 
$600 billion, much of it in the compound interest of loans granted 
to deposed rulers (Hickel 2014). Estimates are that from 2002 to 
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2007 the net flow of money from poor to rich countries was minus 
$2.8 trillion (Abugre 2010).
As we pointed out previously, most of that debt reflects absurd 
conditions, rank incompetence, or a cynical abuse of power by 
lending agencies. Since debt repayment must be taken from national 
budgets for education, health care and poverty alleviation it is also of 
questionable morality. And, as the recent Ebola epidemic illustrated, 
the costs in devastated health systems are no longer confined to 
these countries. To add to this debt burden, developing countries 
lose about $1 trillion a year in capital flight, largely tax avoidance by 
multinational corporations.
Third, education, health care, and childcare should be universal 
and free. This will be easier to accomplish in some countries than in 
others, since many of the most civilized countries already provide 
nonprofit health care and education up to and including postsecondary 
education. This provision will mostly aid developing countries 
whose health and education budgets have been slashed through IMF 
structural adjustment programs. These services should be accessible 
to all and paid, debt-free, from the new public banking system and 
with funds saved through the canceling of odious debt. This will also 
contribute to bringing living standards of developing countries into 
line with that of the wealthy countries.
Fourth, a Party of the 99% should ban all private money from 
politics and those running for public office must be given a reasonable 
set of public funds to run their campaigns. A new political party should 
be eligible for reasonable start-up money as long as it meets certain 
criteria, such as a certain number of supporters. This will help eliminate 
fringe or less serious parties. Campaigns should be short in duration so 
money can be used for other priorities.
Fith, a Party of the 99% should aim to abolish the wasteful and 
innovation-killing patent system. Patents were the original way in 
which a monarch granted a monopoly to private interests—typically 
for an invention. Some believe that patents are the only way to 
encourage innovation: they reason that “inventors” invent only if 
they can profit from their discovery. But this is ridiculous. Neoliberal 
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economists like to argue that contributions from entrepreneurs such 
as Steve Jobs or Bill Gates or literary accomplishments, such as J.K. 
Rowling’s Harry Potter series, would not have been possible without 
existing patent protection (Mankiw 2013). But the idea that Rowling 
would have written the Harry Potter books only if she knew that they 
would make her a billionaire and that Bill Gates expected to earn $80 
billion from his efforts is absurd. The irony of such claims, of course, 
is that it is only by government regulation that such protections are 
forthcoming. And as Dean Baker (2013) points out, government could 
have easily cut the length of such monopolies in half, or return to the 
14-year limit of the past instead of the present ninety-five-year limit 
in the United States.
And government-granted drug monopolies add hundreds of 
millions of dollars to health care costs, particularly in the United States 
and, worse, yet, push such drugs out of the reach of the poor who, given 
the forced reduction of public health budgets in the developing world, 
most need them (e.g., Baker 2005).
Hence the best solution is to abolish patents entirely through strong 
constitutional measures and to find other legislative instruments, less 
open to lobbying and rentseeking, to foster innovation whenever 
there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it (Boldrin and 
Levine 2012).
Sixth, a Party of, by, and for the 99% should make insurance 
public and not for profit. Insurance works on the principle of the law 
of large numbers: the larger the number of people involved in the 
insurance scheme, the less likely it is that everyone will experience 
the same calamity. People who do suffer an injury or accidental 
death are paid out of the contributions provided by those who do not 
experience an accident or injury. There is no reason whatsoever why 
insurance provision should be owned by private individuals making 
money out of the misfortune of others. The absurdity of the present 
insurance system is evidenced by the practice of employers taking 
out life insurance policies on their employees, with the employer-
companies as beneficiaries (Gelles 2014). Because company-owned 
life insurance confers generous tax benefits on employers, hundreds 
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of corporations have taken out such policies on thousands of 
employees, while banks, such as JP Morgan and Chase, count billions 
of dollars on their books as evidence of their ability to withstand 
economic shocks.
Once again, the publicly run banking system can provide for this 
debt-free, with no premiums required. In other words, everyone is 
covered by virtue of being a member of the political community.
Seventh, a Party of the 99% should fund retirement at a 
democratically agreed-upon age. Presently, because of the economic 
insecurity wrought by the 2008 financial crisis and the defunding of 
pension plans by governments and municipalities bankrupted by debt, 
retirement is out of reach for many. Consequently, the elderly are 
forced to continue working longer (see Table 5.1).
While many may be working longer by choice, most continue 
working because savings, pensions, and social security are not enough. 
Moreover, the number of elderly working population is expected to 
increase further in the United States as baby boomers retire. A recent 
survey found that 62 percent of people aged 45–60 plan to delay 
retirement, up from 42 percent in 2010 (Brandon 2013).
In addition, by delaying retirement, jobs become less available for 
young people wishing to enter the workforce. Arguably one of the 
biggest problems in the developing world is the high unemployment 
Table 5.1 Percentage employed of US men and women working full time 
by age group, 1995 and 2005
Men Women
Age 1995 2005 % Change 1995 2005 % Change
55–61 91.8 91.8 0 74.6 78.7 6
62–64 77.9 81.2 4 58.9 65.8 12
65 65.4 73.7 13 45.9 56.8 24
66–69 52.3 65.7 26 34.8 49.5 42
70+ 44.2 51.7 17 29.6 39.2 32
See Gendell (2006).
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rate among the young. Over 70 million young people are out of 
work—12.6 percent—an increase of 3.5 million between 2007 and 
2013 (ILO 2013).
Eighth, a Party of the 99% should provide each adult individual 
with a guaranteed income through the public bank. The income should 
be set at a level that secures a basic standard of living. A guaranteed 
standard of living produces important social goals by taking the 
power of the sack away from employers. First, it establishes a rule of 
greater freedom than is currently enjoyed by the majority of workers. 
The idea is premised on the fact that we are creative, productive 
beings and work is a large part of our subjectivity or identity. Most 
people want to work but they want to work in employments that are 
meaningful to them. With a secure income, we can be sure that those 
who work for added income will be doing so because they want to 
contribute to society in some way. Second, a guaranteed income solves 
the problem of unemployment and does not create any new debt. 
Third, with a guaranteed income, people will likely choose to work 
less, increasing their leisure time and potentially leading to a drop in 
the consumption of goods and services. This is a worthwhile goal not 
only because leisure time is valued by all but also because people will 
probably consume less. Without doubt, some will be up in arms about 
this proposal in such a materialistic economy, where social status is 
connected to possessions and shaped by advertising and marketing. 
But, from a sane point of view, we know from studies that ater a certain 
threshold of wealth, individuals are no happier having more and more 
stuff. It seems that acquiring more and more possessions is not about 
happiness but about power and the demonstration of it. If we displace 
the logic of differential accumulation and stop creating debt money, 
no one will make enough money to acquire an inordinate amount of 
goods in the first place.
Ninth, a Party of the 99% should seek every way possible to 
transition away from fossil fuels and stem the growing threat 
of climate change. There are no quick fixes here, but time is of 
the essence if we want the transition to be relatively painless and 
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peaceful. Three important studies have convincingly demonstrated 
that there is no way to socially reproduce current patterns of high 
energy consumption in rich countries with alternative energy 
(Trainer 2007; Heinberg 2009; Zehner 2012). Of course, a Party of 
the 99% should invest in renewable energy and implement renewable 
energy schemes wherever possible, but the Party should also have a 
program to reduce material consumption and promote low-energy 
leisure activities. As suggested, a guaranteed income should help in 
this pursuit.
Tenth, all parties of the 99% should work together to demilitarize 
the world. The military industry is also capitalized by dominant owners 
and they profit from conflict or the threat of conflict. Most of the bill 
is paid for by taxpayers and future generations, not to mention with 
the lives of soldiers and innocents. This is wasteful expenditure and 
we should not have our scientists working on solutions for how to kill 
people more effectively. In a social order where everyone is guaranteed 
a decent standard of living and there is no chance of gaining excessive 
power over others, there will be no need for a military. Some may recoil 
at this suggestion and believe it unrealistic, but the idea has deep roots 
in the liberal tradition. Concerned with the potential for a military 
dictatorship, people always feared standing armies. It was only with the 
rise of the capitalist mode of power that professional militaries became 
a cornerstone of Western states. As the capitalist mode of power 
withers, so too will the need for wasteful expenditure on an apparatus 
of violence, surveillance, and death.
Eleventh, a Party of the 99% should ensure that the only income 
stream available other than the guaranteed income from the public 
bank comes from a person’s direct labor. What this means is that no one 
will be able to capitalize the labor power of another or take undeserved 
rewards. Individuals will be free to form producing associations, and, 
if they require investment, they can issue a proposal to the public 
bank. Provided that it meets the objectives of the public bank, the 
money can be created for the project. All projects funded by the bank 
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should be transparent: this means that the entire entrepreneurial plan 
is made public. All businesses must be run on a not-for-profit basis 
and the 99% should design a salary schedule for each employment, 
with strict caps at the top. Should some jobs that are necessary for the 
reproduction of society fall into abeyance because no one wants to do 
them, the government can offer special inducements where these jobs 
are necessary to support a decent quality of life for all. It could very 
well be that those working in sanitation and health end up making 
the most money—but, of course, always within democratically decided 
reason.
Finally, promote other alternative financial systems, most notably 
those based on alternative or local currencies, that are designed 
to avoid interest, keep money circulating, and keep it in local 
communities (see, e.g., Kennedy 1995; Hallsmith and Lietaer 2011). 
One of the most successful of the thousands of local currencies 
existent today is Ithaca Hours, the alternative currency created by 
Paul Glover (1995) in Ithaca, New York, in the 1980s (see Papavasiliou 
2008, 2010). Such local currencies are monetary alternatives to 
microcredit, which uses the mechanism of debt to affect social and 
economic change. Instead of microcredit, we need to promote the 
development of alternative currency systems that promote trade and 
exchange, rather than locking local economies into currency systems 
that promote debt and inhibit exchange. By promoting local trade, 
Papavasiliou (2010: 210–211) suggests, we create direct relationships 
between producers and consumers that protect local economies from 
“free trade” commodities and services that don’t reflect the social and 
environmental costs of production and don’t pit the benefit of cheaper 
prices against the long-term costs of deteriorating local economic and 
social conditions.
These twelve points are not a magical panacea for a perfect world 
free of all social ills and of the vast ecological problems we face. Nor, of 
course, are they the only steps necessary. For example, we also need to 
adopt a means of measuring societal well-being that replaces the GDP, 
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such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (Costanza et al. 2009). We also 
need to address problems specific to some countries, such as student 
debt in the United States. But the suggested twelve points are close to 
a minimum of things that need to be done to repair the environment, 
reduce inequality, and inject greater accountability into global political 
systems.
Of course the immediate response to such proposals would be that 
these goals, while perhaps worthwhile, are completely unrealistic. As 
we noted earlier when Thomas Piketty proposed the simple expedient 
of a global wealth tax to stem the growing inequality of income and 
wealth, something as easy to implement theoretically as any land or 
income tax, he noted that even this, seemingly small measure, was 
unrealistic and “utopian.” What hope then for the twelve points above?
We want to suggest that the above measures are at least worth 
debating and that a Party of the 99% has the means to promote change 
provided, first, that we correct the ideological imbalance that exists 
in the creditor–debtor relationship and that we implement a strategy 
based on the existence of debt as a technology of power.
The debtor as cultural hero
For debt to be maintained as a technology of power exercised by the 
1% requires a financial, legal, and ideological structure that vastly 
privileges the creditor over the debtor. As Graeber points out, the 
creditor–debtor relationship is the central hierarchical relationship 
of our society. Debtors are contrasted with “savers,” the thrity ones 
that carefully plan for the future and never “spend beyond their 
means.” We still hear that the financial crisis of 2008 was caused by 
people who bought 4,000-square-foot homes with loans that they 
couldn’t afford or governments spending lavishly. As mentioned 
earlier, the dominant metaphor operative here is one of household 
finance; a family is spending more than it takes in. But that metaphor 
wholly misrepresents and obscures the nature or creation of debt in 
our economy.
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First, it is almost impossible to function without personal debt in 
a global economy where money has been made purposefully scarce 
by the private power of the owners and managers of banks. A person’s 
first loan is likely to be for education, as students need to borrow for 
higher education. While there is some debate regarding the degree of 
dependence of students on loans, presently student debt in the United 
States has surpassed one trillion dollars. Even if someone chooses not 
to attend college and get a job, she or he will likely have to borrow to 
purchase a car. Commercial lenders are so desperate to find profitable 
investments that there is a booming business in the United States in 
lending to the working poor—those with impaired credit—who need 
cars to get to work. Bundled into securities to be sold to investors, they 
grew at a rate of over 300 percent between 2010 and 2014 (Corkery and 
Silver-Greenberg 2015). These subprime auto loans pay up to 23 percent 
interest and are driving workers into bankruptcy (Silver-Greenberg and 
Corkery 2014).
Second, without debt, there would be no money. Money, in 
reality, represents the promise of borrowers to labor to repay it and 
the interest. Furthermore, as we noted, debts are created as assets by 
banks and financial institutions in the same way as factories produce 
automobiles. It is the creditor, ater all, who creates the money and 
benefits from its reproduction.
Third, debt is a part of every economic transaction, and a portion 
of every tax payment goes to service the interest on the public debt, as 
a portion of the price of virtually everything someone buys contains 
interest on someone’s loan. That means that almost everyone is a net 
debtor paying more in interest or dividends than they receive.
Finally, it is one thing for a friend to lend you some of her hard-
earned cash. It is quite another to “borrow” money created out of thin 
air and feel some sort of moral obligation to repay it.
None of this is to imply that people shouldn’t repay their debts. 
The problem is viewing them as moral obligations in a hierarchical 
relationship as opposed to a partnership. David Graeber (2013) 
summarized the mechanism for debt-shaming well: “The last thing the 
1% wants, as the world economy continues to teeter from crisis, is to 
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give up on one of their most powerful moral weapons: the idea that 
decent people always pay their debts.”
To a great extent, the debt–creditor relationship is a perversion of 
the traditional partnership (as it is viewed in Islamic finance). One 
person is giving money to another and saying “make me more.” But we 
do not treat it as a partnership; it is treated as a hierarchical relationship 
that makes the creditor far more powerful than the debtor.
Debt can exist only if the creditor has confidence that the income 
of the debtor will grow sufficiently to pay off the debt with interest as 
our whole economy must rest on the assumption that the economy will 
grow exponentially. Without that assumption, our present economy 
and our financial system makes no sense.
It is important, of course, that the 99% be kept unaware that they 
have considerable power. One way to think about this, we suggest, is 
to understand that the real power lies not with investors but with the 
collective on whom the capitalists depend to generate the return on 
capital. More specifically, the real power lies with the debtor, not the 
creditor. Without the debtor to generate the return on capital, there can 
be no creditor, and as we have shown, in our present system of money 
creation there must be few creditors and many debtors.
Why is it that people have a moral obligation to repay their 
debts, while banks do not have a moral obligation to extend credit, 
even when the money they lend is created by them and when 
the withholding of credit leads to individual suffering, as well as 
financial, social, and political chaos? How can people be said to 
have a moral obligation to repay their debts when corporations, 
multilateral institutions, and national or local governments can 
unilaterally cancel or reorder debt obligations or unilaterally cancel 
negotiated pension rights, or seize the savings of depositors to 
repay foreign creditors, as they have done? How can debtors have 
a moral obligation to repay debts, when at least thirty Republican 
members of the US House of Representatives and thirty-three US 
Republican Senators, attempting to force budget cuts, voted against 
the government repaying its debt obligations?2
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Lending and investing require risk to justify a demand for a return 
on capital. If risk is nullified through the idea that debt entails a 
moral as well as a financial obligation, then there is no justification 
for interest and/or dividends. Yet government policies, particularly 
over the past two decades, have virtually eliminated all risk by having 
taxpayers “bail out” investors and financial institutions. Thus, creditors 
are protected from loss, leaving debtors to assume the burden. There 
is no morality in this.
People must accept debt to function in the current economic world 
because money has been made scarce. In effect, we have far more of 
an obligation to assume debt than we have an obligation to repay it, 
for without the assumption of debt, there would be no money, and 
therefore no economy.
Debt as a technology of power revisited
Besieging politicians with demands and demonstrations, even in 
countries that are nominally democratic, clearly is not as effective in 
determining legislation as the capital drowning them in dollars or their 
currency of choice. And anarchists do have a point when they refuse to 
make such demands because, they say, it legitimizes the state’s power 
(Graeber 2009). In fact, politicians have little power; as we maintain, it 
is capital that has the power that they wield through the technology of 
debt. The job of the capitalist state is to make the world safe for capital, 
using the mantra that what is good for capital is good for the people. 
When Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan claimed that they wanted 
to take government off the backs of the people, they meant off the back 
of capital. By weakening the regulations that had been instituted to 
ward off the stark utopia that Karl Polanyi warned of, dominant owners 
had a field day as the wealth of the 1% soared, while the well-being of 
everyone else declined. Modern corporations are at least honest when 
they admit that their responsibility is not to customers, employees, 
or the community in which they function; their responsibility is to 
shareholders.
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But how do you appeal to capital? The genius of capitalist power 
is its invisibility and anonymity. The insidiousness of this power is 
that it has been normalized and naturalized, and therefore it largely 
goes unquestioned despite the serious consequences it has on people’s 
everyday lives. If, as Jeffrey A. Winters (1996: x) suggested, unelected 
and democratically unaccountable creditors and investors were all 
to wear yellow suits and meet weekly in huge halls to decide where, 
when, and how much of their capital (money) to invest, there would 
be little mystery in their power. But, of course, they don’t. Collectively 
they make private decisions on where, when, and how to distribute 
their investments. Furthermore, investors and creditors are free to do 
whatever they wish with their capital while states are virtually helpless 
to insist that private capital be used for anything other than what 
creditors and investors want to do with it.
The anonymity of creditors and investors and the structural power 
they hold present problems for political leaders: while the actions of 
creditors and investors can greatly influence our lives, it is political 
leaders that we oten hold responsible for the rise and fall of a 
country’s financial fortunes. So how might we think strategically about 
overcoming debt as a technology of power?
There is one way. Representatives of the 99% should communicate 
with capital when they service or pay off a debt. Household 
and individual bill-payers, along with business, corporate, and 
government accountants, constitute the channel of communication 
to capital. Each time a debt is serviced or paid, a portion, as we 
have seen, buttresses the power of capital and serves as a vote for 
the status quo. Each interest-bearing debt payment represents 
acquiescence to a system of money creation and distribution that 
sanctions the funneling of money and power to those that have 
the power to create money out of thin air. In a perfect world, those 
assigned that right would be working in the public interest and 
would be accountable to public needs. Massive demonstrations 
and violent actions may sometimes move capital, but generally 
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the reactions are stopgap measures to defuse the protest. Besides, 
delegitimizing collective action and promoting a value system that 
emphasizes “individuality” and “freedom” defuses the potential for 
protest. Capital fares best when people shop and bowl alone.
The debt action and the implementation 
of debt as a technology of power
To understand how debt as power can be utilized to promote necessary 
change, we need to first recognize that the wealth of the 1% lies largely 
in the pockets of the 99% where it is supposed to work to produce 
interest and dividends. The power that the 99% retains that has the 
potential to promote changes that, in the long run, benefit everyone is the 
right to withhold one’s debt payments. People are told, of course, that 
repayment of debt is a moral obligation; but debt, as outlined above, is 
not freely entered into. As our economy is presently constituted, without 
debt, there would be no money. Furthermore, if governments and 
municipalities can, without penalty, default on pension obligations 
or renounce obligations to protect children, the poor, and the elderly, 
surely we retain the right in the name of a just society to withhold our 
debt payments. By doing so, we deprive creditors, a small minority 
of our society, a source of their power and impel them to consider 
the harm that present arrangements inflict on all. A debt strike must 
not constitute a refusal to pay debts; rather it must be considered an 
act of civil disobedience to withhold debt payments, particularly 
on securitized debt (e.g., mortgages, automobiles, credit cards, and 
student loans), until action is taken to reform the presently unethical 
and unsustainable financial system. This would not be a strike 
against finance, per se; some means of managing the flow of capital is 
necessary. However, a financial system founded on debt and interest 
and the resulting need for perpetual growth is highly unethical and 
clearly unsustainable.
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The idea of a debt action is hardly new; but generally the goals 
have been modest. There have been instances of national movements, 
such as El Barzón, an organization of debtors in Mexico, to resist 
foreclosures and repossessions due to debt default (Caffentzis 2013). 
There is also a movement in France to eliminate the public debt 
claiming that most sovereign debt is illegitimate (Keucheyan 2014). 
The organization, Strike Debt!, has set forth arguments for debt 
refusal (Ross 2014) focused on predatory behavior by the finance 
industry, and the organization Rolling Jubille was formed to raise 
funds for, as they put it, “A bailout of the people by the people.”3 
We propose that a debt action have as a broader purpose the 
recognition that debt as a technology of power and the financial 
structure that it creates is at the root of most of our environmental, 
social, and political problems, and that unless it is addressed, there 
is little hope of solving them.
If a debt action, that is, the symbolic withholding of a month’s 
payments by those concerned about climate change, corporate power, 
the decline of democracy, inequality, racial injustice, and colonial 
exploitation, is not doable, when it is legal and nonviolent and 
involves only a small financial penalty, then it is difficult to imagine 
any other way that the 99% could convey their concerns and instigate 
a movement for reform. Given the fact that it costs millions of dollars 
to successfully run for public office, asking politicians to take the 
message to finance is like asking someone to threaten the interests of 
their fabulously rich uncle who pays their allowance. Even people of 
faith must remember that the sole violent action of Jesus of Nazareth 
was his overturning of the money changer’s tables in the Temple 
(Matthew 21:12), while the Koran has an outright ban on lending at 
interest—albeit circumvented in various ways.
Some might object to a debt action claiming that our economy 
and monetary system are built on trust. But we maintain that 
whatever trust existed has been severely violated by those in power, 
a violation evidenced by how they have used the power of debt to 
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amass great wealth at the expense of everyone else. The purpose of 
the debt action is to hold capital accountable and to restore balance 
to our economic relationships.
The Party of the 99% with chapters around the globe can first 
announce its presence by declaring a debt holiday, a month set aside, 
say October 2016, during which securitized debts (home mortgages, 
student loans, car loans, and credit card loans) should go unpaid. This 
would involve a penalty, and additional profits for creditors, but it 
would be a small price to pay to publicize the presence and platform 
of the 99%.
The next step would be a debt action or strike. The mechanics of 
a debt strike are relatively easy to institute. As with the debt holiday, 
a date in the future should be set, at which point, unless there is 
significant movement to promote public banking and eliminate Third 
World debt, the first two items of our platform, citizens will withhold 
their debt payments until such actions are taken. Further debt actions 
can be instituted as needed. The effort must be global in scope. The 
requirement for perpetual growth is not one faced only by the wealthy 
countries of the world; it is faced by every country that has adopted a 
Western-style, debt-based financial system.
There will, naturally, be some concern on the part of debtors that 
their withholding of payments will result in some negative consequence 
(e.g., foreclosure or repossession of assets, fines, lowered credit rating). 
However, it will require only a small minority (e.g., some 20 percent) to 
begin the strike to make it impossible for creditors (or the government 
or financial institutions) to effectively impose penalties. Remember, 
creditors need debtors; they are the source of their power and 
discrediting a significant portion of them is not in their interest. Money, 
as Barbara Garson (2001) noted, has to keep working, and it is debtors 
who do most of the work. Thus, a debt strike will not be, as mentioned 
above, a refusal to pay debts, but rather an act of civil disobedience to 
effect change that will not only benefit all but save our economy from 
recurrent crises and collapse.
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A debtor’s strike is not without its dangers. If the strike succeeds and 
there is a refusal to implement reform, the economy will collapse in a 
credit crisis. A debt strike, in that regard, is no different than a labor 
strike; as in a labor strike, all parties have a vested interest in changing 
a situation that threatens the firm with collapse. However, without 
some form of financial reform, we remain a world in which ephemeral 
financial gain for the few can occur only by abandoning visions of free 
societies thriving in hospitable environments.
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Table A.1 Interest paid and its percent of GDP in the United States from 
1960 to 2012
Yearly 
range
Interest payments 
1960–2012 
(in billions)
GDP (in billions) Interest paid as a 
percent of GDP
1960 46.1 526.4 8.76
1961 48.6 544.8 8.92
1962 54.4 585.7 9.29
1963 60.4 617.8 9.78
1964 67.2 663.6 10.13
1965 74.4 719.1 10.35
1966 84.1 787.7 10.68
1967 92.2 832.4 11.08
1968 104.6 909.8 11.50
1969 123.4 984.4 12.54
1970 141.8 1,075.9 13.18
1971 151 1,167.8 12.93
1972 168.6 1,282.4 13.15
1973 213.5 1,428.5 14.95
1974 267 1,548.8 17.24
1975 276.1 1,688.9 16.35
1976 298.2 1,877.6 15.88
1977 338.1 2,086 16.21
1978 412.8 2,356.6 17.52
1979 537.9 2,632.1 20.44
1980 687.8 2,862.5 24.03
1981 915.4 3,210.9 28.51
1982 1,028.1 3,345 30.74
1983 1,015.3 3,638.1 27.91
(continued)
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Yearly 
range
Interest payments 
1960–2012 
(in billions)
GDP (in billions) Interest paid as a 
percent of GDP
1984 1,181.9 4,040.7 29.25
1985 1,263.8 4,346.7 29.07
1986 1,313.1 4,590.1 28.61
1987 1,374.8 4,870.2 28.23
1988 1,546.9 5,252.6 29.45
1989 1,824.8 5,657.7 32.25
1990 1,858.1 5,979.6 31.07
1991 1,755.5 6,174 28.43
1992 1,578.6 6,539.3 24.14
1993 1,514.6 6,878.7 22.02
1994 1,628.2 7,308.7 22.28
1995 1,891.6 7,664 24.68
1996 1,976.9 8,100.2 24.41
1997 2,147.5 8,608.5 24.95
1998 2,328.4 9,089.1 25.62
1999 2,430.6 9,665.7 25.15
2000 2,856.5 10,289.7 27.76
2001 2,732.1 10,625.3 25.71
2002 2,284.4 10,980.2 20.80
2003 2,142 11,512.2 18.61
2004 2,324.6 12,277 18.93
2005 3,002.9 13,095.4 22.93
2006 3,852.8 13,857.9 27.80
2007 4,493.4 14,480.3 31.03
2008 3,848.3 14,720.3 26.14
2009 2,860 14,417.9 19.84
2010 2,609.4 14,958.3 17.44
2011 2,601.8 15,533.8 16.75
2012 2,498.6 16,244.6 15.38
2013 2,482.9 16,768.1 14.80
Source: EconoStats (http://www.econstats.com/nipa/nipa_3__1____y.htm).
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Table B.1 Total interest paid compared to total federal taxes paid, 1960–2012 
(in billions)
Year Interest 
payments
(in billions)
GDP Interest 
paid as a 
percent of 
GDP
(in billions)
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue as 
a percent 
of GDP
Difference 
between 
interest 
paid and 
taxes paid
1960 46.1 526.4 8.76 92.5 17.57 46.4
1961 48.6 544.8 8.92 94.4 17.33 45.8
1962 54.4 585.7 9.29 99.7 17.02 45.3
1963 60.4 617.8 9.78 106.6 17.25 46.2
1964 67.2 663.6 10.13 112.6 16.97 45.4
1965 74.4 719.1 10.35 116.8 16.24 42.4
1966 84.1 787.7 10.68 130.8 16.61 46.7
1967 92.2 832.4 11.08 148.8 17.88 56.6
1968 104.6 909.8 11.50 153.0 16.82 48.4
1969 123.4 984.4 12.54 186.9 18.99 63.5
1970 141.8 1,075.9 13.18 192.8 17.92 51.0
1971 151 1,167.8 12.93 187.1 16.02 36.1
1972 168.6 1,282.4 13.15 207.3 16.17 38.7
1973 213.5 1,428.5 14.95 230.8 16.16 17.3
1974 267 1,548.8 17.24 263.2 16.99 –3.8
1975 276.1 1,688.9 16.35 279.1 16.53 3.0
1976 298.2 1,877.6 15.88 298.1 15.88 –0.1
1977 338.1 2,086 16.21 355.6 17.05 17.5
1978 412.8 2,356.6 17.52 399.6 16.96 –13.2
1979 537.9 2,632.1 20.44 463.3 17.60 –74.6
1980 687.8 2,862.5 24.03 517.1 18.06 –170.7
(continued)
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Year Interest 
payments
(in billions)
GDP Interest 
paid as a 
percent of 
GDP
(in billions)
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue as 
a percent 
of GDP
Difference 
between 
interest 
paid and 
taxes paid
1981 915.4 3,210.9 28.51 599.3 18.66 –316.1
1982 1,028.1 3,345 30.74 617.8 18.47 –410.3
1983 1,015.3 3,638.1 27.91 600.6 16.51 –414.7
1984 1,181.9 4,040.7 29.25 666.4 16.49 –515.5
1985 1,263.8 4,346.7 29.07 734.0 16.89 –529.8
1986 1,313.1 4,590.1 28.61 769.2 16.76 –543.9
1987 1,374.8 4,870.2 28.23 854.3 17.54 –520.5
1988 1,546.9 5,252.6 29.45 909.2 17.31 –637.7
1989 1,824.8 5,657.7 32.25 991.1 17.52 –833.7
1990 1,858.1 5,979.6 31.07 1,032.0 17.26 –826.1
1991 1,755.5 6,174 28.43 1,055.0 17.09 –700.5
1992 1,578.6 6,539.3 24.14 1,091.2 16.69 –487.4
1993 1,514.6 6,878.7 22.02 1,154.3 16.78 –360.3
1994 1,628.2 7,308.7 22.28 1,258.6 17.22 –369.6
1995 1,891.6 7,664 24.68 1,351.8 17.64 –539.8
1996 1,976.9 8,100.2 24.41 1,453.1 17.94 –523.8
1997 2,147.5 8,608.5 24.95 1,579.2 18.34 –568.3
1998 2,328.4 9,089.1 25.62 1,721.7 18.94 –606.7
1999 2,430.6 9,665.7 25.15 1,827.5 18.91 –603.1
2000 2,856.5 10,289.7 27.76 2,025.2 19.68 –831.3
2001 2,732.1 10,625.3 25.71 1,991.1 18.74 –741.0
2002 2,284.4 10,980.2 20.80 1,853.1 16.88 –431.3
2003 2,142 11,512.2 18.61 1,782.3 15.48 –359.7
2004 2,324.6 12,277 18.93 1,880.1 15.31 –444.5
2005 3,002.9 13,095.4 22.93 2,153.6 16.45 –849.3
2006 3,852.8 13,857.9 27.80 2,406.9 17.37 –1,445.9
2007 4,493.4 14,480.3 31.03 2,568.0 17.73 –1,925.4
(continued)
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Year Interest 
payments
(in billions)
GDP Interest 
paid as a 
percent of 
GDP
(in billions)
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue
Total US 
federal 
tax 
revenue as 
a percent 
of GDP
Difference 
between 
interest 
paid and 
taxes paid
2008 3,848.3 14,720.3 26.14 2,524.0 17.15 –1,324.3
2009 2,860 14,417.9 19.84 2,105.0 14.60 –755.0
2010 2,609.4 14,958.3 17.44 2,162.7 14.46 –446.7
2011 2,601.8 15,533.8 16.75 2,303.5 14.83 –298.3
2012 2,498.6 16,244.6 15.38 2,450.2 15.08 –48.4
Total $72,929.1 25.15 $53,108.1 17.06
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.3; http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ (last accessed April 21, 2014).
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Despair,” New York Times, June 6.
2 P. Sainath (2011) “In 16 Years, Farm Suicides Cross a Quarter Million,” 
The Hindu, October 29.
3 The latter argues that India handled the 1991 crisis successfully, though 
the author may want to watch the documentary Nero’s Guests to uncover 
how unequal the “success” was shared.
4 The transaction is also facilitated by the Buddhist religious-cultural belief 
that women are inferior to men and that all children owe a debt to their 
parents just for being born—a debt that children are obliged to repay. 
See Bales (2012).
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was introduced by Katerina Kitidi and Aris Hatzistefanou in their 
documentary of the same name on the economic crisis in Greece.
8 If we consider equities or shares in publically listed corporations as a 
form of debt, that figure would be closer to $242 trillion. Data on equity 
market capitalization are taken from the World Federation of Exchanges 
as of May 2014. http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/time-series/
market-capitalization (June 9, 2014).
9 Market capitalization is the value of one share multiplied by the existing 
number of shares. For example, the US bank Wells Fargo & Co. has 
5.27 billion shares outstanding and the value of one share at the time of 
this writing was $51.98, giving the firm a market capitalization of about 
$274 billion. Firms with the largest market capitalization typically have 
considerable power to shape and reshape social reproduction. There is 
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also a forward-looking element to market capitalization since investors 
capitalize expected future earnings.
10 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/t/survey/so/2014/res052314a.htm 
(June 8, 2014).
11 Credit Suisse’s Research Institute estimates that the richest 10 percent 
of adults own 86 percent of all global wealth, with the top 1 percent 
accounting for 46 percent of it, while Oxfam (2015) estimates it is now 
over 50 percent. The bottom 3.2 billion of the population collectively own 
a mere 3 percent of global wealth (Credit Suisse 2013: 22). This suggests 
that the vast majority of humanity do not own any significant amount of 
shares in banking corporations. What privilege workers likely own in the 
pension or mutual fund schemes is likely negligible in comparison to the 
dominant owners.
12 Hembruff (2013) also argues that Graeber lacks a convincing theory of 
the state.
13 Hudson ([1972] 2003), Ingham (1999; 2004), Brown (2007), Mellor 
(2010), and Rowbotham (1998) certainly recognize the power 
dimensions of money creation but none of them theorize this as 
the capitalized power of a private minority of owners. A focus on 
capitalization as the key ritual of capitalist (money) accumulation is 
associated with the seminal work of Nitzan and Bichler (2009). Nitzan 
and Bichler do not, however, theorize the creation of money as debt. For 
a summary and engagement with their work, see Di Muzio 2014.
14 Polanyi writes, “The transformation to this system [capitalist market 
economy] from the earlier economy is so complete that it resembles 
more the metamorphosis of the caterpillar than any alteration that 
can be expressed in terms of continuous growth and development” 
([1944] 1957: 42).
15 Douthwaite (in Heinberg 2010: 279–283) and Hall and Klitgaard (2012) 
notice the interconnections between energy and money, but their 
treatments are considerably undertheorized and require more empirical 
detail. See also, Di Muzio (2015).
16 In fairness to Graeber and his anarchist approach, any solution 
that involves action through government is no solution at all, since 
it legitimizes the very institutions seen as the root of the problem 
(see Graeber 2009: 203).
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17 The term “nonindustrious poor” seems to be an oxymoron. Most poor 
people, by definition, have to be very industrious, though in ways 
Graeber may have overlooked.
Chapter 2
1 By rational pursuits, we do not imply “rational choice” theories that 
theorize humans as little more than calculative rational actors seeking 
to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in some abstract space absent 
history, politics, and power. Rather, we follow Foucault and argue that 
there are different rationalities for social action. But what unites them 
is the notion that they all involve reasons or justifications for action. 
This makes rationalities difficult to assess in any objective way. As such, 
we are let to critique and scrutinize the effects of these rationalities by 
subjecting them to ethical and democratic tests of legitimacy. Put simply, 
we judge their effects on social relations and the natural world.
2 Discounting is the process of evaluating the present value of a future 
payment or stream of income. For example, I may have a government 
bond that says that in 15 years’ time, the government owes me $100. If I 
need the money now or don’t trust that the government will repay, I may 
sell it on to another party. The other party will likely discount the bond, 
that is, pay less money for the $100 dollar bond. She may only pay me 
$90, but since I need the money now or do not trust that the government 
will repay me in the future, I would be happy to at least get $90 rather 
than some lesser amount in the future. Discounting is central to finance 
and is premised on the time value theory of money. This theory basically 
states that a dollar is worth more today than it is in the future because 
the dollar you have today can immediately start earning interest. The rate 
of interest is absolutely integral to capitalism, and without it, capitalists 
would have a difficult time assessing a normal rate of return and the 
future.
3 The oldest recognized exchange was established by the Dutch East India 
Company in 1602.
4 Data are from the World Federation of Exchanges: http://www.world 
-exchanges.org/about-wfe (accessed July 11, 2014).
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cms/s/0/988051be-fdee-11e3-bd0e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3O3vRstzX.
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(accessed February 21, 2014). Figure as of June 5, 2014.
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Money,” Financial Times, April 24 and David Graeber (2014) “The Truth 
Is Out: Money Is Just an IOU and the Banks Are Rolling in It,” The 
Guardian, March 18. 97% Owned is also a telling documentary.
8 The general idea here is that the interest banks pay to depositors is always 
less than the interest they charge borrowers.
9 See also, David Pilling (2014) “Has GDP Outgrown Its Use,” Financial 
Times, July 4.
10 The Economist, “Household Debt,” June 1, 2013: http://www.economist 
.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21578669-household-debt 
(accessed July 14, 2014).
11 As Brown has noted, “the elimination of a public debt by a central 
government is a rare happening in fiscal history” (1989: 4).
12 But to recall, since banks do not create interest when they contract loans, 
there is always more debt in the system than the ability to repay.
13 Piketty (2014: 206) notes, “In both France and Britain, from the 
eighteenth century to the twenty-first, the pure return on capital has 
oscillated around a central value of 4–5 percent a year, generally in an 
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Chapter 3
1 Killingray notes that taxation and the emergence and growth of colonial 
policing were intimately intertwined.
2 The Maria Theresa thaler or dollar is a silver coin that originated in Austria 
but was minted elsewhere and widely circulated as a global trade currency. 
It was popular in many parts of Africa and the Middle East (Tschoegl 2001). 
Manillas are silver bracelets, while cowries are a particular type of sea shell.
3 As Kindleberger reminds us, borrowing for such endeavors was not 
exclusive to India. Royalty in Europe borrowed for “coronations, 
marriages and funerals” as well as war (1996: 29).
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4 For example, in early modern England, estate records demonstrate that 
thousands of peasants were forced to flee the land due to unrepayable 
debts (Clay 1984: 90–95, 150). As the aristocracy and gentry borrowed 
to reinforce their social status, they too fell into unrepayable debt 
and were forced to sell some or all of their holdings in land. Debt and 
dispossession should be understood as concurrent practices, intimately 
intertwined and historically repeated in different times and places, with 
only the agents changing slightly.
5 http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock (accessed January 
18, 2014).
6 These events are a forerunner to the twentieth-century debates on 
declining terms of trade and the possibility of independent development, 
particularly in Latin America.
7 Political theory of the time has it that republics were best safeguarded 
when they were smaller territorial units.
8 A further reason for the proclamation was that it was easier to govern the 
population on the seaboard rather than inland.
9 Before the arrival of synthetic fertilizers, the growth of tobacco was 
extremely ruinous to the soil. Fertility was lost in four to five years, 
making it a necessity for owners of tobacco plantations like Jefferson and 
Washington to constantly seek out new lands westward.
10 The letters of Thomas Jefferson, 1743–1826. Letter to William Henry 
Harrison, 1803: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/
letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl151.php (accessed August 24, 2014).
11 Much of the same still occurs today in the capitalist heartland. For 
instance, vulture capitalist firms are capitalized on the basis of collecting 
the bad debts of individuals (or nations) by purchasing them at a 
discount from their original issuers, as we will examine further in 
Chapter 4 (see Roberts in Gill and Cutler 2014: 243).
12 By 1787, Massachusetts applied heavy direct taxes in order to help 
repay its war debt and the share it owed to creditors of the Continental 
Congress. Debt had to be repaid in scare specie or its equivalent, 
forcing many into debtor’s prison or to foreclose on their homesteads 
(Hammond 2003: 187–188).
13 New and cutting-edge empirical research by Sandy Hager on the United 
States has demonstrated that “the public debt has come to serve as an 
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institution of power working in the interests of the top one percent” 
(2013: 177). Over the past three decades, Hager’s study found that the 
public debt effectively works as a mechanisms for redistributing income 
from the working class to wealthy bondholders of the 1 percent.
14 In one of his many letters on the subject to the New York Tribune, Marx 
spelled out what this transfer meant for Indian debt:
 The proprietors of East India stocks were to be paid out of the 
revenues enjoyed by the East India Company in its governmental 
capacity, and, by act of Parliament, the Indian stock, amounting to 
£6,000,000 sterling, bearing ten percent interest, was converted into 
a capital not to be liquidated except at the rate of £200 for every £100 
of stock. In other words, the original East India stock of £6,000,000 
sterling was converted into a capital of £12,000,000 sterling, bearing 
five percent interest, and chargeable upon the revenue derived from 
the taxes of the Indian people. The debt of the East India Company 
was thus, by a Parliamentary sleight of hand, changed into a debt of 
the Indian people.
 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1858/02/09.htm (accessed 
August 27, 2014).
15 Jon Henly (2010) “Haiti’s Decent into Hell,” Guardian UK, January 14. 
Henly cites the British historian Alex Von Tunzelmann, whose quote is 
cited here.
16 The experience of China is far from the exception and rather 
demonstrates the rule.
17 UN Decolonization, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov 
.shtml (accessed August 28, 2014).
18 The first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, wrote that “The Third 
World is now blamed for its own poverty. Each country is analyzed 
separately by international institutions and by political commentators. 
Its problems are then explained in terms of its socialism, its corruption, 
the laziness of its people and such-like alleged national attributes. The 
fact that virtually all Third World countries and certainly all the poorest of 
them, are in the same plight is largely ignored” (1985: 489, our emphasis).
19 Morgan, Oliver and Faisal Islam (2001) “Saudi Dove in the Oil Slick,” The 
Observer, January 14: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2001/jan/14/
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globalrecession.oilandpetrol (accessed August 31, 2014). During an 
interview with Morgan and Islam, the former Saudi oil minister Sheikh 
Ahmed Zaki Yamani stated, “I am 100 percent sure that the Americans 
were behind the increase in the price of oil. The oil companies were in 
in real trouble at that time, they had borrowed a lot of money and they 
needed a high oil price to save them.” Presumably the oil companies 
needed a high price for oil to repay their own debts to their bankers 
and finance the North Sea development as well as Prudhoe Bay—both 
relatively inhospitable territories posing significant challenges for oil 
production.
20 On the connection between oil prices and recessions, see Hamilton (2009).
21 During the massive spike in oil prices from 2001 to 2008 when WTI 
went as high as $134, the consumer price index remained relatively stable 
in both the United Kingdom and the United States—the opposite of 
what one might expect. The likely reason for this is the fact that wages 
have been making up less and less of a percentage share of GDP since 
de-unionization and the offshoring of production to parts of Central and 
South America as well as Asia.
22 The claim that interest rates were also increased to attract foreign capital 
is also untenable. The United States had already made a deal with the 
Saudis for recycling petrodollars and other OPEC nations followed suit; 
oil and other commodities were priced in US dollars and the United 
States had the largest securities market on the planet. Moreover, investors 
and countries held dollars in the United States when it went off gold 
and they would have held them in the 1980s without diabolical interest 
rates. The evidence is the fact that at record low interest rates today, 
the United States has still not experienced a great “dump” of dollars as 
some financial analysts have anticipated. See, “Still No Alternative to the 
Dollar” Financial Times, video: http://video.t.com/3592100572001/Still 
-no-alternative-to-dollar/Markets (accessed August 31, 2014). Hudson 
calls this phenomenon “monetary imperialism” ([1972] 2003: 385).
23 To recall, this debt was never to be paid off in full.
24 This is not to suggest that ideas are unimportant—far from—but to 
see to it that ideas operate at a broad societal level; that is, to effect the 
processes of social reproduction writ large, they must be connected up 
with interests backed by institutional rule and technologies of power—
with debt as the leading weapon.
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Chapter 4
1 In 1991 the GNP was turned into the GDP. With GNP, the earnings 
of a multinational firm were attributed to the country in which the 
firm was owned and where most of the profits would eventually 
return. With the change to GDP, however, the profits are attributed 
to the country where the factories or mines or other corporate assets 
are located, even though most of the profits won’t stay there. Thus, 
GDP excludes overseas profits earned by US firms but includes profits 
earned in the United States by foreign firms. Although it makes little 
difference in the index of economic growth in wealthy countries, 
this accounting shit does raise the measure of economic growth in 
the poor or peripheral countries. However, it tends to hide the fact 
that profits extracted from the periphery are generally going to core 
countries.
2 But since, in a market society, all desired goods and services are available 
largely only to people with money, his argument is akin to saying that 
people who have access to food are healthier. And, of course, it enables 
them to repay their debts.
3 The computation is far from neutral and a very poor indicator of social 
well-being.
4 More recently, neoliberals are claiming that continued growth will help 
solve our environmental problems. They cite research that suggests 
that while countries in the initial stages of economic growth may 
experience increased environmental degradation, once per capita 
income reaches a certain point, the environment improves (see, e.g., 
Chua 1999). They argue that since economic prosperity provides 
people with more money, citizens can use that money to create a 
demand for a cleaner environment. The problem with that claim is 
that, even if the research is useful—and there is much evidence that it 
is not (see, e.g., Harbaugh et al. 2002)—estimates of per capita income 
at which the environment improves range from $4,000 to $13,000. 
Since more than half the world’s population earns $5,000 per capita 
or far less, billions must try to survive in increasingly devastated 
environments.
5 In the United Nations World Economic Survey for 1959 the authors note 
that
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 Increasingly it has become apparent that the realization of the goal of 
economic growth may render manageable the dominant economic 
problems, both national and international, which in a stationary 
economy might produce only conflict and frustration. (quoted in 
Arndt 1978: 62)
 We should note that the neoliberal cannot ask why the economy must 
grow. This is the reason, perhaps, that major textbooks on economic 
growth (see, e.g., Jones 2002; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Aghion and 
Durlauf 2005) nowhere address that question.
6 We realize we have not dealt with the issue of population growth, which 
many assume to be the cause of the need for perpetual growth, and 
which many developmental theorists assume to be the cause of poverty, 
going back to Malthus (see Victor 2008). But economies must continue 
to grow at the minimum rate of 3–5 percent to avoid economic collapse, 
regardless of their rate of population growth, while the economies of 
most developed countries grew at high rates even when their populations 
were dramatically expanding (see Robbins 2014, Chapter 5 for a fuller 
discussion of this issue).
7 Milton Friedman put the minimum required growth at 5 percent per 
year.
8 It is difficult to conceptualize what these huge numbers mean and what 
the difference is between millions, billions, and trillions. To illustrate, 
if in the year 0, you had a trillion dollars (1012 or 10E12 in US scientific 
notation or a thousand billion) to spend, and you spent it at the rate 
of one million dollars (106 or 10E6) a day, you would spend a billion 
(1012 or 10E12) within 3 years, but, by 2010, you would have had 700 
years remaining to spend the trillion. A quadrillion is 1015th (or 10E15). 
At one million dollars a day, it would take 2.74 million years to spend a 
quadrillion. Even if you spent at the rate of a million dollars a second, 
it would still take almost 32 years to spend a quadrillion. Even if the US 
economy grew only at the average rate since 1870 (1.8 percent), by 2100, 
it would be 75 trillion (5 times what it is today) and the global economy 
would be 300 trillion, or more than 4 times what it is today.
9 We might even suggest that the guiding formula of our political economy 
is that of the exponential curve, Xt = X0(1+r)t.
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10 Julien-François Gerber (2014: 13ff) notes how in early capitalism debt 
served to accelerate production to match the time period in which the 
debt had to be repaid. Gerber recognizes this as a general feature of 
capitalism.
11 To put that into some perspective, banks recommend that the price of a 
home should not exceed 250 percent of the borrower’s yearly salary. Of 
course, that loan mortgage would not be granted unless the borrower 
had a credit rating that ensured that there was an excellent chance of loan 
repayment. And, of course, the bank has a lien on the home until the 
debt is repaid.
12 Prior to 1989, coffee prices were regulated by the International Coffee 
Organization. Initiated with support of coffee-producing and coffee-
importing countries, the organization formed to address the fall in coffee 
prices in the 1950s. The system worked to afford producers at least a 
small profit until 1989, when quota limits were eliminated due largely 
to the efforts of the United States, following which coffee prices plunged 
(Tucker 2011: 121).
13 As of April 2015, the issue of debt payment for Argentina is 
unresolved, as negotiations continue between Argentina and its 
creditors, while the right of a US judge to issue a judgment itself is 
being questioned.
14 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed 
September 27, 2014).
15 The buying of bad debt is a practice that traces back prior to the Civil 
War in the United States. Abraham Lincoln, in fact, signed a promissory 
note when he bought a general store from a man named Reuben Radford 
but was unable to pay. Radford sold the note to the debt buyer, Peter 
Van Bergen. Van Bergen then successfully sued Lincoln, whose tools 
and saddle were seized and auctioned off to pay the debt (Halpern 2014: 
21–22).
16 The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States is the only central bank 
among developed countries with the dual role of controlling inflation 
and maintaining employment. In practice, it generally places a far greater 
priority on the former and virtually none on the latter. By keeping 
inflation low, it ensures that banks and other lenders are repaid in money 
whose value is close to that lent. But it also limits the growth of the 
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economy by limiting economic activity, and, hence, limiting job creation. 
It has long been a policy of central banks to increase interest costs when 
unemployment rates fall below 5 percent.
17 The 1% claim that they are the job creators, although as Robert Reich 
(2012) points out, it is consumers and laborers that make the greater 
contribution. Clearly, only if people have resources to spend and 
employment to earn money can the economy grow and debt be repaid.
18 But we note that the government does not have to wait around for 
tax receipts to spend money into the economy. In the United States, 
the federal government simply spends from its account at the Federal 
Reserve. For a detailed account of this process, see Bell (2000).
19 To the share of GDP taken by finance in interest, fees, expenses, and 
so on, we can also add the additional amount taken from taxpayers to 
bailout banks and other financial institutions ater the latest crash, which, 
so far, amounts to some $53 billion (ProPublica 2015), to which we could 
also add the sum of $900 billion in tax dollars, or $32 billion a year, as the 
ultimate cost to taxpayers of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s 
(Zepezauer and Naiman 1996).
20 In the United States, there is, in fact, substantial research that shows that 
in policy-making and legislation, the 1% have far more influence than 
the 99%. The most recent study by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page 
(2014) demonstrates that ordinary US citizens have virtually no influence 
over policy (see also Kaiser 2010; Kuhner 2014).
21 http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml 
(accessed February 1, 2015).
Chapter 5
1 “Margaritaville” won the 2009 Emmy Award for Outstanding Animated 
Program for Programming Less Than One Hour and was released along 
with the rest of the thirteenth season on March 16, 2010.
2 See http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call 
_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=00011; http://projects 
.washingtonpost.com/congress/113/house/1/votes/30/.
3 See rollingjubilee.org.
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